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PART I 
A discussion of the history and background of the potato 
industry; consumption and produ.ction trends are analysed vd th empha-
sis on the economic and social factors which motivate the consump-
tion of potatoes. 
CHJl..P'.r:SR I 
To Ul1derstand the economic problems concerning the pot t , 
·t is essential to kno its history and i s economic and social 
significance. Y: e stern civilization became acquainted with the potato 
at the same time it became acquainted with Inca treasures of s i l ver 
and in the same place~ Yet, the Incan silver, which has long ceased 
to have any direct influence on society, is ·widely written about and 
st died; while the potato, a far gr eater Incan treasure for the 17el-
fare of mankind, is studied little. 1 Fortunately, t he potato arri vsd 
i n Western Europe at a time of unpr ecedented literary and intellect-J.aJ. 
activity. This fact has been of great adv~~tage to the histor · an, f r 
unlike other important but earlier innovations i n dietetic such as 
V>Jheat and rice, its characteristics and impact were not enti r y 
unc ronicle .. 
The vmrd pot ato in its several shapes and forms can ctae~ly 
e traced to the sweet potato, ipomoea batatas , which Columb·J.S fo d 
· n wide use in the West Indies. He brought this root ho to Sp i n 
along vd.th I1 dian corn to ive to Ferdinand and Isabella. The sweet 
potato achieved little economic significance i n Europe because it ne 
a ·:arm climate not availabl e north of Spain. However, the word b tata 
1 · Redcliffe N. Sal -:nan, '::?he Hi s tory and Social Influence of Potatoe s, 
Cambridge Pr ess, Cambrid e;e, En -lan '., 1949, Preface, p .. l3 
corrupted to botata; and finally, the word potato was applied to 
solanum tuberosum which we call the Irish potato. This root, native 
to the Andes Mountains1 where it grows in both wild and domesticated 
form, concerns us most in: this paper. 2 We will not discuss the others 
although some of the same problems affect the m~et potato and yam in 
the United States as affect the common potato. 
The date at which the common potato was intr oduced to Europe 
is not as definite as that of the s•~et potato.3 However, we are safe 
in assurirl.ng that it was introduced in Spain, the only nation which 
enjoyed any contact with t.he western parts of South America between 
the years of 1550 and 1570. We make this assumption since the Conquis-
tadore Valdivia had described the potato in 1551 as a crop grovr.n by the 
South American natives, but he did not mention using i t as a ration even 
~hen his troops were starving. However, the potato was being eaten in 
the wards of the Sangre Hospital i n Seville in 1573 and it is likely 
that the stocks were raised locally) In short, the Spaniards learned 
to eat it and imported it to Spain between the two dates .. 
The seventeerrth century gave rise to modern inductive science 
and the early development of the capitalist system, two forms of human 
endeavor which between them have shaped the world of today. Both r..a.ve 
1. w. stuart, The Potato, Lippincott & Co., Philadelphia, Pa., 1928, 
p. 369 
2. Redcliffe N. Salaman, Op. cit., p. 130, History 
There are many types of potato like foods eaten and cultivated in 
the world. Among the most important are solanum tuberosum - the 
common potato, ipomoea batatus - the sweet potato, helianthus 
tuberosus - the Jerusalem artichoke, dioscorea opposita - the yam, 
colocasia esculenta - the taro, manihot utiliss1ma - the maniac, 
cassava or yucca. 
3.. Redcliffe N. Salaman, Op. cit .. , p. 68 
2 
played a part in determining the policy of the ruling caste toward 
the masses and this, in turn, has affected the adoption of the potato, 
the only new foodstuff of first-class importance other than corn ~hich 
has permeated Western Europe in the last 300 years. 
In the middle of the seventeenth century, far-sighted states-
men and men of science began to recognize that the adoption of the 
potato might have wide social and economic repercussions.1 The Conquis-
tadores almost immediately realized its economic importance and imme-
diately used it as a food for slaves, but later adopted it for their 
own use. In Ireland, a rather similar situation existed. Most v~iters 
held a generally favorable opinion of the potato in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries, but its adoption met opposition from the ignorant, 
superstitious poorer classes. 2 In 1761 Turgot combatted the supersti-
tion that potatoes caused leprosy by serving them at his own t able . In 
Prussia, the belief that potatoes gave rise to Scrofula and Rickets 
forced Frederick the Great to use a SWabian gendarme to persuade the 
people of Kolberg to eat the potatoes which were sent to relieve a famine 
in 1774. Count Rumford as late as 1795 tells how he used subterfuge to 
get the inmates of his beloved House of Industry to taste soup made from 
potatoes. In Ireland, only the pressure of extreme want was strong 
enough to break down all opposition.? 
1. Redcliffe N~ Salam~~, Op. cit., p. 101 
2. Ibid., P• 115 
3 
The inherent qualities of the potato, however, over came all 
obstacles.l It is easy to grow, easy to digest, and yields a higher 
f ood value per acre than any cereal. (An acre of potatoes will f eed 
four times as many persons as an acre of \vheat~) 2 Although it is 
about 77% water and only 23% solids, the solids are about 85% starch 
and 5% sugar, so that it is a high energy food~3 For 200 years, it 
has been recognized that potatoes have done much to abolish scurvy~4 
We know today that one pound of potatoes contains the daily needs of 
Vitamin c, ascorbic acid, as well as important · nerals like iron and 
calcium, and Vitamins B and B2.3 On the other hand, the daily use of 
t he potato does not lead to the deterioration of the teeth, so commonly 
seen amongst people who depend on cereals, like oatmeal, for their 
supplies of carbohydrates~ 
Potatoes often lVOn converts to their culture as a r esult of 
food shortages due to wars and their aft,ermath. Above all, the potato 
has one quality which enables people suffering the deprivations of 
guerilla warfare to survive. Most crops like 'Wheat, corn or rice are 
easy for pillaging troops to destroy or carry off once they are harvested 
and stored, as they must be when ripe. But potatoes may be left in the 
ground unt il well i nto the winter and dug up only when needed. No 
1. Redcliffe N .. Salaman, Op. cit. , p .. 121 - "On the other hand, we see 
that the Jerusalem Art1choke introduced at the same time was pleasant 
to taste, easier to grow, nearly as heavy in yield, far less subject 
to disease in the fiel d or in storage, did not become important be-
cause even before science was available, public opinion declared it 
hard to digest. Today we know that Inulin, its Carbohydrate, has 
25% less energy value than potato starch .. 11 
2. Ibi d., P• 576 
3. Un1ted States Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Yearbook 1953 
See also Chart 3 of this paper. 
4. w. G. Burton, The Potato, Chapman & Hall, London, 1948, P• 188 
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pillaging troup of soldiers can take the time to dig them, even if 
they c~~ find them once their tops have been removede In addition, 
later needs may be met by the farmer with potatoes harvested and 
stored in underground 11 clamps11 covered with straw. These are also 
easily hidden from view.1 And when all else has been destroyed, a 
person may survive very well on potatoes alone. This was one of the 
key reasons that Ireland2 became so dependent on the potato during 
its centuries of struggle with England; especially after the Crorrw1ellian 
era in which five-sixths of the population died of famine or the ~vord 
in four years,3 and the English wiped out all enterprise or hope of 
betterment .. 
But potatoes have other advantages. They may be grown in 
small plots or large plantations.. They w.i..ll grow in a drained bog or 
on a mountain. They need relatively little care and so they are one of 
the cheapest sources of food energy available t o man.. I t was these 
qualities which led the Highland Scots to raise potatoes when the Act 
of 1747 abolished the feudal ties of the clansman and chiefs. Displaced 
from their glens by the sudden advent of sheep raising am ng their land-
lords (the chiefs who now had to support themselves) 4 th usands of ten-
ant farmers moved to the costal lands of the vvestern highlands~ There, 
l. Redcliffe N. Salaman, Op. cit., p. 572 
2. Ibid., p. 227 
3.. Later this sole dependence on the potato was to cause great hardship 
when the blights struck the potato crop down. 
4. Redcliffe N. Salaman, Op. cit .. , P• 359 - After the defeat of the 
Pretender at Culloden, the Act of 1747 abolished the judicial rights 
of the chiefs, the carrying of arms, and the weaving of tartans .. 
Most import.ant, it converted the chiefs into sole proprietors of cl an 
lands to the exclusion of the right of any clansman to right s of 
t enure .. 
5 
high winds, excessive moisture, boulders, and Lack of capital, together 
wvith high rent s on very small land holdings made grain cultivation un-
feasible . Only cultivation of the potato saved them from catastrophe. 
The lowly root made possible a peaceful if abrupt transition from 13th 
century feudalism to 18th century capitalism. 
In Engl anct, 1 as in other countries, the potato made no progress 
as a food for the people until industrialists discovered that the easi est 
way to produce cheap goods, i n order to capture the foreign market, was 
to pay the lowest living wage, and that workers could only be induced to 
give of their labor under such a system if the cost of living was kept 
at the lowest possible level. The potato fulfilled their needs of cheap 
subsistence for labor perfectly and they urged it on the working classes. 
In Ireland the potato had no sponsor. The common people had 
used it to fill the food gap caused by the wars. In Scotland, sponsored 
by the clergy, it replaced the oatmeal and milk no longer available under 
the new economic and social structure in the Highlands. But in both 
Ireland and the Highlands, the populace suffered from the l ower levels 
of agriculture and from the lower standards of living induced by potato 
culture in a backward, repressive environment~ As soon as the potato 
became established in those areas , the standard of living was fixed at 
a level commensurate with the energy its production demanded~ The more 
the potato fulfilled the requirements of the household, the more that 
ambition was destroyed~ In these areas, furthermore, it failed to bring 
1. Ibid., PP• 342, 371 
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about much improvement in the current methods of husbandry e Poverty 
bred potatoes; but potatoes helped breed poverty and large familie s, 
for by reducing the cost of living to the l oYv-est level, it caused the 
value of labor t o fall t o a corresponding level, whi le it permitted 
population to increase f r eely.1 But this depressing effect was true 
only in a backvvard economic envir6nment2 associated vdth a repressive 
social system. 
In cont r ast , i n the Scotti sh l owlands vmere there was free 
and dynamic movement in both economic and social activity, the potato 
played a valuable part in improving agricultural methods. It made the 
transition of the peasant class from independent farmers to laborers 
easier, and served as a dietetic asset for all classes of people, not 
as the sole food of the masses. 
In England, as we have said, the potato made little progress 
until the necessity of a cheap subsistence for industrial labor brought 
it into ·wide use,. It was first a luxury food for the rich but Adam 
Smith3 and others foresaw that it. might to a large extent replace wheat 
as the mainstay of the poor, since they calculated it yielded the equiva-
lent of three times as much food per acre. However, there were several 
obstacles to overcome before potatoes becarne a main source of sustenance. 
The mass of people in England in the eighteenth century were relatively 
better off than ever before; white bread made of Ynleat was coming into 
1. Redcliffe N~ Salaman, Op. cit., p. 343 - Malthus warned that tr~s 
sort of situation might lead to population outrunning subsistence. 
2. Ibid., p. 408 
3.. Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of 
Nations, 1805 Edition, p. 106 
7 
ydde use by even the poorest families. Now white bread was a token 
of class distinction,1 (i. e., a mark of privilege) and its adoption 
by the poor was evidence of an equalitarian spirit beginning to be 
felt in England. This use of white bread as a badge of prestige to 
sustain their pride was very important 'When, late in the century, food 
supplies began t o diminish and meat almost vanished from the poor 
man's diet., It was important because the wor king man insisted on 
white bread i nstead of a cheaper barley l oaf. Many preferred to use 
the Irishman's potato or even t he cooli es ' rice, (both of whom were 
regarded socially as little better t han slaves ), than to ret urn to 
the use of coarse br ead. At any r ate, because the potato was thought 
f it only for the Irish and the swine, 1 its adoption was slow in 18th 
century England. 
But in 1795, two things happened which did much to change 
the situati on. Fi rst , wheat was scarce and priced so hi gh as to make 
i t i mpossibLe f or the laborer to balance his budget even by cutting 
down ot her expenditures. Secondly, there was the adoption of t he 
Speenhamland policy o~ paying labor standard wages based on t he price 
of wheat plus relief ("Which was mostly in the form of potato rations) • 
As a result of the wheat shortage, the poor were urged by all the 
nobility from the King down to eat potatoes instead of white bread. 
This, they refused to do and so Lived for the most part on an unbalanced 
1. W. G. Burton, Op. cit . , P• 23 
8 
diet of white bread and cheese completely laCking in vitamins. In 
so doing, they successfully began a struggle to assert their rights 
in the determination of their wages and their standard of living, 
matters which had previously been decided by their employers alone. 
Hunger forced them to eat the potato in the following century, but 
it was to be incidental to their standard of living and not to be-
come a determinant in lowering their standards of living as it had 
with the Ir'ish.1 
As the wages rose and food cheapened with the advent of 
the twentieth century, the potato habit was weakened until it no 
longer served as a buffer between the impact of high food prices 
and low wages. In fact, a 1936 study showed that the poor in 
England economized mainly by eliminating sugar, milk, eggs, green 
vegetables and fruit from their diet and so were short of both vita-
mins and calories which their fathers had derived from potatoes. 
Salaman concluded from a study of the history of the potato 
in Europe that when the potato is raised as a conmercial crop and used 
as an accessory foodstuff, it has great economic and social value, 2 
but when it is . used by merely one class, the laboring poor, it may, 
like rice, accompany the lowest standard of living; or it may be an 
instrument of class exploitation even when neither group is conscious 
of the part it is playing. 
L. Ibid., P• 25 
2. Redcllffe N .. Salaman, Op. cit., p. 503 
9 
More important to the purposes of this paper, is that we 
understand why the potato is declining in use. It has been suggested 
that Yre do not need as much high energy food as our hard-working 
ancestors, but this does not seem to be the whole answer, because the 
use of sugar has been increasing. However, when we see that our ances-
tors ate potatoes as substitutes for foods they could not afford or to 
prevent starvation altogether, we can perhaps conclude that the potato 
is merely declining to its rightful place in a society with plenty of 
food of all sorts8 (See Appendix I.) 
As the United States has been adequately supplied >vith food 
since Colonial Days, the potato's history has differed here fr om its 
history in Europe~ The potato was brought to the United States by a 
group of Irish Presbyterians in 1719 •vhen they settled at Londonderry, 
New Hampshire. 1 But there was some prejudice against the spuds since 
they w€re felt to shorten men's lives and make them unhealthy. The 
result was that there were only a few varieties known in 1771, and the 
rich had to lead the poor into eating it as a wholesome dietary addi-
tion .. 2 
A century later a different situation prevailed as the potato 
was in wide usage abroad and crop failures in 1845 had led to famine in 
I reland. This had a beneficial result in the United States in that Rev. 
Chauncey Goodrich began to experiment in breeding new and better 
1. Stuart, Op. cit., p. 351 
2. In this period, George ashington experimented with scientific 
methods of raising potatoes according to a New York Times· art,icle 
of February 20, 1955. 
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Acres 
Harvested 
--
420 
410 
400 
380 
360 
340 
320 
300 
280 
260 
240 
220 
200 
180 
160 
140 
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80 
60 
varieties~ 1 He was thorough and hard working as well as a prolific 
writer so that others were inspired to follow in his footsteps, and 
from their work we obtained better varieties.1 
During the early history of the United states, commercial 
potato production was centered in the New Englam and Middle Atlantic 
States, partly because there were marl<:ets close by and partly because 
of favorable cool climate. As the west was developed, the commercial 
production of potatoes developed with it where cool, humid conditions 
prevailed. Where favorable soil and temperature were available but 
precipitation was inadequate as in Idaho and Colorado, irrigation 
eventually ~ame to make these areas important producers. The so-called 
"late blight" was a serious handicap to the expansion of the imustry 
prior to ltl70. 2 Utilizing varieties imported from Europe or South 
America, the Rev. Goodrich and others produced satisfactory species 
for our climate and soil. 
With these new varieties, a control for the blight, labor-
saving devices, and new lands coming into production; output soared 
from about 66 million bushels in 1849 to 395 million bushels in 1909. 
The largest acreage was planted in 1917 with _over four million3 acres 
devoted to potatoes as compared to less than two million in 1950. 
Greatest production came in 1945 when about 500 million bushels were 
l. Ibid., p. 3tl9 - Goodrich obtained new stocks direct from South 
America but did not do any artificial crossing; all his seedlings 
were produced from naturally fertilized seed. 
2. E. V. Hardenburg, Pota·t.o Production, Comstock Publishing Co. 
Ithaca, New York, 1949, p. 6 
3. Ibid., P• 8 
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CHART II 
POTATO YIELD PER ACRE 
UNITED STATES AVERAGE 1930-1951 
(BUSHELS) 
Highest yield between 1900 and 1980 was 
123.7 bushels in 192L~ 
Yield in 1900 was 86. 6 bushels per acre . 
t1 11 1910 11 93 . 3 11 n 11 
II II 1920 II 111.8 II II II 
Note that Aroostook yield of 480 bushels 
per acre could not be plotted here 
separately. 
Source: United States Department of Agriculture 
Bureau of Agricultural Economics 
Statistical Bulletin No. 122, 1krch, 1953 
·-' 
produced on less than three and half million acres. Yield per acre 
has increased from about 70 bushels per acre in 1890 to about 250 
1 
bushels per acre in the United States today. 
In addition to the increased yield per acre and the s maller 
t otal acreage, other major changes have taken place since 1942 which 
have been contributing factors to the two changes just mentioned. 
The average acreage of potatoes per farm has increased while the 
number of farms growing potatoes has decreased tremendously. Coupled 
with this there has been a shift of production from farms which used 
the pot ato as a side line to farms which specialize in the production 
of potatoes; and a shift in the geographical areas of plantings. 2 
~e can attribute these changes to several causes. Labor 
costs have increased, a factor vmich induces farmers to adopt machinery 
in place of labor or to drop potatoes. New, heavy and expensive machin-
ery has been developed for potatoes, such as, multiple row plant ers, 
sprayers, diggers and combines. Such machines are not adapted t o small 
acreages or even small fields, but they do lower costs and increase out-
put per man hour enabling the user to survive profitably. Bett er t r ans-
portation makes it more feasible than ever to grow cr ops fQF~her f rom 
the market in areas wher e the best potato soils are located so f arm3rs 
abandon t he poorer soils or convert them to more profitable crops. 3 
There has been an accentuation of these changes through the effects of 
1. Commodity Yearbook, 1953, Commod "ty Research Bureau, New York, 
Section on Potatoes 
2. Hardenburg, Op. cit., p. 9 
3. Ibid. 
12 
1 the price support program for potatoes according to some experts. 
In addition, price supports on other crops have enabled farmers 
producing potatoes only as a side line to their main crop, (as a 
hedge against price declines); to stop this inefficient productive 
process. A very important aspect of this shift is reflected in the 
fact that it took place in spite of the restrictive influence of 
acreage allotments Which, of course, are designed to prevent shifts 
and expansion by producers.2 
1. Gray, Sorenson and Cochrane, "Price Supports and the Potato Industry", 
Station Bulletin 424, Minnesota Agricultural Experiment station, June, 
1954, p. 18 
2. Ibid., p. 22 
13 
PART II 
The problems of production and marketing in the potato 
industry are discussed. Emphasis is on areas which affect the 
marketability of the crop since the surplus of potatoes and result-
ing low prices are the most important single problem which the 
industry faces. Other problems are recognized, however, and an 
attempt is made to give each its due place. 
14 
CHAPTER II 
THE PROBLEM OF POTATOES 
The problem was expressed succinctly by Earl Banner in the 
Boston Globe on January 31, J.9.54, when he said in his lead paragraph, 
11 spuds that cost $2.00 a barrel to raise currently co:rmnand only about 
$1.00 a barrel. 11 It seems, therefore, to be a severe problem for the 
producer, but it is not quite so simple as Mr. Banner makes it sound. 
There are two major aspects of the potato problem. On one 
side we have a situation of increasing productivity1 due to technolog-
ical advances in farming. On the other side, we have the picture of 
decreasing consumption due to competitive foods and materials a s well 
as to changing consumer needs. Both of these forces join together to 
cause the price problem eA~ressed so well by Mr. Banner. There are 
in addition, other less important, but no less difficult, problems 
arising out of cyclical variation and government activities. 
PROBLEMS OF PRODUCTION 
To take these up in detail, let us discuss the production 
problem first. 
Before 1921, the average yield of potatoes harvested was 
below 100 bushels per acre. In the two decades from 1900·-1921, only . 
in seven years was the yield above 100 bushels. Since 1921, the yield 
1. Gray, Sorenson and Cochrane, Station Bulletin 424, Op. cit., p. 20 
1.5 
has never been below 100 bushel s per acre and has been st eadil y improv-
ing$ Since the end of the second world war, the yield has averaged 
well above 200 bushels per acre due to the impact of increased f erti -
l i zer application and even more to the use of new insecticides like 
D.D.T. Nor is this the ultimate s ince the Aroostook potato grower s , 
who lead the rest of the nation in this field, have increased their 
yiel d to over 400 bushels per acre with the 480 bushels average yield 
of 1950 as a record~ 1 
Indeed one reliable observer2 reports a 1954 yield of 740 
bushels per acre on an overhead irrigated farm owned by the Colby 
Brot hers in Litchfield, New Hampshire ~ This is unusual except as an 
indicat i on of the direction in which production is moving. 
The average yield, however, measures both the advance s of 
specialist planters like t he Colby Brothers; and the withdrawals from 
t he industry of the non-specialist farmers >~o~e low product ivity per 
acre tended to keep the averages do-rm for many years. This shift of 
pr oduction from low yielding to high yielding farms was extremely slow 
unt il 1942, probably because of unfavorable market conditions which 
exist ed for 30 years.3 The Minnesota study credits the shift t o 
stability of price rather than to high prices and this would seem to 
be borne out by the fact that the greatest shifts took place under 
war-time price controls ru1d price stabilization. 
1. Earl Banner, Boston Sunday Globe, January 31, 1954 
2. George Moore, Public Re~ations Director , First National Stores, 
Speech on "Retail Cooperation with Agriculture" before the 
.American Marl(eting Association, Boston Chapter, January, 1955. 
3. Gray, Sorenson and Cochrane, Station Bull etin 424, Op. cit. , p. 20 
16 
The two factors together, the shifts in production from 
general farms to specialist potato growers and the increased use 
of scientific farm methods have had important consequences~ Acreage 
has declined in almost every year of the program; while production, 
which averaged 357 million bushels annually from 1936 to 1942, in-
creased to an average of 430 million bushels annually over the years 
1943 through 1950~ See Charts 1 and 2. 
What then are the production problems of potatoes? There 
is a problem of national overproduction or underconsumption depending 
on the point of view~ But there are still other difficulties as to 
who should produce potatoes, what kind of potatoes to produce and 
where production should take place~ 
Who Should Produce Potatoes? 
Let us take these production problems i ndividually. With 
a given price structure for all commodities, who should produce pota-
toes? Ideally for the economic system, it would be those farmers 
whose resources, skills and locati on are such as to enable them to 
maximize their profits producing potatoes. They are not necessarily 
the lowest cost producers using accounting cost measuring techniques, 
but they are the lowest cost producers using economic cost measuring 
techniques~ In other words, some farmers closer to the market might 
have lower dollar costs, but they might also have greater alternative 
returns from some other crop, such as, wheat. If wheat farmers were 
17 
to shif t to potatoes, we might have lower cost potatoes, but our wheat 
would probably increase in cost by more than the amount we might save 
in potat oes because our resources would not be employed in the Dl()St 
efficient manner.1 
How does this apply to the United States producers of pota-
toes? First, in regard to resources of land, labor and capital. Since 
labor costs are high relative to machine costs, the farmer with large 
enough acreage to use machinery more efficiently than hand labor would 
tend to have the lowest costs and obtain the maximum profits as a pro-
ducer. Since potatoes are less demanding in soil and climactic condi-
t ions than most other crops, the farmer whose land has its greatest 
dollar return producing potatoes would tend to also obtain his great-
est profit producing potatoes rather than other crops. This might not 
be true with crops of lower dollar costs of production if the dollar 
savings in producing the other crop exceeded the added returns from 
potatoes. Since proper mechanization not only cuts costs of production 
but increases quality, the farmer with adequate capital will t end to 
make maximum profits while the farmer without sufficient capital would 
tend to make minimum profits, if aey. 
1. For discussions of production costs, the equilibrium of the farm and 
laws of comparative advantage, see P. Samuelson, Economics, McGraw-
Hill Publishing Co., New York, N. Y., 1948, Chapters 21, 22, 23a 
For discussion on nature of costs and the production function, see 
G., Stigler, The Theory of Price, MacMillan Publishing Co. , New York, 
19$2, Chapter 6. 
18 
Many agricultural experts tell us that soil erosion has 
been and would likely continue to be a serious problem for America 
as a whole.1 
"Crops and cropping practices that bring about a 
diminution of soil productivity are of two classes: 
(a) those that do not disturb the structure of the 
soil sufficiently to bring about erosion, which 
means that the soil may subsequently be restored 
simply b,r adding certain soil nutriments and, accord-
ingly, the depletion and rebuilding are reversible 
processes - one representing disinvestment and the 
other investment in the productive property of the 
soil; and (b) those that alter the structure of the 
soil to the point where wind and water erosion take 
place, in addition to the depletion of soil fertility. 
11Soil erosion is not an easily reversible process, as 
is the depletion of soil fertility, because to restore 
soil that has been eroded usually entails a very high 
cost - a cost much larger than either the addit1onal 
income that was actually obtained from the production 
of the crops that contributed to the erosion, or the 
additional output that may be obtained after the land 
has been restored. In other words, there is an impor-
tant gap separating the added income that is obtained 
by the disinvestment through erosion and the much 
larger cost involved in restoring the soil once erosion 
has taken place. Much of the cost of soil erosion 
escapes the private ledger of individual farmers, to 
be borne subsequently b,y society. This means that the 
price of the farm product does not include all its costs. 
Since this is true, should the United States discourage 
the export of these crops? Presumably we sell them, at 
a net loss."2 
Schultz concludes that soil losses from erosion are too serious 
a cost not to be brought into account and that we must overhaul our agri-
cultural institutions to reduce the divergency between the social and 
1. Theodore Schultz, Agriculture in an Unstable Econosv:, McGraw-Hill 
Publishing Co., New York, N. Y., 1945, P• 154 
2. There ie a close parallel in the case of Great Britain or any 
industrial country. Should such a country take steps to restrict 
the export of industrial goods because manufacturers' prices do 
not include the social cost of the smoke that their plants belch 
forth? 
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private cost of producing t he crops which cause erosion. He also 
points out that there is another social cost in the shipment of 
farm crops, for it is a transfer of soil nutriments as well as a 
shipment of product. 'I'hus feed shipped to the milk sheds builds up 
these areas at the expense of the farming areas that produce the 
feed because the manure which is used to build up the dairy farm's 
soil fertility represents productivity removed from the feed grow-
ing areas. 
Thus we can say that there are many farms which should be 
planted permanently to grass or forest to prevent erosion and m~ 
farmers who should change their methods of farming in order to pre-
vent the waste of our resources. But we will need better cost 
analysis to determine which farmers should plant and which should 
not; ·these analysis would have to include long-run social costs as 
well as short-run private costs. 
Since potatoes are widely grown, the redistribution of 
production of row crops like corn, cotton and tobacco, which lead to 
erosion, would also help determine who should grow potatoes and where 
to grow potatoes . 
This whole issue of poorly allocated resources, of course, 
is tied closely to the dust bowl problems of the mid-west, the irriga-
tion ana water use conflicts of the far west and the soil depletion of 
the south, but it is a problem which all the people of the nation, 
directly or indirectly, face for a long time to come. 
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There are, however, more immedi ate problems of serious nat ure 
connected with poorly allocated human resources. Schult,z has expressed 
1 
t his very well when he says: 
11 It is important to bear in mind that as long as millions 
of people are 'crowded' into agriculture, as is the case 
in the South because of the stagnation of industry, it is 
necessar.y to find the best alternative employment for such 
labor resources. Under the present distribution of labor, 
the value productivity of many workers engaged in farming 
has been maximized by producing cotton, wheat, and other 
crops for export.. For example, if we were to deny export 
outlets to cotton or restrict its sale because of soil 
erosion costs, we would reduce even further the value of 
cotton, and, accordingly, the value of the labor of two 
to three million people now dependent upon and situated 
in the cotton econo~. 
"The real shrink in exports should come not from restric-
tions of this kind but from the transfer. of labor resources 
out of agriculture into indUstry. Such a transfer would 
occasion a recombination of resources in agriculture in 
favor of the human agent, and it would, therefore, improve 
the value productivity, and thus the real earnings, of 
those persons who remain in farming. 
"When our farm exports are reduced through this ·transfer of 
labor, we may be assured of · a result in a larger total out-
put on the part of the nation. Until this happens, however , 
it is necessar.y for those who are in agriculture to produce 
those crops in which their advantage is greatest. With 
. about half the farm people of the United States situated i n 
the cotton states, we will produce a lot of cotton, even 
though it is exploitative both of the soil and of the people 
growing the crop. The exploitation of the soil arises from 
the divergence between the social and private cost entailed 
by erosion, but it is intensified by the very serious lack 
of balance in the distribution of workers between industry 
and agriculture." 
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We can conclude, therefore, that certain of our so-called farmers 
need to move into other occupations. This is not exclusive~ a problem in 
agricultural economics but a problem in education and sociology as well. 
1. Schultz, Agriculture in an Unstable Econonv, Op. cit., PP• 156-157 
Where Should Potatoes be Grown? 
Secondly, where should potatoes be grown? The costs of 
shipping potatoes are relatively high compared to selling prices in 
the market. Therefore, the farmer who is nearest to market in terms 
of shipping costs would tend to maximize his net share of the market 
price, and, therefore, would increase his profits relative to co~ 
petitors with greater shipping costs but otherwise eq~al costs of 
production. Gray, Sorenson and Cocbrane1 say that where th~re is 
no regional specialization as such, potato production will follow 
the same pattern of concentration as population. They do emphasize, 
however, that there is a trend toward regional concentration and that 
this is causing a movement of production away from centers of popula-
tion. They feel t hat transportation is an important factor in loca-
tion for it has delayed the trend toward specialization for years, 
but that the economic advantages of large scale scientific farming 
are stronger2 and transportation's importance diminishes as we improve 
our transport facilities. Other factors in location include soil 
fertility, loose soil texture, flat terrain, crop rotation favorable 
to potatoes, and a lack of alternative crop uses. The very adaptable 
nature of potatoes and the efforts of the crop scientists has tended 
to reduce the importance of land fertility and climate, however, since 
they enable us to grow potatoes almost anywhere. 
1. Gray, Sorenson and Cochrane, 11The Impact of Goverrunent Programs on 
the Potato Industry", North Central Regional Publication, No. 42, 
University of Minnesota Agricultural Experiment Station, Technical 
Bulletin 211, 1954, P• 25 
2. ~' P• 31 
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How Should Potatoes be Grown? 
It is difficult to attribute any long-run economic conse-
I quences to the superior skills now evinced by segments of the trade. 
State, Federal and private educational efforts should cause the wide-
spread usa of scientific farming methods in all parts of the United 
States in the next few decades. For this reason, wa shall mention 
' 
' I 
the fact that all farmers do not have knowledge of or practice scien-
1 
I 
i 
tific farming today. Those who utilize the best methods of agricul-
' i 
ture tend to have greater profits than those with equal land and 
capital who do not. 
There is some evidence of a need for green crop rotation 
to replace the organic content formerly supplied by manure.1 This 
prevents the soil from packing down and maintains yield when mineral 
fertilizers are used primarily. Two or three year rotations with 
clover, field peas, or vetch are followed on some specialist farms. 
That is, of course, tied in with acreage restrictions, since a farmer 
I 
w~o cannot grow potatoes on all his land, may as well rotate them with 
soil conditioners like clover. 
Such a practice would give these farmers the possibility of 
benefits of diversification and a steadier income by combining dair,y 
or poultry production with potatoes. Cattle feeding can also provide 
a 'use for surplus or cull potatoes. We will examine this more closely 
I 
later. 
John D. Black, Rural Econo1 of New England, Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, Mass., 19$0, P• 39 
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In many types of farm production, the optimum fertilizer 
application and resultant production per acre have been considered 
a problem. Let us examine the practices of potato producers. The 
usual fertilizer application in Aroostook in 1928 was 18o0 pounds 
o1low grade 5-8-7 formula. Some farmers, however, were using 
dbuble strength fornnllas to save on shipping costs and the practice 
hL grown since then~ 1 In a long haul, the freight on the inert 
r t ck used to dilute single strength fertilizer can be considerable, 
bl t . more care is needed in applying the stronger double-strength 
mp:ture. This is especially true since farmers have increased their 
t~tal fertilizer applications to offset higher labor and machine 
I 
c~sts and acreage restrictions. But what has happened in Aroostook 
I has happened elsewhere also, or is happening at the present time so 
t "'.l at ,~ there seem to be few real problems in regard to production per 
aJre through the use of fertilizer. Recent news stories tell of the 
dl velopment of liquid fertilizers which may revolutionize present 
p1actices. How these will affect the potato industl7 iB not known to 
the author at this time. 
The same sort of thing can be said about the uses of and 
c1sts of insecticide, or capital, or farm machinery. In view of the 
mqny efforts to improve their use and to make their usage nationwide, 
i J is difficult to see how they ~an remain problems of importance to 
pj tato growersa 
1 Ibid., P• 438 
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To summarize the production pr oblems, other than the question 
of what to produce . In the long run farmers may have equal skill and 
I 
I c~pital in Vermont, Idaho or California. Fertilizer costs m~ become 
equal in all three places due to competition of fertilizer manufacturers, 
I 
and labor costs may be equalized by migration or lmv; but the problems 
! . 
of distance from market, climate, plant disease and land fertility will 
I . 
cbntinue to affect the production of potatoes. None of these difficulties 
l 
I 
shows signs of complete and absolute 
mky be diminished and their relative 
I 
solution at the present time. The.r 
proportion or weight may vary, but 
they will in the long run determine the production patterns 
t~ in regard to who will produce, where the,y will produce, 
I 
oroduce and to . a great degree what they will produce. 4 1 
I 
What Kind of Potatoes Should be Grown? 
in the indus-
how they will 
The problem of the kind of potatoes to grow has been left until 
I lFst because it belongs next to the marketing problems. Whether potatoes 
are to be sold to farmers as seed, consl.imers as food, or industry as raw 
I 
mkterials, they must be adapt ed to their market needs rather than to the 
I 
p~oducers' needs. 
I 
Let us first consider what qualities a farmer needs for seed. 
The most important need is freedom from disease because diseased plants 
I 
will not oruy grow imperfectly themselves, they may permanently infect 
I 
~ field for future crop uses. All potatoes are potentially seed pota-
toes' but it is not good practice. to use ordinary potatoes for seed 
25 
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~bst farmers plant certified seed potatoes which are tested 
nd inspected both while growing and after harvest to assure the pur-
haser that they are relatively free of disease. Not only do f anners 
onsider the reputation of the grower but also the reputation of the 
tate seed certification agency so that three-fourths of the total 
1 
seed crop of 43 million bushels is concentrated in four 
tates. 
The farmer's second consideration in buying seed is the yield 
f er acre. For the time and investment he puts into a crop, the farmer 
rants as many bushels of potatoes as he can get. Some varieties yield 
ra~ more bushels per acre than others, but yield may be at the expense 
f quality since the average size potato m~ be too large, the variety 
ay have too many eyes for consumers, or are damaged too easily in 
andling. 
However, the individual farmer m~ not be penalized as much 
or a lack of quality as he is by other factors, such as price over 
hich he has no control, as a stuqy of price fluctuations clearly shows. 
Chart 3.) This does not mean that price does not have connection 
ith quality. Waugh is quoted2 as saying that, 
"In 1928-30, 40% of the differences in price between 
cars was due to differences in the proportion of under-
sized potatoes, 13% due to differences in color, and 5% 
to proportion of misshapen potatoes. The reduction in 
price for each l per cent above 5 of bruised or under-
size potatoes was between 2 and 3 cents per hundred-
weight at the price of $2.40 per hundredweight prevail-
ing in that year. Field run potatoes with 40 per cent 
or more of under sized potatoes sold at half price .. " 
1. United States Department of Agriculture, "Highlights of Potato Market-
ing", Agricultural Information Bulletin 114 , Washington, D. c., 1953, 
p .. 13 
2. Bl ack, Rural Econoll\Y of New England, Op. cit., P• 443 
However, even the extreme 40 per cent of undersize means only 
a "half-price" penalty, whereas the price varied from year to year by 
o~r 50% in maQ1 years when price controls were not in e~fect.1 This 
Jbans that if a farmer obtained 100% marketable potatoes as a yield 
from a given quantity and variety for two years consecutively, he might 
r~ceive only SO% as much for one year as for the other, a painfully 
or~vious lesson~ On the other hand, each farmer actually has some culls 
· every variety every year so that a slight change in percentage of 
potatoes is not too impressive (gains are always slight and 
ot always dependable)8 With the possibility that increased yield can 
ften offset price fluctuation small wonder that farmers worry more 
1~out the quanti~ of production and total yield of a variety than about 
]
he quality. 
But in order to get either high yield or quality of yield, the 
ariety must be adapted to the climate and soil conditions of the area, ~or some types are excellent in one locality and poor in another. As a 
1esult, the best variety for his needs should give the farmer both a 
~ood yield and a high per cent of marketable potatoes. 
27 
Another way of looking at quality is from the point of view that 
orne types command a higher market priee than others. However, while every 
I armer wants a variety of seed potatoes that gives him the maximum dollar 
neturns per unit of investment of land, labor and capital, many farmers 
1. 
• 
Gr~, Sorenson and Cochrane, Technical BUlletin 211, Op• cit., p. 139 
University of Minnesota, Agricultural Experiment Station, Miscellaneous 
Report 19, Minnesota, 1954 
ranslate this into heavy yield per acre onl~ ignoring the specialty 
arket advantage. Others, often more prosperous, have thought of 
dollar profits per acre to be made b.r early harvests or premium quality. 
his is true of specialist producers in Kern County, California, and 
daho, who are distant from their market and cannot ship low value crops 
~t a profit. Even in a specialized production area closer to market ike Aroostook County, the length of haul does not warrant shipping No. potatoes except in unusual years.1 But Black says that even the Maine 
~cialists were losing ground, because thew do not grade uniformly and 
maintain quality of product. Local growers, that is farmers who are 
d1ose to market, are even more indifferent to quality and grading stand-
I! ds than are the specialists more distant from market.
2 They could 
~ obably sell more potatoes at a higher price with a quality pack but 
~h as their dist ant competitors have large freight bills, local 
mrowers get a better than average return, so are satisfied3 with what 
t bey do cget. There has been one attempt to raise a baking type potato 
Jn Maine, however, in order to obtain a premium such as Idaho potatoes 
cbnsistently command in eastern markets. But while the State Extension 
Sr rvice in Maine and elsewhere have long been able to show the penalties 
paid for shipping undesirable products to market, no one has the courage 
t r end the practice and some farmers continue to grow and sell varieties 
w!th inferior demand qualities.4 
I 
12 ~ John Black, Rural Econoll\Y of New England, Op. cit., p. W.U ~ Ibid., P• 443 Jl John Carew, 37th Union Agricultural Meeting, Memorial Auditorium, 
l Worcester, Janu~, 1955 4. United States Department of Agriculture, "Potato Preferences Among 
Household Consumers", Miscellaneous Publication 667, Washington, 
D. C., 1948, P• 13 
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The second and most important group of market factors which 
h llp to determine the types of potatoes to grow are consumer require-
ments. Consumer requirements are mostly based upon cooking advantages 
r l ther than upon taste differences, although the latter are important. 
Pt tatoes are most often boiled, but frying, baking and creaming follow 
~that order of frequency of preparation.1 The marketing implications 
~f the consumers' needs will be developed in the next chapter; however, 1 buying seed, a farmer must also consider the consumers 1 wants. For 
~stance, five out of six consumers preferred potatoes of uniform size 
~ one stuqy.2 The reason for the preference are that such potatoes 
cr ok uniformly, whereas mixed size lots do not. There is also a distinct 
preference for medium size rather than large or small potatoes. Some 
el forts are being made to meet this need by breeding special potatoes 
w~ich have uniform market size characteristics.3 A second important 
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nl ed of the customer is potatoes free from cuts, diseased spots and 
br ises. Some varieUes are more free from such defects than others~ 
and indeed,several varieties of potato are grown which score low in both 
rlspects; the,y have relative~ high size variation and many grade defects.5 
Ct nsumers also like potatoes with a smooth contour and few eyes, for ease 
i:m peeling. Knobs, bottlenecks and growth cracks were responsible for 
Ibid., P• 17 
c. H. Merchant, Bulletin 465, Maine Agricultural Experiment Station, 
Orono, Maine, 1948, P• 13 
University of Minnesota, Agricultural Experiment Station, Miscellaneous 
Report 19, Minnesota, 1954 
R. J. Bouchard, Bulletin 476, Maine Agricultural Experiment Station, 
Orono, Maine, 1949, P• 14 
Merchant and Woodward, Bulletin 466, Maine Agricultural Experiment 
Station, Orono, Maine, 1949, P• 6; also Bouchard and Perry, Bulletin 
486, Maine Agricultural Experiment Station, Orono, Maine, 1950, p. 19 
o er 50% of the defects which lowered the grade from number one to 
n ber two in a recent Idaho late potato crop.1 In this same crop, 
5~% of the culls were so classified because they were too small for 
el an grade two. 
However, no single variety of potatoes is perfect in all 
r spects. As an illustration, Russet Burbanks grown in Idaho have 
Sfcellent consumer acceptance; but the crop usually contains a greater 
p~oportion of small and large potatoes with a lesser proportion of 
mldium. potatoes than corresponding crops of round potatoes. 2 This 
tlnds to create wider price differentials for size in Russet Burbanks 
~an in round potatoes to such an extent that the producers of Russet 
Burbanks could increase their income if they could produce a greater 
pt oportion of medium and large potatoes* 
One of the key consumer demands represents a problem which 
unlike the last one mentioned may not be solved by plant breeding. 
P4tatoes which consumers rated as excellent for baking are regarded 
aJ poor for boiling.3 And potatoes which are rated good for boiling, 
fk equal:cy far when rated as to baking qualities. The differences 
c I be measured by specific gravity test$ which enable the producer 
t determine the best way of cooking a given crop or variety. However, 
k owing the cooking quality of a variety does not mean that you can 
2.1 
3.1 
one variety with two cooking qualities. 
Clayton P. Libeau, "Marketing Potatoes for Consumer Approval", 
Experimental Stat ion Bulletin 285, University of Idaho, 1951, P• 21 
Ibid., P• 23 
Ibid., P• 17 
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Beyond these areas varietal differences have other complica-
ions perhaps best expressed in the booklet "Highlights of Potato 
arketing11 : 1 
"Reference is often made to a 'premium' variety, that 
is, one that will connnand a higher price than most 
other varieties. Unless the quality, size and appear-
ance are superior, no variety will command a premium. 
Good quality Russet Burbank or ~bite Rose potatoes will 
generally sell at relatively high prices. Poor quality 
stock of these varieties will comma.nd no premium and may 
be discounted~ Red McClure potatoes that are deep-
colored will sell at higher prices than those showing 
pale color, even though other quality and size factors 
may be identical. 
"In general, the East prefers the round, white type 
potato;the Mid-west uses all varieties but some markets 
prefer red types; and the far West prefers the long 
types. Russet Burbanks - a .Long type potato - are dis-
tributed to all states and many people prefer them 
especially for baking purposes. It is likely that high 
freight rates preclude a wider distribution of these 
western-grown potatoes." 
What implications can we find in these conflicting needs of 
onsumers in determining the type of potatoes to grow in order to please 
he consumerw First of a.Ll, no one type presently grown can satisfy all 
Jeeds or desires of the consumer. Potatoes for baking are not good for 
+iling, disease resistance may be accompanied by poor appearance, eacy 
Jeeling may be accompanied by mushiness, etc~ Secondly, consumer needs 
Jary from place to place and probably from time to time. A farxoor will 
nave to swap varieties to keep pace with demand if he wishes to maximize 
~s income. Thirdly, a variety which is good at one place or time may r poor at another. "For example, Bliss Triumph, llhen grawn in Nebraska 
ll.. United States Department of Agriculture, "Highlights of Potato 
Marketingn, Bulletin 114, Washington, D. c .. , 1953, p. 45 
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nd Wyoming, usually shows some scab, air cracks and shatter bruises. 111 
t takes much time to develop a new variety, but even after varieties 
re introduced, they may prove inadequate and disappear& 
The third group of considerations which enters into the deter-
rnation of the type of potatoes to grow are needs of the industrial 
larket, now increasing in importance. These factors help to solve many f the problems created by consumer needs, but they also create other 
Jroblems. Let us examine the industrial market which consists of firms 
Jrocessing the potato for the customer into edible form or using it as 
l raw material. About 10 per cent of the potatoes sold for food purposes 
lre processed into such products as potato chips, frozen french f ries, 
1anned whole potatoes, and dehydrated potatoes, and into mixed foods, 
uch as, soups and hash. 2 The industries Which use p tatoes as a raw 
terial for other products include the starch makers, who are concen-
rated in Maine and Idaho to a great degree; industrial alcohol makers, 
ho buy surplus potatoes occasional ly in large q~antities; and the 
armers who use surplus spuds as livestock feed. Each type of user has 
. · fferent requirements arising out of the chemistry, physics, and eco-
'omics of the use~ As examples, potato chip makers demand a high starch 
ontent, a low sugar content, and medium to large size.. The sugar· con-
lent of potatoes depends on the variety, the place where grovm, and 
leather conditions during the growing season~ Potatoes 1~th high sugar 
rntent do not make good chips because the sugar burns and darkens the 
~· Ibid., p. 13 
2.. Ibid., p .. 3 
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hips~ Potatoes with a high specific gravity are needed for maki ng 
r rench fried potatoes and the frozen french fry industry has stressed 
· gh quality, so will take nothing else.. The whole potato canners 
ffer an excellent outlet for over a million bushels of potatoes one 
o two inches in diameter~ 1 The livestock feeders and the industrial 
users are not so particular about the variety of potato since their 
uses are based on price economics, transportation economic and costs 
of handling more than upon quality of raw materials. For example, 
the starch makers cannot get much more than 10 to 12 pounds of starch 
2 from one hundred pounds of potatoes~ Such weight loss would be con-
ducive to locating any industry close to its source of raw materials. 
Hovrever, by locating close to the sorting sheds from Yihich culls and 
number two potatoes must be trucked as waste, they buy these otherwise 
useless spuds for a price which varies from 15 to 50 cents depending 
on the price of starch .. 3 In other words, the price of starch determi.nes 
the va~ue of its raw material, the waste product of the potato industry .. 
This phenomenon is not uncommon in by-product industries, and we might 
consider the relation of the industrial sale of potatoes as a by-product 
to their sale for table use .. 
Beyond these locational factors we may note another reason vmy 
they care little about types. Their most important consideration is the 
starch content of the potatoes which varies ~ith the season, the length 
of time they have been in storage, the temperature of the storage; and 
it can be modified by cP~nging storage temperatures. 
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We can conclude that as the processing of potatoes as frozen 
french fries, potato chips, canned whole potatoes arn potato flour 
increases, the potato producer ~~11 sell increasingly according to the 
t igid specifications and standards usually found i n industrial markets, 
1Jnere quality controls are essential to get uniform products, as in 
otato chips, then uniform raw materials standards must also prevail. 
armers will have to choose varieties to grow carefully, and exercise 
igid controls over growing conditions through irrigation, soil testing , 
r
ainage, etc. 
To summarize the factors that determine vlhat varieties a farner 
ust grovG we find that these are important: 
1. The distance from market. The further away he is 
the more necessary it becomes to ship only a high 
quality product to market, because low quality 
products do not connnand adequate premiums to cover 
transportation costs. 
2. The prevalence of peculiar consumer requirements. 
If customers in his best market demand red skinned 
species, then a farmer must pick the best variety 
of that species that his land is adapted to grmving. 
J. The availability and needs of nearby processors such 
as manufacturers of frozen french fries, potato pan-
cake mix and potato chips. To give manufacturers 
exactly what they want, a farrrer must pick a variety 
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with such qualities as high starch content, high 
specific gravity, large size, or whatever they 
require. 
4. The reputation of the area and the state seed 
certification agency. If the area is noted for 
its seed potatoes, a farmer may choose either to 
produce old staple varieties of seed or newly 
developed types to trade on the reputation of t he 
area as a seed source., 
5. The yield per acre of the various types . A f armer 
may find that total yield is more importa.11t than 
quality of yield, premiums for certain varieties 
or available industrial outlets. 
6- The quality of yield in regard to average size of 
potatoes. Picking a variety which gives the maximum 
per cent of marketable potatoes becomes essential 
as the price differential between first quality and 
second quality becomes greater.. Distance from market 
and lack of industrial outlets aggravate tbis differ-
ential. 
7.. The quality of yield in regard to insects and disease 
resistance. For some farmers plant diseases are more 
troublesome than for others. Grade one standards 
require freedom from disease and insect damage. Some 
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varieties have much more resistance to a particular 
disease than others so that they yield a high per-
centage of grade one potatoes than do others in a 
given producir~ area. 
8. The premium earned for early crops. New potatoes 
bring a higher price than old ones so that the first 
producer gets the highest price. Some farmers choose 
this highly speculative way of increasing profits by 
growing the early varieties but such farmers must 
have favorable climate as well as proper care to be 
first to market their crop regardless of variety. 
9.. The last but perhaps most important factor in the 
delivered quality of the variety.. Some types bruise 
easily or have many knobs or eyes. Such factors 
reduce the incoiOO which a fariOOr receives on grade 
one potatoes and increase his culls. To maximize 
his income, a farmer must pick a variety which avoids 
these losses if such is available~ 
No one variety can give every farmer all he desires and needs .. 
Each must choose the variety which is best for him~ 
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CHAPTER III 
MARKETING PROBLEMS OF POTATOES 
The marketing of potatoes has been brought into the discussion 
of the production problems of the industry in several forms in Chapter 
two. Such areas of discussion as the quality of production, the variety 
to produce, the needs of the consumer, the distance to market and product 
diversification are marketing provinces more than production province s. 
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In addition, such subjects as prices, elasticity of demand, and develop-
ment of new users for the product, channels of distribution, quality 
standards and grading of shipments, brand name policies, consumer r esearch, 
marketing agreements and future are marketing matters scarcely mentioned 
thus far. All of these can be classified under three basic economic 
activities into which marketing can be divided; maximizing income, mini-
mizing costs and maximizing long-run profits. We shall discuss each of 
these in detail. 
:W.J.AXIMIZING INCOME IN MARKETING 
The best method of maximizing profits is that of the monopolist 
who operates at the output where marginal cost equals marginal revenue 9 
But potato farming i s one of the few industries which can presently be 
said to approach the other extreme from monopoly ~ich is pure competition. 
As a result, we cannot talk of maximizing profits in the short run and 
may not be able to do so in the long run for the industry as a whole. 
However, i rms in a competitive industry may r ceive profits because 
of differences among firms or because of a state of disequilibrium. 
If some of the entrepreneurs have special aptitudes for the industry, 
that is, if they have low alternative costs compared t o other firms, 
they will receive higher returns than their competitors, returns which 
are rents or wages for superior ability. However, if they can obtain 
a higher income than others with equal alternative costs by introduc-
ing a new product or technique or opening a new market, they may obtain 
true profits. It i s t he latter area of maximizing income through nell 
markets and new marketing techniques with which we are concerned in 
t his section. The problems involved in the marketing of potatoes are 
not only the most difficult problems the industry faces but they i ncrease 
in difficulty as producers learn how to produce more potatoes 'vith less 
effort while consumers consume smaller quant i t i es of the crop. 
3 
The farmer has a complex situation i n 'which the elimination of 
production hindrances, such as, plant disease, insects, water hortage, 
inferior plant species, poor management and soil infertility leads to 
greater volume of production in an industry burder.ed with over production. 
Not all solutions to production problems lead t o overproduction, however, 
since some are concerned with quality of production, suitability of prod-
uct for consumer needs, elimination of waste, and lower production costs. 
I n fact, many of the marketing problems, i ncluding the disposition of 
surplus stocks, may be helped by better quality and specialized production 
aimed at developing new markets or enlarging old ones, or by the elimina-
tion of waste, etc. In order to maximize their income, producers must 
find answers to many such questions on pricing, demand and sales. 
I 
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CHART III 
PRICE FLUCTUATIONS IN POTATO INVJSTRY 
ACTUAL PRICE PER BUSHEL 
Historical Period Without Price Controls 
1 MAINE FARM PRICES 
1900-1931 
(As of December 15th) 
\ 
I 
I 
U. S. FARM PRICES2 
1900-1930 
(As of December 1st) 
--- UNITED srATES PRICES 
--- MAINE PRICES 
SO:JRCES: 
1. Maine Agricultural Experiment Station, Bulletin 364, 1furch, 1933 
2. United States Departrrent of Agriculture, St atistical Bull et in 
No. 122, Bureau of Agricultural Economics, March, 1953 
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I~come and Prices 
i 
I 
I 
What can be done to get an adequate price for potatoes? It 
i F easy to show that for the whole United States, a short crop brings 
i F higher prices than a large crop.1 It is more difficult to shaw how 
vf-oJ.ent changes in income affect planters in succeeding years. Extreme 
changes affect the attitudes of producers as well as their financial 
I 
pr sition so that we must analyze price changes in terms of risks and 
profits if we are to determine what an adequate price consists of. 
I 
I~ order to analyze the effect of risks of price fluctuation on atti-
1 
thdes, we can measure the relationship of such factors as the potato 
I 
pi:-ice level of the preceding year, the gross value of the previous crop, 
I 
I 
I 
the net income from the 
l 
previous crop or the value of the previous crop 
I 2 per acre to the acreage planted. 
! 
I 
The analysis is made more confusing 
bjecause we are not sure whether it is actual prices or these prices 
translated into purchasing power which affect attitudes and finances 
I 
o~ the producer, and, therefore, his production, his prices and his 
j 
profits. 
I 
I 
Studies in the North Central region3 show these risk rel ation-
spj.ps on the basis of an idealized model of small size. The authors 
a~ply the results of their model study first ·to the corn belt 
! 
t hen t o 
the potato industry in arriving at the folJ.owi ng conclusions : 
i 
I 1. "That some producers had more r i sk4 than others . 
The pr oducers in the tier of states bordering on 
t he Gr eat Lakes, for example , were protected by 
John Black, Rural Economy of New England, Op.cit ., p. 445 
Ibid., P• l-14 
Gray, Sorenson and Cochrane, "Impact of Government Programs on the 
Potat o Industry of the United Stat es 11 , Technical Bulletin 211, 
Minnesota Agricultural Experiment Station, 1954, p. 76 
Ibid. , pp. ~o, 86, 87 
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11the fact t.hat if a large enough proportion of 
prodllcers grow a large enough proportion of a 
crop i n a homogeneous climate belt, they auto-
matically create for themselves the artificial 
risk advantage that results from their yields 
fluctuating in phase with total production. 
Producers in another 'out-of-phase' area do not 
have this comparative advantage. In addition, 
those who produced potatoes merely as a side-
line using the crop diversification principle 
ran less risk as a reSlllt. 
2. 11Risk as 1reasured by acre value fluctuation, is 
relatively great i n potato production, and that 
the marketing component of this risk, as opposed 
to the physical component, is also relatively 
1 great in potato production.-
3~ 11 It is concluded 1 that wide price fluctuations 
act as a deterent to the specialized potato pro-
ducers generally quite apart from the deterent 
effect which it has on the expansion in the 
specialist statese The removal of price risk 
under parity did not remove just the risk dis-
advantage vmich specialists had endured because 
1~ Ibid~, PP· so, 86, 87 
I 
I 
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i 
nof their location, but also the risk advantage 
which specialists everyv1here has endured because 
of the greater importance of potatoes in their 
production scheme.• (All their eggs were in one 
basket. )1 
4 .. "The expansion of production occurred through pro-
duction adjustments induced by - motivated by -
1 the greater price certainty .. ~.... of price supports .. " 
We can say as a result of the findings in the study just cited 
that farmers are affected more by the sureness or security of income than 
Jy the amount of speculative profit possible.. If producers are sure of 
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I 
moderate profits, they Ynll use more scientific f arming methods to control 
I 
I 
t he size of their crop and potato production will tend to mo e toward the 
I 
i 
nbst efficient production locations.. The former is true because a snecial-
1 . ~ 
I i!st producer (or a producer in a specialized area) can be sure that his 
I 
.! 
~eturn from the crop will be adequate to pay for the added investment 
deeded' for scientific farming.. The move toward the areas i n -whi ch potatoes 
! 
~re grorm vuth a high degree of economic efficiency is brought about be-
jause low profits tend to discourage farmers in marginal production areas 
I 
: 
I £rom growing potatoes as a speculative sideline. V~hen the speculators are 
I 
~one, production is concentrated in the hands of specialist growers and in 
~pecialist areas where production can be planned and controlled more effi-
1 
ciently. Thus an adequate stable price will not only bring a more even 
! 
i.. Ibid. 
I 
I 
pJoduction of potatoes by discouraging speculators from entering and 
I 
I 
l~aving the market but also by encouraging the use of irrigation, 
I 
f~rtilizers, and insecticides which reduce the fluctuations in crop 
l s~ze due to the forces of nature . l The profit margin of an adequate price must be such as to 
d~scourage overproduction or underproduction in relation to consumer 
i demand. This profit margin, however, is a very difficult probl em 
. I . 
since an inelastic demand tends to encourage violent price fluctua-
i . 
I t~ons, as only large price differences can affect consumption suffi-
c~ently to bring i t into line with supplies avai lable. In fact , when 
i 
I 
there is a large surplus even giving potatoes away, figuratively, at 
I 
ope cent per pound, might not induce enough extra consumption for eat-
1 . 
I 1 ing purposes to absorb the surplus. As a result, the lower limit to 
I 
pptato prices seems to be the price necessary to get starch manufac-
1 
turers, distillers and cattle feeders to buy up the surplus, and the 
u~per limit seems equally remote from production costs. 2 As a result 
I 
I 
of the volatile flights 
I 
yi ar-to-year basis that 
should.3 But there are 
i 
' 
of price away from cost, we se~dom find on a 
the profit margin regulates production as it 
other aspects of an adequate price beyond the 
s~imulation of efficient production in sufficient quantity, and with 
I 
~ependable quality. An adequate price should be one which encourages 
I 
efficient marketing aimed at lowering distribution costs and at raising 
i 4 demand for the product. Price should adequately reflect the differences 
I 
I 
11. Earl Banner, Boston Sunday Globe, January 31, 19.54 (See Appendi x II) 
2:. Ibid. 
3
1
.. Gray, Sorenson and Cochrane, Technical Bulletin 211, Qp . cit .. , P• 173 
U. John D. Black, The Rural Economy of New England, Op. cit., P• 443 
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in quality of the potatoes when they are received by the consumer, but 
I 
do not now reflect them in all areas.1 These differences should be 
I 
carried through the marketing price mechanism to the farmer so that he 
I 
will produce the type of potato the consumer wants and deliver it to 
t~e consumer in such quality and package as to make the consumer want 
mi r e potatoese We have much evidence that the consumer is not getting 
I 2 3 w~at he wants even from the specialist producers in Maine. Surveys 
I 
by t he United States Department of Agriculture showed that: 
11 Household consumers rate quality, size, and price 
in that order of importance when they purchase 
potatoes. In fact, the item of quality outweighed 
the two other items by approximately twelve to one 
•••••• When potatoes are of poor quality, even when 
t he price is low, 44 per cent of the homemakers 
stated that they purchased fewer potatoes •••••• 
The Insti tutional buyers want high quality of a size 
and type t o suit their needs. They reported that 
inferior quality potatoes are high at any price. 
Inasmuch as these surveys indicate that the majority 
of all buyers gage the volume of their purchases more 
on quality than on any other factor. It appears that 
one of the best ways for the potato industry to main-
tain or increase consumption is to offer the consumer 
the quality and type of potato they want. These 
surveys indicated that homemakers were most emphatic 
in wanting clean potatoes. About half of the women 
interviewed spontaneously specified their demand for 
clean potatoes. Most of the Institutional buyers 
also specified washed potatoes. 11 
I 
1 The evidence, especially the spontaneous demand of 50% of the 
w
1
omen for clean potatoes, is astounding, yet farmers have done next t o 
J othing until recently. Various theories may be advanced for this lack 
o~ determined effort to give the consumers the type of product they want. 
~ · I 
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2. 
~ · 
I 
Merchant and Woodward, "Quality of Potatoes in Retail Stores", Maine 
Experimental Station, Bulletin 466, Orono, 1~ine, 1949, p. 49 
Gray, Sorenson and Cochrane, Technical Bulletin 211, Op. c i t., p. 173 
United States Department of Agriculture, 11Highlights of Potato Market-
ing", Op. cit., P• 44 
IJ might be, as the Gray, Sorenson and Cochrane study previously 
relferred to might seem to imply, that the long years of risky pricing 
I h1ve engendered a sense of futility based upon the belief that nothing 
t,at the individual could do would materially change the returns for 
t~e crop in the great gamble of potato production. Why should the 
f~rmer bother to grade potatoes, handle them with care, clean them or 
I 
I 
p~ckage them in order to make a few cents a bushel extra when the price 
I 
might vary by dollars without his doing anything. On the other hand, 
B~ack1 points out that the attitudes and motivation of the farmer may 
b, the cause. He describes the farmer of Aroostook as having the care-
fr1ee independence of the pioneer, of having faith in the future and 
I 
c~elessness in providing for it, and as being dependent on commercial 
I 
I 
market and long distance transportation. He then says: 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
none would expect farmers with such behaviour patterns 
to be interested in volume rather than quality; and 
they are. Under Maine conditions the patterns should 
also lead them to want large yields as well as large 
acres, and incline them to favor bulk handling and 
machine methods. Careful sorting and grading, preven-
tion of bruises, cleaning and brushing of potatoes and 
the like call for motivations and habits that are not 
general~ establish as yet. No doubt such attitudes 
and behaviour patterns account in part for the dire 
financial straits in which many potato farn~rs found 
themselves after a series of depression years." 
We might also blame the marketing system b,r which potatoes 
re'ach the consumer. For example, potatoes are damaged in every handling 
I 
nol matter how careful, but under our present distribution methods, they 
I 
I are not onzy handled roughly but too many times. 
! 
l.i Black, The Rhral Econom[ of New Eng1and, Op• cit., P• 450 
I 
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I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
As Woodward and Merchant say in their 1948 study: 
"The wide variation in the quality of potatoes between 
lots and within the same lots makes it extremely dif-
ficult for consumers to discriminate in their preference 
of potatoes. This fact alone may have contributed much 
to the non-relationship between the per cent of grade 
defects and the retail prices of potatoes. Also, it 
may be assumed that consumers and the trade have become 
accustomed to these wide variations in quality and 
accept them without much association between quality 
and price .nl 
One might ask, of what use is it to the farmer to carefully 
gdade and pack when one study showed potatoes averaging2 four to five 
I 
per cent external grade defects upon arrival at the retail store and 
I 
sJven to eight per cent defects at time of sale? A product which is 
s Jven per cent defective would hardly be so impressive to the consumer 
I 
I 
a5 to get him to pay a high price. The answer is that seven per cent 
I 
i$ better than ten per cent, or twenty per cent, or fifty per cent 
i 
which might be the proportion of defective potatoes without some care 
I 
bt the farmer. But more to the point, two-thirds of the damage first 
nbted in the stores was due to previous mishandling and the problem 
t l en seems to be that it would behoove each handler from the farmer 
tb the retailer to exercise more care and use better methods for one 
I 
1ong does not excuse another. 
1 Whichever theory you may subscribe to, they all have one 
I 
a~pect in co~non. Even if prices are stabilized to eliminate excess ive 
pt~ce fluctuation, even if farmers become newly motivated with ideas 
I 
I 
i 
11. 
I 
' I 2!. 
Merchant and Woodward, "Quality of Potatoes in Retail Stores in 
Boston, Mass., and Maine Markets in 1948 11 , Maine Agricultural 
Experiment Station, Bulletin 466, Orono, Maine, 1949, p. 49 
Bouchard and Perry, "Development of External Defects in Maine 
Potatoes at Retail Stores in Boston, Mass., February and March, 
195011 , Maine Agricultural Experiment Station, Bulletin 486, Orono, 
Maine, 1950, P• 4 
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I 
i 
of scientific controls to be used in delivering a quality product, 
• t en if producer s diScover new ~rketing methods, they will not 
a:oply these cures to the problems outlined in the theories above 
uhtil they think that the price system functions in such a ¥ay as 
I 
to pay f or the added services to be performed. As with any other 
I 
g~od, prices must have enough stability so that the pennies paid 
fbr specif ic services are not wiped out or hidden by excessive 
i~come fluctu~tion, and farmers must believe that the prices are 
I 
wbrth while. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
To summarize the qualities of an adequate market price. 
If must furnish a means of matching a variable supply to a relatively 
i~elastic demand. It must encourage production and distribution in 
the most efficient manner .. It must give essential producers an ade-
qhate income, so as to cover all costs necessary to accomplish the 
i 
ar ove ~ms. It must do these things in such a way as to enable the 
farmer to know where his best interests lie so that he will be able 
I 
tb maximize his income .. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
~mand and Income 
The relationship of producer income, prices and market demand 
I 
eCLasticity has been well analyzed by Gray, 
tbrrnk of the so-called "cobweb theoremn. 1 
I 
Sorenson and Cochrane in 
It is in fact a keystone of 
tbei analysis of the effects of the price support program. In their 
!. bray, Sorenson and Cochrane, Bulletin 211, Op. cit., p. 171 
I 
I 
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I 
I 
I 
I 
Ndrt Central Regional study, they found that a reasonably well-
' ! 
dJfi ed relationship exists between market elasticity of demand 
i 
I 
a~d he proportion of the crop that must be controlled to raise 
i 
I 
ptod cers 1 income through a policy of market restriction.,l This 
i s t ue of the whole market acting as a unit, but it would not be 
I 
pfss~ble ror the producers of a region (without control or a suffi-
c~en~ proportion of the crop to assure more than nominal r eturns 
rJ~m r estriction) to raise gross receipts from potatoes. 2 Under 
pjrf ct competition, if one region attempted to raise its price 
bJ r stricting sales, potatoes from other regions would infringe 
I 
oJ i s market until a single price (modified by costs of transport a-
tion~ again existed f or all potatoes reaching the market. 3 
I 
I 
As part of a long-run program of product differentiation, 
h~we er, it may pay regional producers to keep low quality potatoes 
I 
oif he market even though income is not immediately increased by 
I 
I 
t Je acti on. The purpose of such a move would be to build up a reputa-
tion for the quality of a given region's products so that they would 1 
colmm nd a premium in the long run. 
I These are the two most important areas in vihich demand affects 
t4e I ncome of potato producers, However, in addition t o demand elastic-
iJy rd quality references, there are such demand factors as consumer 
i J co_ and attitudes. Let us develop each in detail supplerrenting such 
I 
I 
i 
I 
I 
' 3~ 
Thid.' p. 171 
...___ 
Gray et al are 
~he curve. 
Jfbid., p. 171 
assuming demand elasticity is constant throughout 
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l 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
i 
I 
I 
mat rial as has already been given in considering the varieties to 
b1a[ , prices and as historical background. 
L et Restriction and Income Maximization 
I 
I 
I 
The Department of Agriculture supplies some income totals 
and a few facts which show the r elationship of producers' income to 
I 
I 1 pri es and demand quite well. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
i 
"During t he 20-year period, 1920-39, the smallest 
crop - in 1925 - had a production value of $505,000,000 
and the largest crop - in 192tl - had a value of only 
$230,000,dOO. In these 20 years, the three smallest 
crops averaged 314 million bushels With an average 
value of $433,000,000, and the three l argest crops 
averaged 416 million bushels 'With an average value of 
only $22o,ooo,ooo. These figures emphasize the inelas-
ticity of demand for potatoes. The growers receive 
less total money for a large supply of potatoes than 
f or a small supply. It appears that ther e is a current 
market demand for about 24 million bushels a month for 
food purposes~ Prices within a season go up or down 
as offerings decrease or increase. No one has been 
able to develop a correlation among the various factors 
affecting prices vvith sufficient accuracy to be of much 
value in trading at the time the trades are being con-
su.mated. As a rule of thumb, a one per cent change in 
production from average will cause approximately a 3.5 
to 4 per cent change in price in the opposite direction, 
when other factors affecting prices remain constant. 
This means that five to ten per cent change in produc-
tion can cause extremely high or low prices. The level 
of consumer income is the second most important factor 
affecting prices. Psychological factors which defy 
quantitative measure are involved in marketing any 
perishable commodity.~ •• The timing in marketing a 
crop is important •••• because (most) people prefer new 
crop potatoes (and tend to stop buying the old when · 
the new crop appears)." 
1.1 ~nited States Department of Agriculture, 11Highlights of Potato 
! Marketing 11 , Op. cit., P• 48 
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I 
I 
I 
I 
Thus far we have talked about demand elasticity in terms of 
al whole market with free competition. But we are interested in what 
pl obl ems potato growers f ace in trying to raise income via the medium 
o~ dlmand manipulation. To do this, Gray, Sorenson and Cochrane1 
s~palate the potato industry from the rest of the economy to assume 
al l bther conditions constant. Under these model conditions, the 
i hcol e of potato producers would vary in accordance with the quantity 
I I 
of potatoes made availaole for sale. The extent to which a group of 
I I . ' 
prod1cers could control their own income would depend on several 
f l ct In a free market, the potato industry faces a severely in-
1 
I 
i 
elas ic demand curve while decisions as to how much to offer for sale 
i 
a~e de on the basis of a horizontal demand curve facing individual 
I 
p~od cers. In other words, the whole industry has an inelastic demand 
c~t but the individual producer has an almost flat curve with prac-
t t cally infinite elasticity, because he has only a very small portion 
of t l tal demand as demand for his product so that his customers have 
lyl alternative suppliers to choose between. ·wnen the individual 
pJod ·cer shifts the decision as to the quantity to market to a large 
gJouJ of producers, the group makes its decision in relation to a 
I 
mJre inelastic demand since the consumers have f ewer alternatives. 
I 
T1e larger the proportion of total production which is controlled by 
t1e 1estrictive group (the more imperfectly competitive it becomes), 
the ntore elastic the ttrealized demand" becomes. 2 This is important 
i I 
1.: qray, Sorenson and Cochrane, Technical Bulletin 211, Op~ cit., p. 156 
2.1 :Qbid. , PP • 158-161 - Here the realized demand is the demand actually 
1 ~ealized by a producer group taking r estrictive action. The elastic-
1 ~ty and position of the realized demand curve is determined by two 
I
' Eactors, the proportion of crop restricted and the elasticity of 
~~arket demand. Elasticity of realized demand varies along the curve 
I ~ecoming smaller as the quantity increases. We assume zero transfer 
I sosts, homogeneous output, large number of buyers and sellers, market 
" nfrin~ement by competing groups. 
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I bee use 1vhere infringement equalizes the whole market price structure, 
I yhe income control that they exercise depends on the extent that they 
I t . · · b t · + · aL. d th t t ean ge pr~ce ~ncreases y r es r~c~~ng s es; an as ey ge a grea er 
I 
JroRortion of total supply under their control, increasingly larger 
Jerdentage restrictions for the group will obtain larger percentage 
J riJe increases up to a certain limit. A more complete and accurate 
Jta ement is: 
"Namely, where infri ngement results in a single price 
for the restricting and non-restricting producers, the 
restricting group stands to benefit only if its pro-
portion of total supply is numerically greater than 
market demand elasticity.~ •• The foregoing principle 
applies only under the conditions of complete price 
equalization, as stated, but it also applies o11ly with-
in certain limits. Since t he realized demand becomes 
progressively more elastic as larger amount s are with-
held, restriction up to a certain level may be advan-
tageous, while beyond that level it would become 
increasingly disadvantageous. This level is r eadily 
ascertained for any given realized demand curve. If 
the ratio of market demand elasticity to the proportion 
of total supply controlled by (the group) is l ess than 
unity, then the elasticity of realized demand will be 
less than un..i.ty with no restriction, and it "Will pay to 
restrict until realized demand ela ticity reaches unity. 
This occurs at the point of r estriction where t e rat io 
of market demand elasticity to the proportion controlled 
by 'the group) r eaches unity. The value of this ratio 
is the sole determinant of the i nitial val~e of realized 
demand elasticity (i.e. , ela ticity at the point of no 
restriction), but it is not the determinant of the rate 
at which realized dem nd elasticity ch~nges •••• The 
reason for this is that the ult "mate price rais "ne power 
is greater the larger the proportion of the market con-
trolled •••• If the initial ra.tio between elasticity o.f 
market dem nd and the proportion controlled i s ·ive , 
the greater the proport ion of the m rket controlled y 
the r estrictine group the ere ter the p rcentage r es r · c-
tion it pays to undertake.ttl 
l .i ~bid .. ' p. 161 
I 
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I t _is mode discu s · on, re have een as umi .a there 
mpl ete i nfrj_ngement and that s one gr o p ~ithhe suppli s I yr 
ano her gro~p rould o era gre ter pr o· ortion h .n pr e ' ous-~ offer e 
lnt ' l price ~qualized again. This need not always happen and the 
Jxt+ t to which it happens is dependent on the degree of market isola-
~io1 and transportation costs. Where there is complete infringenent 
Jhe 1non-restricting groups benefit more than the restricting group so 
jrat if producers do not ~sh to benefit their competit ors more than 
t remselves by restricting sales, they must be able to isolate market de+· With potatoes market. isolation is difficult and become s lllOre 
d~ff~cult as transportation and productipn methods improve . 
\ To summarize the factors given thus far in income maximiza-t~onl as related to demand. Generally the greater the proportion of 
or tput controlled, the less the elasticity of market demand, and the 
g(eaf er the degree of market isolation; the more effective the method 
of restricting sales to raise income ·will be.. There are exceptions to 
I I . the rule based on imperfect1ons of the market not present in our model 
I I . but the rule has some applications. 
The problem of the potato producers is to combine their 
resources in such a way as to minimize the characteristics of competi-
t i on ~ch are detrimental to profit maximization and to increase their 
ct ntrol and manipulation of macket characteristics which are advantageous 
ill pt ofit maximization. As an example, product differentiation which 
j mentioned as the second important area of demand and income r elation-
s~pl is actually a form of imperfection of the pure competition, which 
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make for an exception to the rule given above. roduct differentiation 1 a !form of imperfect c01J1Petition makes it poss+ le for the producer of 
a ieJr small portion of total output to increase his and the industry's 
pr[ fil se 
Pr duct Differentiation and Income Maximization 
Product differentiation can be carried on by many techniques, 
I 
surh r s advertising and branding, controlled quality or design differ-
e"fes coupled with pricing, or by psychoLogical dlvices, such as sale 
thr'f' franchised prestige out;lets. The first t r are mere education 
ana pi-opaganda tools which can be used to supplenwrnt the others when 
pr hpef ly used. Psychological devices would have limited usefulness with 
a ltap~e food like potatoes. Product design i~ pl tatoes would be based 
upbn ielecting the right variety to plant, adequat ely developed 
prlvibusly. I 
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1 We shall, therefore, first endeavor to ~ive some illustrations of th advantage of controlling quality to get a ~omogeneous, dependable 
pr ·dubt or the disadvantages of failure to controf quality. For example, 
so1 l armers sell all their product "ru.n-of-the-fl eldll on the open mar-
kei. Such sales would include culls and second ~ade stock. This means 
t~t the industry is not supplying a homogeneous product so that the 
pr1ce for the products of all producers will be ~for several reasons.1 
Fij st
1 
if farmers agree to high standards of qual1ty, the market price 
1. · Jcbn D. Black, Rural Economy of New England, Qp. cit., p. 4.53 
I 
I J ha the i ncome from the 1951 crop was reduceda As an indication of 
~~e i ndustry's conviction on this point, culls and smaLl sizes were 
rt eld by Idaho growers and ship~ers throughout the 1952 crop year 
even though prices were favorablee 
As a third illustration of the advantage of a product differ-
~ntiation, we may note that before 1951, Connecticut Valley potatoes 
Jrr j discounted 30 to 50 cents per hunrlredweight in Boston. "When 
Dec1ivers became convinced that potatoes from the Valley were bei ng 
Jr"jed, inspected and marketed i n better condition due t o a marketing 
Jgrjement regulat ion, the discount was dropped. In short, these growers 
+ d r een giving away their low grades, and by adding low-quality stock 
t io the supply, had depressed the price for the bulk of their crop which 
c
1
o ld meet acceptable market grades. 2 
There is another aspect of product differentiation which vre 
examine at this time. This i .s well developed by the authors of 
Economic State of New Englandu, when they say: 3 
"But the New England farmer, because of his very 
nearnes s to the market, is faced with a difficulty 
that confronts the nearby producer arou_~d all l arge 
consuming centers. He has a market for his ent ire 
cr op - good, bad, and indifferent •••• · omeone will 
buy over-ripe tomatoes or dirty, undersized potatoes 
and be glad to get them at a low price •••• However, 
low the price of these low-quality products may be , 
t hey ar e sold, because the cost of marketing is 
practically nothinge••• It would be disastrous for 
many of the poorer consumers if a supply of this 
Bnited States Department of Agriculture, 11Potato Marketing Agreements 
Under Federal Legislation", Washington, D .. c., 1954, p. 8 
I • Jb~d . 
~ommittee of New England of the National Planning Association, The 
Jconomic State of New England, Yale University Pres s, New Haven-,--
1954, p. l25 
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"low-e,Tade produce were not available at low prices. 
The local producer is the only one who can afford to 
supply such produce. He can supply it, does supply 
it., and will continue to supply it, because it will 
. bring enough in the market to pay for transpo ting 
and selling it ••• ~ But products o! poor quality 
placed on the market are in many cases injuring the 
reputation of local products in general and tending 
to decrease their sales. 
11The principle solution to this difficulty is through 
better grading and labeling of New England produce. 
Some products now carry brands telling of their origin, 
such as •state of Maine Potatoes•, . 'Vermont Maple 
Syrup', and 'Cape Cod Cranberries'. These brands 
denote quality products which have met grading stand-
ards. · The New England branded items, ho-wever, a:re 
largely those sold extensively outside the region. 
Branding has helped maintain their sales in the rest 
of the country in competition vdth produce raised in 
other regions, but less attention has been given to 
grading and branding other New England products sold 
in the local markets. The use of New England brands 
for the regions quality agricultural products should 
be greatly expanded., Adequate policing of market areas 
and grade inspection can hold abuses of brand names by 
unethical dealers to a minimum. 
11 Improved transportation techniques permit high quality 
products from other areas to enter into direct competi-
tion with local produce on local markets. To meet this 
competition, a more effective marketing program must be 
developed This program should include: 
1. C~oser grading for quality and size. 
2. Standardization of items in a package., 
3. Further use of labe~s signifying the 
product is from a New England State. 
4. More effective promotional programs 
acquainting the consumer with the advan-
tages of New England produce and, just 
as important, acquainting fa.r1rers and 
packers with necessity for offering 
quality packages. Marketing cooper atives 
off er one way in which producers can do 
these things effectively and efficiently." 
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I 
I 
, I 
I 
st 
,., ,, h y are ayin here ts that product gr di g a d 
can be perf r d on re io · 11 a 
ol · ndividual asis. P o uct differentiatio y r egions is well 
e\.:e+lified by the Idaho pot to gr wers. But the deve. op en f 
r l io a ran s coes no m~a that second rate nroducts may no als 
I ve ependable quality and price characteristi:s, althoug of a 
level than the bulk of the crop~ Proper utilization of all 
is necessary t o maximize income f om any crop~ 
To summarize the possible alternatives which e potato 
I pr od ·cers have available in attempting to incre se income in the 
free of aP- inelastic demand, we can say this: 2 
I la Farmers may seek either to combine .forces so that pro-
1 di..tct,-on restrictions and sales restrictions cover 100 per cent of the 
I 
I 
~he advantages of grading and standardization have been best 
kUIIDJlarized by Wilson Gee, "The Social Economics of Agriculture", 
~A:acMillan, New York, 1942, p.. 285: 
a . Grading decreases marketing cost~ Standardizatio products 
are sold by grade not by personal inspection. Standardiza-
tion lessons risks, cheapens financing, cheapens transporta-
tion by reducing loss and damage, cheapens storage by reduc-
ing decay or deterioration, cheapens retailing and v'lidens 
the market., 
b. Grading encourages future trading which lowers risks and the 
premium enacted for these risks .. 
c. Grading decreases consignment business$ Brokers can handle 
the business at less expense. Also more goods can be sold 
directly. 
d. Grading promotes sales, f.o.b. shipping point . 
e. Grading promotes f.o.b. sales in transit. 
f.. Grading promotes f.o.b. a.uction. 
g. Grading reduces rejection dispute s. 
h. Grading makes market information available. Prices . cannot 
be compared unless grades are stated., 
i. Grading reduces frei~ht costs by keeping culls at home. 
j.. Grading makes advert1sing campaigns possible .. 
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2 yJ·e do not necessarily advocate the procedures outlined in this section. 
~fe are merely pointing out possible alternatives to the most difficult 
single problem that potato producers have to face at the present time. 
We vdll later develop t he merits or demerits of each type of program. 
I 
I 
droJ ; to utilize some isolating technique such as prodQct differ-
j nt,ation to separate the w~ket into non-competing areas; or combine 
1otl met hods. To solve the problem, production and marketing controls 
dre available under the law to restrict supply and several effective 
~t;rds of isolating market areas, i.e., product and customer differ-
eirrtiation, are available. 
I 2~ Farmers may seek either to prevent or minimize competitive 
cparacteristics which weqlcen their attempts to maximize income .. ince ~ 1 of the act· ons detrimental to long-run income maximizati n arise 
ol t pi the efforts of i ndividuals to maximize their short-run income a~ the expense of the group, some means may be sought to curb the indivi 
ull 
I 
t o compensate the group for the damage of individual actions. 
crer n by law or voluntary cooperation by education and common u der-
s an i ng are among the alternatives available to curb the · ndivid 1 .. I 
I 
I Cbmpensatory payments, price supports, and purchase agreeme ts are 
t~pilal means of compensating the group .. 
I l We do not necessarily advocate any of the above measures 
late chapters we shall discuss the relative merits of these solutions 
:te~t~v:r::~ngo~~::::ng income. 
I 
! Up to this poirrt, we have been talking about demand - in me 
r f lajionships i n terms of exploitation of existi ng inelastic demand, 
·we J t, however, think of the possibilit ies of demand creation ( es 
I 
or m rchandising) Which is a far better way f rom the point of vi ew of 
I 
i 
I 
I 
I 
I 
In 
5 
oth the producer and consumer to i ncrease short-run income a~d Long-
r un profits. Demand cr eation can be brought about in 'several ways. 
One method is the utilization of price differentials based ~pon the 
abi lity to pay of the various market areas. Another. method of demaoo 
creation is one used most often by the industrial marketer , the 
development of new uses f or the product through research and the educa-
tion of the public in those uses. A third approach is the medium of 
product differentiation which we discussed as a method of exploi ting 
existing demand. All of these repr esent difficulties for the industry 
if it wishes to raise its income for no one method is suffici ent by 
itself. Indeed all are used to a minor degree in the industry or at 
least under stood in principle. Let us examine the status of each 
method beginning with the use of price differentials. 
Industrial utilization including feeding of livestock are 
mostly salvage uses which are based upon the low price of surplus crops , 
culls or gr ade two potatoes. In such uses as starch and alcohol manu-
facture , potatoes compete with grain and black strap molasses which are 
les s costly to handle generally.. Grain can be handled by gravity, sue-
tion or conveyors, whereas potatoes have required much hand labor hitherto. 
But since potato starch is a superior product commanding a premium price, 
staxch makers are prepared to use up t o 20 million bushels in the starch 
l plants in Maine and Idaho.. The location factor is important since 
pr oximi. ty to the sorting shed eliminates long haul and extra handling. 
1. United States Department of Agriculture, "Highlights of Potato 
Marketingn, Agriculture Information Bulletin 114, October, 1953, 
P• 6 
The culls must be removed from the grading shed at any rate, so it 
is no more costly to deliver them to a nearby starch factory than to 
dump them. Prices range f rom 15 cents to 50 cents a hnndredweight.1 
A second locat i on factor arises from the factor of weight loss in 
processing; 100 pounds of potatoes make about ten pounds of starch 
which can be more easily moved under some conditions.1 
In one government demand creation deal, the Publicker · 
Industries announced that it had purchased from 3 to 6 million bushels 
of potatoes from government surplus stocks for a nominal sum. These 
were to be delivered to the Publicker plant in Philadelphia, at a 
reduced t ransportati on rate, from grarTing , areas in New York and Penn-
syl vania8 Publicker is a large manufacturer of industrial alcohol and 
chemicals82 
These industrial sales would not be possible 'Wi. thout the price 
concessions made to the industrialists. These buyers, however, are tak-
ing only rejects and surplus stock, whereas experiments have shown that 
institutional users could aff ord to pay a premium for potatoes segre-
gated into more uniform sizes. This separation into size clas ses can 
be accomplished most efficiently at the time the potatoes are graded 
for market.3 We can say that some of the effort in demand creation in 
the industrial area will be based on price concessions but that another 
portion will be based on developing products suited to t he needs of the 
market. 
1.. Ib1d .. 
28 Associated Press, fashington, D. c., Febr~ary 10, 1950 
3. United States Department of Agriculture, "Potato Marketing Agree-
ments Under Federal Legislation11 , October, 1954 
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This is well expressed by the authors of "Highlights of 
Potato Marketing111 as follows: 
"Processing. Approximately 10 per cent of the 
potatoes sold for food purposes are processed 
before being sold to the consumer into such 
products as potato chips, fro zen french fries, 
canned whole potatoes, and dehydrated potat oes 
and in mixed f oods such as soups and hash. 
Under a recent development potatoes are partially 
processed, that i s t hey are peeled f or sale to 
institutions such as restaurants, hotels, schools, 
and hospitals . The processing of potatoes is 
mentioned here to point out that buyers of pota-
toe used f or these purposes usually demand 
varieties, types, grades, or sizes suitable for 
their particular uses. Processors are i nterested 
in uriformly good quality as a means of increas-
ing their volume of sales. Potato growers and 
country shippers are vitally interested i n enlarg-
ing the business of these processors in order to 
expa.11d the consumption of potatoes. Growers and 
shippers should do everything possible in both 
gro1"1ing and handling potatoes to meet the exacting 
specifications of the various processors. 
"Because t he volume of potatoes absorbed for a 
particular use is small, that use should never be 
underrated until its market potential has been 
thoroughly tested and explored. Only 20 years ago 
potato chips were largely pr ocessed in home kitchens 
or in small restaurants and most of them were sold, 
either in bulk or i n any type of package. In a 
relati vely short . eriod of time the chip industry 
has progressed f or many small plants operated by 
individuals to a relatively few centrally located 
plants. Many of t he chip manufacturers have large 
processing plants and distribute their pr oduct over 
a wide area. 
rtThe use. of potatoes for processing into chips has 
been an important factor in checking the normal down-
ward trend in potato consumption. It is estimated 
that the volume has increased about 10 per cent in 
each of the recent years . In 19 ·slightly more tha...rt 
23 million bu hels of pota-i:,oes were processed into 
chips. Chip manufacturers have continually expanded 
1.. Uni·ted States Department of Agriculture, "Highlights of Potat o 
Marketi ng", Op. cit., pp. 3-4 
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11their sales volume by producing a quality product, 
packaged in the type and size of container demanded 
by the consumer and by effective promotional work 
by the industry. n 
Another group in the industrial market whose dem n could 
be further developed are the frozen french f ried potato processors .. 
At present many processors of frozen french fries use them as a means 
of keeping freezing and packing pl~~ts busy in t he off eason. This 
method of processing potatoes is relatively new and still exp nding 
rap · dly. Most of the almost two mil ion bushels sold in frozen form 
in 1951 were packed by a few large companies that handle a wide variety 
1 
of frozen f oods. These conpanies stress high quality in raw material 
and finished product. The product should continue to expand in volume 
ince the consumer is constantly searching for good- quality foods ich 
can be erved with a minimum of preparation and in little time. 2 
Frozen french fries are ideal since they can be taken directly from the 
freezer, spr ead out on a pie plate, and put into the oven in less than 
a minute. In addition, they are priced s mewhat in line with the cost 
of home preparation. 2 As a result, they are the biggest seller in the 
frozen food field i n 1955, according to George Moore of the First 
National Stores. However, that does not mean that they have reached 
the limit of their growth for in t he last survey available to the writer 
11 the actual number of respondents who had bought frozen french fried 
potatoes was so small that detailed tabulations based on their attitude 
~. Anglo-American Council on Productivity, Fruit and Vegetable Utiliza-
tion Producti >ri ty Team Report, London, p. 
2.. United States Department of Agriculture, "Highlights of Potato 
Marketing", Op . cit. , p .. 4 
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toward the product are not statistically reliable". 1 If this type of 
processing shows patterns of growth similar to tho e of the potato chip 
industry discussed above, it will achieve a much greater volume in the 
coming years. However, producers may be able to help develop the . ar-
ket hrough i n titutional advertising and promotion act·vit ies,. as well 
as through pricing and quality controls; beyond the point rhere the 
processors th selves could develo it. Witnes the effectiveness of 
the orange growers in C lifornia in t his ar 2 ., "T pr d ion f ci r · s 
fr i s ha mor e than doubled since 1930, yet demand has been so stiw~-
late tha this creatly inc eased pro uct ·on been mark f'd t rub= 
s n ially higher price than growers v oald h ve received from equal 
volumes of the fresh f ruit."3 Much credit is given to the ne me h ds 
of canning and freezing in creating demand but the Califo nia oranr:re 
gro ~rs gave utmost cooperation to the innovators of the new techniQues 
The orange growers have frequently ccepted m ch lo er ret~rn on r uit 
for proces ing than on fruit of comparable quality for the fresh market. 
The economic reasoning behind this is quite simple. When prod cers are 
able to control the allocation of a raw product betvreen different uses, 
(as -with California orange growers ), they sometim:ls find it advantageous 
to set different prices for the raw product i n each use. Larkets for 
the end uses of the product are often competitive and some consumers 
will 1rary their purchases i n response to changes in the relative prices 
1. United States Department of Agriculture, 11Potato Preferences Amo g 
Household Consumers", Miscellaneous Publication 667, 'la shington, 
D. c. , 1948, P• 31 
2. United States Department of Agriculture, Marketing, Yearbook of 
Agriculture, ~ashington, D. Ce, 1954, P~ 341 
3. Ibid., p. 122 
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of he given and all competitive products. So it is necessary to set 
different competitive prices on each product use j_n order to control 
or maximize each use so as to maximize total income for the whole crop .. 
Since potatoes are more vddely grown than oranges with many more actual 
and potential producers, such techniques would be more difficult in the 
potato industry but not necessarily i mpossible, as we shall see below 
in our discussion of starch. 
In the second field of demand creat"on, the development of 
new uses, we can refer to the experiments being made by Dr. H. c. D"ckey 
at the Maine Agr:Lcultural Experiment Station which indicate that dried 
potato pulp can be substituted for hominy in a dairy ration ·with no 
adverse effect on milk produ.ction. The cost of dryin..g the pulp using 
present equipment and techniques, prevents its use, however, so more 
must be done on this problem to develop a market for culls and secon -
grade stocks in the dairy industry .. 
The starch manufacturers also need an economical method of 
converting the pomace (the residue of the potatoes after the starch is 
l 
removed) into a profitable by-product. The lack of such a product 
places a low limit on what the starch manufacturers can pay for raw 
materials by making them entirely dependent on the price of starch 
which is usually low.2 
In order to sell potatoes to starch makers, the producers are 
accustomed to charge what the end product will bear. The producers of 
l. Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Monthly Review, . March, 1954, P• 3 
2.. The Aroos oo Republican of Marcn-31, 1955 reports the prod. ction 
and sale of cattle feed made of pomace by the Colby Cooperat "ve 
Star h Co .. which may indicate solution of this problem is alre dy 
a complished. Production of 12 tons of feed a dayvdth 2 ons of 
starch is planned in this plant. The dried pulp is high in sugar 
content bulk and free from dust which makes it palatable to cattle. 
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pot toes are able to all ocate their product by grade diff erent · a.t · on, 
geogr phic isolation and time of saLe. The potatoes bo g t b~· stare 
mwcers are very inferior for other uses , would cost too much to t r ans-
port and often are sold when they are too old for table use or process-
ing int.o food. 
Utilization of the Potato Crop1 
A crop of 350 million bushels, under present conditions, vrould 
be disposed of about as follows: 
Use 
Food (domestic use in fresh or processed form) 
Exports* 
Seed 
I ndustrial Products 
Feed shrinkage and other loss 
Total 
Million 
Bushels 
283 
5 
32 
6 
24 
350 
*Exports would be offset by imports of about 3. 5 million 
bushels for use as food and seed mostly from Canada. 
Applications of latest research findings by growers gives Maine 
producers 45 per cent of the certified seed market. They not only provide 
local table stock growers with seed but bring added income to the area by 
6 · 
selling its product to other potato producing areas at a prew.ium over table 
stock prices. 2 In this way the certified seed industry is expandi ng the 
market for Aroostook potatoes. There are some farmers yet who do not buy 
1. United States Department of Agriculture, "Hi ghlights of Potat o rarket-
ing", Op. ··cit., p.. 2 
2.. Ibid. , P• 2 
certified seed to plant so that this market still has room for expansion 
and development domestically and perhaps in foreign trade. 
The most important industrial outlet which pot~.to producers can 
develop through education is adequately described in 11Highlights of Pota-
to Marketing11 as follows: 
11The la:ryest potential outlet for low-grade and surplus 
potatoes is for livestock feed. Although central and 
northern Europeans have for generations fed potatoes to 
livestock, the value of potatoes as stock feed has not 
been appreciated in this country until recently. It 
has been difficult for potatoes to compete successfully 
wi.th corn and other feed grains which can be grovm easily 
and economically throughout most of the United States. 
Potatoes have a feeding value about equal to corn ensilage, 
or somewhere between a fourth and a fifth of the value of 
good-quality corn. The feed value and the most economical 
feeding rates have not been determined for potatoes as 
accurately as they have for many of the other feed prod-
ucts, but i t is known that large quantities of potatoes 
have been fed to livestock within the last 10 years i'dth 
very good results. 
"In nearly all instances dairymen have reported an increase 
in milk production when potatoes are fed. Some farmers 
have fed feeder steers nothing but potatoes for 90 to 100 
day's with f~.ir success but this practice is not reconnnended. 
Potatoes should be fed in a well-balanced ration. They 
make an excellen feed for beef cattle that are being fed 
dry rations m1ch as grain and hay. 
nBecause of their bulk and weight, the feeding of potatoes 
presents special problems . One of the biggest problems has 
been the assa~ance of a fairly uniform volume over a peri od 
of 90 days or more. Potatoes are highly perishable and 
must be protected from frost during the 'vinter months. 
This means that the livestock feeder in the late-production 
areas either must haul directly from a packing shed on a 
day-to-day basis or obtain his potatoes from a nearby stor-
age house. The feeder cannot change rations at frequent 
intervals and maintain profitable gains. Since it requires 
400 to 500 pounds of potatoes to equal the feeding value of 
1. Ibid., P• 7 
"100 pounds of corn, it is obvious t hat the livestock 
feeder cannot afford to move these potatoes many times 
before they are fe d to the ivestock~ Therefore , a 
l i t t le ingenuity and cooperation between the potato 
gr owers or l ocal deal ers are required to keep the live-
stock f eeder supplied with a fairly uniform volume of 
potatoes over a peri od of time . 11 
The third method of demand creation, product di f f erentiation, 
has been thoroughly discus ... ed previously in respect to exploi ting exis -
ing demand. However, some slightly different approach i s needed to cr eate 
new demanda As an illustrat ion, the technique used by some producers in 
the beer industry to ~~e beer acceptable by showing t hat t he ir beer i s 
not fatt ening is an attempt to develop a female marke t . Since some people 
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avoid potatoes as fattening, the industry must show they are not as f att en- · 
i ng as supposed by the public. In fact, ten pounds of potatoes and a pint 
of milk are almost a bal anced diet for one day 1 For exampl e , i n di scuss-
i ng the f ood value of potat oes, the Bureau of HQman Nutrition and Home 
Economics of the Department of Agriculture says ••••• 2 
1. Theodore W. Schultz, The Economic Organization of Agriculture, McGraY~ 
Hil l Book Comp~, Inc., New York, 1953, pp. 89-90 
The low-cost diets that circumstances have imposed on people, for 
instance, the Irish subsistence on potatoes, should be instructive. 
How adequate was the Irishman's diet around 1800 when it consisted of 
about 10 pounds of potatoes and l pint of milk a day? An excellent 
recent st udy, by K. n. Connell, The Population of Ireland, l?S0-1845 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1950), includes the relevant data 
and f inds that this diet was surprisingly satisfactory. Connell used 
the National Research Council's Recommendations adjusted downw•ard 30 
per cent for minerals and vitamins. To test this typical Irishman • s 
diet of that time against current information on food nutrients and 
recommendations, the writer obtained the following calculations from 
the Bureau of Nutri·tion and Home Economics which indicates that this 
diet, except for Vitamin A, is quite abundant in the nutrients 
required (see table on following page): 
2. United States Department of Agriculture, "Highlights of Potato Market-
ingn, Op . ci t., p .. .3 
Ol • '0 
· ~ Q) tf ..... ~ • • 0 tf p s:l • aS F-t 
.f1 < • ... . .... tf Item ~~ "' • H ~ ~ . 0 s:l • ~ . § ff s::: ..... Remarks ..... ~ ~s ~ .. ·~ s:l ..0 • 0 Q) • ObO ..... ~ CH[?f ..... ~ ~ '0 +>S ~ 0 c: .8 0 0 0 M ~ ~ 0 ~raJ :a Ill 0 0 F-t 
.tl ;g ..... Cl) 1%. ~ 1%. 0 0 I> I> E-1 z < 
Potatoes, 10 lb. A.P •• 3,176 76.0 4.0 728.0 420 27.0 700 4.00 1.50 44.0 640& Data based on u. s. Dept. 
Agr. Handbook 8, 1950 
Milk, whole 1 pint, 588 
gm. (1/8 imp. gal.) 399 20.5 22.8 28.7 690 0.6 940 0.23 0.99 0.6 6 
Total potatQes and 
milk •••••••• 3,575 96 27 757 1,110 28 1,640 4.2 2.5 45 646 
Recommended daily dietary 3, 000 70 •••• • •••• 1 12 5,000 1.5 1.8 15 75 National Research Council, 
allowances, man 1948 
physically actiTe 
Nutrients in 100 grams or indicated quantity. 
It should also be noted that only about 1 per cent-of the calories are supplied by fat, whereas 20 to 25 per cent 
are considered desirable . 
~ear-round average. 
0' 
-.J 
"Potatoes fit into any meal. You may serve them at 
breakfast, dinner, or supper~ And potatoes need not 
be fattening~ One medium-sized potato has about 100 
calories - no more than an apple or banana, and only 
half the calories of a medium-sized piece of pie or 
·a hamburger and roll. If you 1 re watching weight, 
watch what you put on the potatoes. It's the gra:vy, 
butter or other fat that 'piles up'calories. And 
it's the t otaL of all the f oods you eat that adds the 
pounds." 
The industry might show how to season with vinegar or paprika 
for those on a diet.. In other words, differentiate between the qualities 
of finished products. 
Another way of looking at this type of differentiation is in 
the gains which this industry has already made i n selling potatoes in 
cooked frozen forms. OVer 80 million pounds of pot atoes processed into 
mashed, french fried, pancakes, patties, and other forms was sold in 
1954 .. 1 
Each neYr successful type of product creates some new customers 
to add to the old purchasers of plain raw potatoes. Even if the millions 
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of United States households were just to try the new products once, potato 
producers would sell mi:llions of bushels of potatoes. But these products 
are not the type that are purchased once then forgotten. They are bought 
repeatedly.. Undoubtedly, they will r eplace fresh potatoes in s ome cases. 
But they y;ill also create sales where none.existed before. People without 
time or inclination or facilities to prepare fancy potato dishes can now 
have them ready in minutes. They could perhaps be promoted now as quick-
to-prepare breakfast foods . Frozen potato pancake batter is easier to 
1. Bernice Stevens Decker, 11Taste Test Rates Frozen Foods Tops 11 , Christian 
Science Monitor, Bo ton, April 1, 1955 
use for instance than biscuit mix and potato pancakes are just as 
traditional. The industry could promote them as a midnight snack 
or a side dish for r egular meals or as an emergency food for un-
expected g~ests. 
This type of differentiation aims at showing the customers 
that pot atoes are not one product with one service, but many products 
'th . l va. many servJ.ces. You remove potatoe s f rom the class of "infer ior 
foods" when you succeed. i n this aim. 
Another technique of demand creation is based upon the packag-
ing techniques such as those in use in the tomato repack trade. If 
people get a quality item in a fancy package, they ~~11 buy more or they 
vdll buy something they· do not customarily buy because it has eye appeal 
as well as quality connotations. 
Packaging can have more practical i mpli cations as far as demand 
creation is concerned. . 2 As one study has expressed it recently: 
np ackaging has undergone a radical change, as the trend 
toward smaller homes. has led to the substitution of 5 
to 15 pound paper sacks for the old 50 and 100 pound 
burlap bags. 11 
But even this 1954 statement is obsolete practice for today the 
housewife has exhibite positive buying response to smaller sized t r ans-
parent plastic bags in which she can see washed, flawless potatoes . In 
other words , she wants to be able to see what she is buying, and ·what s he 
sees should represent labor savings in cleaning and peeling in the case 
1. Committee of New England of the National Planning Association, The 
Economic Stat e of New England, Yale University Press, New Haven-, -
1954, p. 111 
2. Secretary of Agriculture Benson on the radio program American Forum 
called this "built-in maid service" . station WBZ, Boston, April 17, 
1953 
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of potat,oes. Since more '1\Umen are v-10rking in our society than bef r e 
the war, income has gone up and • omen must be free of unnecessary 
drudgery. I ncreased income means more expensive foods and l e s s pota-
t oes, as we already have noted in our historical studies. But potato 
prod cer can regain some of the lost rna ket by packaging the prod ct 
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in su.ch a way as to give the product luxury appeal and ease of prepara-
tion for V~hich the customer ·will, willingly pay. This is dem nd creation 
in its best sense, and business competition in its highest level. Demand 
creat ion of this sort can be carried on by individual producers nd/or 
·small groups under brar.d-name protection so that the promoters 'lill obtain 
the greatest p rt of the benefits .. 
The producer must utilize demand creation if he is to maximize 
his income and perhaps his profits as we shall soon see. There are many 
methods of increasing the total demand for a product.. Not one is exclu.sive 
and not one should be neglected by the potato producer who must fight com-
petition from all the foodstuffs that nature produces - vd.th the added 
disadvantage of an inelastic short-run demand. 
Minimizing Costs 
The second category into which the problems of marketing can be 
classified is that of cost minimization. Marketing or distribution costs 
are one of the a~eas of economics which deserve much more attention than 
they have been given in the past. This perhaps has been more true of the 
nota to i ndus ry than of industry in general until r ecently. As one 
f . 't 1 group o exper~s e presses l : 
11The developments of the past few years (surplus 
and low prices, etc.) have also produced a r apid 
shif from research on potato production alone to 
combined research on production and marketing 
techniques. · :So far, there has been comparatively 
little research on new methods of merchandisi ng 
and selling potatoes .. " 
It has been our intention throughout this paper to showy th t 
this is one of the most important problems that the potato industry 
faces -
The most important functions performed by the potato indu try 
in marketing the crop are sto age, transportation, handling, gra i n,.. and 
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packaP"ing at present.. Each of these operations involve costs and spoilage. 
There are other functions which should be included in any summary of cost 
factors in the industry and these include advertising, promotion, risk 
taking, financing, information and selling services generally. I n prac-
t ' cally all f these there is room for cost cutting, but by actually 
increasing our expenditures on some, we may maxi111ize out total savings on 
all. I n this category of discussion as in all others, we shall endeavor 
to discuss each topic separately but in thi s as i n all others, we shall 
.find that the t opics arE~ inextricably inteMiDYen., 
After the crop is mat"J.red and ready to be picked, the fi rst step 
in marketing is begun because maturity means the form utility aspects of 
production are complete and creation of place, time, and possession 
1. Committee of New England of the National Planning Association, The 
Economic State of New England, Yale University Press, New Haven-, --
1954, p. 117 
utilities are about to begin. We shall, therefore, includ certain 
aspects of harvesting in our discussion of marketing. We are arb · trary 
in this division because there is no clear cut natural division between 
production and market · ng .. Y~e feel that since the declsion as to "Whether 
to harvest depends on ~~ket f act ors rr.ore than upon production f actor , 
that it is a marketing area.. Beyond this, however, some potatoe are 
sold run-of-the-field m1d so are actually sold as harvested, and trans~ 
ferred directly from the field to the buyer's warehouse~ Our decision 
coincides with that of A. Clinton Cook of the United States Departmnt 
of Agriculture in the booklet "Highlights of Potato M:arketing". 
Handline and Cost Minimization 
If the harvesting operat · on is co sidered as the first handl" ng 
o eration, uch sav · ng should be possible i n potato handling and spoilage 
costs . Vfe shall rely much on th only new study available to us in this 
subject area, one made :Ln Aroostook County, Maine, by vi liam E. Schrumpf~ 
F.ovrever, potato harvesting is much the same anyv.nere so that conclusions 
drawn by S hrumpf should apply to the whole U.S.A . 
"Each year th•3 harvesting of the potato crop in Aroostook 
County is race against time. Generally the crop is not 
mature enough for digging before September 12, and even 
then it is often necessary to kill the potato· vines 
artificially~ After October 12, there is always the like-
lihood of severe damage from freezing. Moreover, during 
this time, there are usually several days of bad weather 
that retard :igging. In practice, therefore, there are 
usually only 18 to 20 working days in which to harvest 
Aroostook Co·~~ty1 s 40 to 60 million bushels of potatoes. 
This situation makes rapid handling necessary. However, 
potatoes· are easily bruised and excessive damage from 
bruising needs to be avoided.. Care, therefore , as -v.rell 
as speed is e sential. 1!1 
1~ William E. Schrwnpf1 11Prqctices, Costs and Tuber Bruising in Digging 
Potatoes in Aroostook County, Maine11 , Bulletin 472, Maine Agricultural 
Experiment Station, Orono, Maine, ~949, p. 9 
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The im ortant problems in harvesting are the re lative speed, 
the number of workers and rat es of br uisi ng of the various me t hods 
employed. 
The average rate of digging with single row equipment was 332 
barrels per day and with double row equipment 732 barrel s . The average 
cost per barrel for single row digging was 32 cents and f or double- r ow 
digging 28 cents. As the rate of digging increases, the cost per barrel 
decreases as it does when a helper or tender rides on the digging machine. 
Digging ~~s most efficient in respect to both rate and cost where the 
vines were dead, the fields were free from weeds and stones , the l and is 
level, and the soil moist but not soggy. Increased speed often results 
in increased bruising, however, and a distinct need was seen for padding 
on surfaces vmich the potatoes contact. 
Another problem for farmers is the r elat ion of the number of 
workers t o the machine . If there are too few workers, the machine is 
idled, if there are too many, the workers are idle. This factor i s 
complicated by the yield, if it is low the costs per barrel are high; 
and by the length of the row, short rows have higher costs. Al though 
bruising was only half as much as was found in a 1932 study, it is still 
averaging 11.!~ per cent which is excessive. Much of this reduction in 
bruising is due to improvement in digging machine designs and to the 
introduction of new potato varieties. Fields with either vreeds of 
stones tended to have 50% more bruising than weed-free or stone-free 
acreages. 
3 
rrFor several years ther e have been attempts to design1 
a digger combine that, for ftxoostook County conditions 
of rather stony soil and rolling topography, would lift 
the tubers from t he soil and deposit them by means of 
conveyor belts directl y i nto receptacles instead of 
dropping t hem back on the ground as in the present 
method. Such attempts have been under observation since 
1944 .. 
"In the early combine trials there vrere many breakdovms 
because of str uctural defects and t uber bruising was 
excessive, grade bruising alone running up to an esti-
mated 20 to 25 per cent. 
"In a later trial (19~.7) forty acres were dug Ydth a 
single-row potato combine manufactured in Aroost ook 
County. The observed capacity of this combine averaged 
331 barrels per day compared Ynth 332 barrels per day 
for conventional single-row digging. The digging cost 
was 26 cents per barrel compared vdth 3~ cents. Total 
tuber bruising averaged 45 per cent more for this co~ 
bine than for average digging although grade bruising 
was less. 
11An experimental combine .in trials initiated in 1948 
primarily to test structural fitness under adverse 
conditions of stones and land slope, dug potatoes at 
a...11 average rate of 450 barrels per day and at a cost 
of 21 cents per barrel. Grade bruising in these t r ials 
was 22 per cent less and minor bruising 15 per cent 
less than comparable bruising from conventional singl e-
row digging in stony soil." 
What conclusions can be drawn from this summary of problems? 
Schrumpf concludes that there is a need for more padding on machinery 
and care on the tractor operators part to prevent bruising. He also 
concludes that the combine digger-picker might have several benefits 
with further deveiopment . The labor force needed to harvest the crop 
could be much reduced, perhaps up to one-fourth, and labor of different 
i. Ibid., pp. 8-9 
quality could be utilized as the work would be lighter . The -v-;orking day 
could be ~engthened by using artificial light supplied by the tractor. 
As indicated by the cost per barrel obtained in trials, costs could be 
reduced. 
There are other observations wPich we can make here, howev er. 
One is that since machines have been constructed to r emove stones from 
fields, and since the cost of doing such a job could be amortized over 
a long period, that it might profit some farmers to have their f ields 
corrected since rocks not only damage the crop but a~so slow digging 
and raise costs. Stones so removed can be utilized for road building, 
ci ster ns and terracinga1 A second point which we may make is that sime 
each handling damages the potatoes, the present hand picking me thods can 
be improved even vvithout machiner y. 2 Pickers ~no use sacks should use 
heavy wei ght sacks which will protect the potatoes from bruising as they 
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ar e dragged across the ground. The United States Department of Agriculture 
r eports that in hot dry weather heavy sacks can also prate t the pot atoes 
from the drying and heating effect of the sun and ~~nd. 2 Heating or freez-
ing cause the potatoes to rot in storage and the presence of a few rotten 
ones mixed in with the bu~k of he al t hy potatoes during the grading process 
will cause terminal buyers to evaluate the shipment as low grade. In 
addition to heavy sacks, potatoes can be covered with tarpaulin while on 
the trucks as protection against sun and wind.1 
l. A f riend from Aroostook, Ernest Lander, whom I consulted on my thesis 
tells me that farmers are utilizing their new potato combines to pick 
their fields clear of stones this sprin~. He says the combines are 
now in commercial production. There are professional s oil conditioning 
services which will sterilize soil to clear it of potato scab, etc. , 
in California. 
2. United States Department of Agricult ure, "Highlights of Potato arket-
· ngn, Op. cit .. ~ pp. 15-1'7 
Among the other precautions which can be utilized at virtually 
no cost are t nese. Idaho Experiment Station r ecommends slow speed for 
the digger , covering metal with old rubber tubes, and eli.mi ation o.f 
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situations where potatoes drop more than 6 inches .. 1 In Maine, the hand 
pickers put their potatoes in baskets, then d mp the baskets in barrel ~ 
This dumping causes three to four per cent bruising which could be e lim-
inatede2 The truck bed used to haul potatoes should be covered with 
sponge rubber or even just a layer of sacks and str aw to prevent bruising. 
These are mere expedients, however, for as the Department of 
Agriculture says: 3 
"During the last few decades the harvesting of many farm 
crops has been radically changed, simplified, and speeded 
up, with consequent savings in cost, by applying po•-ver and 
mechanical methods to the jobs. The old hand methods of 
harvesting and hauling potatoes on commercial farms appear 
to be giving way to mechanical operations, requiring fe1ver 
hands to get the job done. M.any combine harvesters , either 
homemade or manufactured by machinery companies, are in 
the process of development. Most of the combine harvest,ers 
have attachments for elevating the potatoes, from he digger 
chain, over a: short picldng belt for the removal of trash, 
vines~ and tones. The elevator t hen depo its the potatoes 
into a dump truck or into a truck with a V-shaped bed and 
an unloading conveyor at the bottom of the V ~ An Iowa 
grower has gone one step further, placing the potatoes from 
the mechanical pickup into 4- by 4-foo boxes ;1hich ho~ 
approximately 40 bushels of potatoes. These boxes - 6 on 
a dual-wheeled truck are hauled to the storage or grading 
shed and handled by fork-lift truclcs. In this operation 
the potatoes are stored in the boxes ~ This eliminates many 
of the pres~~re bruises and much of the mechanical damage 
caused by unloading into and out of bins .. 
"Everything points to the fact that there is less mechanical 
injury to potatoes in combine harvesting and hauling i n bulk 
or large boxes than in the conventional methods of hand 
1.. Clayton P. Libeau, "Marketing Potatoes for Consumer Approval", 
Experiment Station Bulletin 285, University of Idaho, Moscow, Idaho, 
~951, p. 12 
2. United States Department of Agriculture, "Highlights of Potato Market-
ing", Op .. cit., pp. 15-17 
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"picking and hauline in sacks nd b rrels. Research 
information also indicates that some potatoes are 
mechanicall i njur ed each time they are hanclled, 
r egardless of how carefully they are moved. It would 
appear that proper handling of potatoes in palletized 
40-bushel boxes vrould afford the most efficient method 
of handling and storing them, even though the initial 
investment be higher. Information on the 1952 harvest 
indicates that the cost of large boxes and lift trucks 
at storage warehouses can be offset by reduced harvest-
ing and unloading cost s of producers of more than 20,000 
bushels of potatoes." 
Fork lifts and pallets are fast, efficient, r equire no back-
breaking labor, and do no damage to products. This 1mthod would tie 
i ery well with the needs of minimizing wind and sun damage if 
tarpaulin is used to cover the boxes and also should coordinat e ell 
wi h storage needs. Each farmer must frequently determine whether 
the savings in using machinery will offset the costs of the equipment 
which is constantly being improved.l 
All the points of criticism are points at which costs of 
handling or spoilage rise and each one represents a separate problem 
for the farmer. Any plan to help the farrer must help him to solve 
smaLl problems such as these as well as the l arge obvious problem of 
over-production. 
storage and Cost Minimization 
One of the most important functi ons t hat the producer perf rms 
ar · ses out of the f ct that pota oes are perishable and damaged by · 
e·v-ery movement. Because of this, late potatoes usually remain at the 
herm n P oducts, Inc., Royal Oak, Mic igan, ha a e r fork-lift 
att chment, for example, to conve·rt an ordinary farm tra or into 
a fork-lift trQck capable of lifting two tons ten feet. 
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original point of storage until they start on their way to the ultilnate 
consumer. Most potatoes are stored in bulk in bins ·which are cooled 
by t e circulation of nioht air. Early potatoes (late spring to early 
fall) are seldora stored because they are innnature, because artificial 
refrigeration would be necessary in the warm season, and because prices 
usually fall as the season progresses, so that storage would not pay 
at any rate.1 
Most potatoes are stored on the farm or at railroad sidings 
near the farm. There are advantages to both systems. Storage at the 
farm minimizes trackside congestion, costs of tru.cldng, and time required 
for hauling at harvest time, and gives the farmer income-producing activ-
ity during the winter,. Storage at the track insures that potato c n 
- shipped on days when extreme cold or deep snow would prevent auling 
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from fann to shipping point. 1J'Jhere winter temperatures are mild, it is 
difficult to store potatoe s for more than three to four months ·without 
artificial refrigeration. ~~ere winters are extremely cold, hea·in y 
necessary. Both air circulation and humidity must be controlled. 
Although air circulation through bins results in effective cooling~ it 
causes great shrinkage. In late crop areas, shell cooling reduces shriru(-
age and preserves better table quality. This process consists of circula-
ting air under and around the bins having tight floors and sides rather 
than through the mass of potatoes. Poor air circulation causes potatoes 
to sprout while condensation dripping from the roof causes rot and both 
of these destroy the value of the crop. 2 
1. United States Department of Agriculture, rtHighlights of Potato Ji~arket­
ing", Op. cit., p. 20 
2. Ibid. , p. 21 
One of the biggest problems is that of handling pota oes · 
and out of storage . It irrvol;res both labor costs and losses due to 
m chanical damage of the tubers. Most of the damage and he exce s 
handling can be prevented. One way to do this1 i s by the use of the 
40 bushel pallet boxes for storage just as they are brought from the 
ne ' combi nes which load them in the fields . These boxes are unlo ded 
f r om the trucks by fork-lift devices and can be stored loosely to allow 
air circulationw ~~en potatoes are to be sold, a2 
11 system has been developed whereby these boxes can 
be tilted i nto the grader hopper with a device that 
forms a partial lid over the box so that the pota-
toes can be gradually poured into the hopper. If 
potatoes are properly handled, this sy t ern should 
reduce mechanical injury in handling to the grader 
by 50 per cent or mor e.' 
The heavy initial cost of these boxes should be offset by·tne 
savings on wire picking baskets and field sacks or barrels, which normally 
are rather costly. 
What we are discus sing here is the utilization of the unit-load 
principle which has several adv antages in warehousing whether performed 
by farmer or wholesaler.. This principle may be stated as folloN·s: 3 
"The more pieces or pounds of merchandise it is possible 
to combine in a unit that can be moved in a single handl-
ing operation, the lower the cost of moving each piece or 
pound and the shorter the tL~ required to move a physical 
volume of goods~" 
In addi t.ion to lower costs and rapid movement unit loads in bin 
pallets makes possible stacking of merchandise without crushing and good 
1. Ibid .. , p .. 22 
2. Ibid. 
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3. Bec~nan and Engle, ~Wholesaling, Ronald ?ress, New York, 1951, Chapter 23 
hoJ.sekeeping in the form of orderly stacks. Physical inventory is 
facilitated because you merely count the pallets and there is less 
merchandise damage.. There are other methods of handling, . s:.1ch as 
the "continuous flow11 type, however, these do not seem as well adapted 
to potato handling. 
There are other aspects of warehouse cost pattern which 
deserve attention.. The physical facilities of many potato houses which 
1 
do consumer packaging are still inadecpate. Their work areas are too 
small to accommodate the grading, sizing and packaging equipment neces-
sary to do ' the job efficiently .. Correction ~f such plant deficiencies 
is necessary for the future prosperity of potato growers. 
8 
We can say that this is definitely an area in which the farmer 
has many problems. As labor becomes more expensive, it becomes increas-
ingly worth while to avoid extra or inefficient work in storage areas. 
And, as better methods of storage which will avoid crop damage and 
deterioration are developed, it might be wise to adopt them even if costs 
were to increase. Ho~~ver, there does not seem to be any danger of cost 
increase for wherever pallets are used for storage, as an example, costs 
usually come down. Each farmer, however, should have the accounting 
tools at his disposal to determine how he may control his costs so as to 
i ncrease in his net profits. It is, after all, net profits, not low cost s 
or high income alone w~ich determines each farmer's prosperityw 
1. Committee of New England of National Planning Association, The Economic 
Sta e of New England, Yale Press, New Haven, 1954, p .. 117 
Gr ading, Packaging and Cost J'Jlinimization 
"Gradi ng of potatoes and vegetables is a relatively recen 
development. About 40 years ago there was virtually no grading or 
sizing of potatoes .. nl Even today the industry is developing new grades 
and new methods of grading. Obviously, there is an uppe:r;- limitation 
t o the amount of gr ading and sizing that is economical, but it is still 
doubtful as to whether the i ndustry has gone ' far enough to obt ain max-
imum returns .2 However, there is no doubt that the industry i s begin-
ning t o do something in this area. This season (1954-55) there are 58 
potato Vfashers in operation in Maine as compared with about a dozen a 
year ago 3 In 1953 alone .the Maine Agricultural Experiment Station 
conducted experiments i n washing, drying, shipping containers and plastic 
bags for consumer packages~ These folio~~d studies in past years on 
grade quality at shippi ng points, quality at r etail s tores , consumer 
acceptan e of sized potatoes, and consumer acceptance of was 1ed potatoes. 
These all showed that higher gr ades and quality were not only acceptable 
to the consumer but commercially feasible. These findings have been 
borne out by actual r esults: 4 
"1 Sized potatoes in visual containers have been well 
accept ed,• a department sunmary said. 'There is an 
increased demand.. Most Maine ·wholesalers have trie d 
the pack and very consistent sales have resulted~ 
u 1 Out-of-state markets in which the washed and sized 
potatoes have been especially well r ecei ved include 
t he Springfield, Mass., and Hartfor~, Conn. , areas.' 
l. United States Department of Agriculture, "Highlights of Potato Market-
i ng", Op . cit., p. 23 
2. Ibid., p. 2b (See also Demand Creation and Profit ~ imization Section 
of this paper.) 
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J . New Engl and Council, 11The New Englander", Boston, Mass . , January, 1955, 
p . 39 
4. Ibid. 
"The report noted that I1.hlne Russet Burbanlcs, which 
1 ere marketed f or the first time last year, are 1 more 
in evidence and have proved very popular with the 
trade .. 1 " 
However, each added operation brings· added cost s which must 
be minimized if the operation is to be worth w1ile to the consu_rner. 
Let us examine some of the problems the producers and shippers must 
solve . 
Probably the most important probl ems are involved i n choosing 
the standards by which the potatoes must be graded. All grade standards 
have some tolerances for defects and sizes . (U. s. No. l has 6% external 
defect grade toler ance . ) Some shippers make a pr actice of staying well 
within the limits of toler ance while others try to let as much 11 go under 
the wire" as possible . To eliminate tolerances would add t o the costs 
of grading; and in some lots or with some types of defect, it would be 
impossible to detect all defective potatoes if toleran?es were eliminated. 
I n addition, potatoes are damaged enroute to the r etail store so that 
potatoes which were perfect at the shippi ng point would have about 4% 
damage at the ret ail l evel.1 
"The three basic grade classificatim s f or potatoes 
are U. S .. No. l, U. S.. o. 2, and culls. Culls or 
pickouts are not defined in the standards for grade, 
but they include any potatoes failing to ID..eet, from 
a quality standpoint, the standards for TT . • r o. 2 
or better. The other grades such as U. s. Fancy, 
U. s. Extra no . 1, and U. s. No . 1, S:tze A, are bet er 
than "J . S~ No .. l; and :J . S .. Commercial is in bet ·reen 
the No . 1 and No. 2 grades.. In conjuncti on wi th either 
t he u. s. To . 1 grade or the U. S. No . 2 grade, Size A 
1. United States Department of Agric·ilture, 11Highlights of Potato 
Marketing", Op. cit., p. 2 
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11 or Size B, a s well as any ot her size classification 
which a particular l ot. of potatoes meet, may be used. 
Some of the grades have special requirements for size 
and cleanliness, and permit fe~er defects or more 
tolerances for certain defects. Special State stand-
ards are generally based on modifications of t he u. s. 
standards a nd have been established to meet certain 
locali~ed condit ions. 
nu. s. consumer standards for potatoes were developed 
·with respect t o small-size consumer packages. Relativel y 
few shippers have used these consumer gr ades even though 
they have been in effect several years~ rost of the 
consumer-size packages at'e marked ' U. s. No. l' • 11 
There is a possibility of enlarging the market demand by ca-ter-
ing to special needs with finely- graded potatoe s, but it is also possible 
to carry grading to the point where costs exceed r eturns. If producers 
can find better ways of performing each operation or service , they can 
offer more at prices "V'ihich the consumer will pay. 
A second group of problems that the producers must solve in 
minimizing costs of performing new services for the customer are loca-
tional in nature. Where should potatoes be graded, on the farm, a.t the 
country assembly point, or in the terminal market? Grading on an average 
size farm is not nearly as uniform and may not be as efficient as that in 
centralized packing sheds . However, farm grading of late-crop potatoes 
can afford a better utilization of labor during the winter months. Cen-
tralized grading affords better use of machinery in washing, dr;ying and 
packaging, as well as increa sed specialization of labor. Terminal market 
operators (repack houses) have entered the business of grading, cleaning 
and packaging potatoes close to the market so that their product will be 
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in grade when delivered to the r etailer (i.e. , not damaged en ro 1te). 
Such packers can operate on a steady year-round basis thus spr eading 
overhead over a l arger quantity of product . However, labor costs, 
investment, and freight charge s will probably be higher. The latter 
will be higher in that freight will be paid on culls and dirt1 because 
they purchase field-run potatoes f . o.b. country shipping point • 
Farmers may have a choice of places to gr ade , but .they have a decisi on 
to ~ike as to which method i s best for.them. 
A third group of problems in min.i.mizing costs wh:Lle performing 
merchandise services for the customer arises out of the washir.g of 
potatoes. v;e have quoted studies showing that housewives prefer washed 
potatoes because they keep dirt out of the house, keep l~nds clean, and 
keep preparation down to a minimum. However, all potatoes are not 
satisfactorily washed at the present time. Excess bruising, disease, 
i mmaturity, and storage time prior to wasning may r esult i n an unsatis-
factory appearance of a washed potato. Such defects may not be so 
obvious on a dirty potato, as they are on a clean pot ato, although the 
house1vife will discover them eventually. But the farmer must decide 
whether his potatoes vr.i.ll be b.enefited by the extra expense of washing 
and drying. Washing vdll not sal vabe defective potatoes and if too 
many defective potatoes are washed, the consumer may bl ame t he washi ng 
rather than the producer. Thi s would l ower the value of ashed potatoes 
i n the consumers' eyes and lower the price the consumer ould pay f or 
washed spuds. 
i. Ibid., p. 28 
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The farmer has two basic problems here, the necessity of 
r educing the cost of washing, and the necessity of producing a product 
which is improved by washing. If washing provides a stimulus to grovf 
better variety and handle the crop with more care, it Yiill cut dovm 
on spoilage losses and grade losses as ·well .. 
In regard to a lo·w-er cost of washing and drying, the Maine 
Agricultural Experiment Station has made several studies i n this area,. 
In the firs.t study, an attempt was made to show the amount of money 
which would be invested in a potato washing and drying machine at 1952 
prices. The authors made it very clear that the equipment installed 
would cost about $10,000 which could be amortized at a rate of $1,295 
a year with interest for 10 years. If only 100 cars a year wer e washed, 
the cost would be three cents a hundredweight for amortization. But 
the machinery had a capacity of 2 carloads a day which on the basis of 
300 l'rorking days a year would be 600 cars a year. However, it woul d be 
more conservative to estimat e f ull capacity operation for only 150 work-
ing days which would give about 300 cars a year at one cent a hundred-
weight. These figures show plainly the need f or volume operation on a 
year-round basis as far as overhead is concerned. other costs ~~uld 
include space rentals, electric povrer and fuel for the hot air dryer.1 
The second Maine study was concerned -vd th reduction of the 
drying costs and possible effects of dampness on potatoes by substituti_~g 
sponge r ubber roller dryers for hot air dryers. The results were s 
f ollows: 
1. -vah L .. Perry, "Commercial Washing of Maine Potatoes" , Maine Agricul -
tural Exper iment St ation, Orono, Maine, 1953, p. 6 
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11 Some of t he advantages of sponge rubber roll 
drying over heat drying of washed Maine potatoes 
are l o-v.rer investment co&-t, lower installation 
expense, l es s space tru~en by the equipment , greater 
mobility of equipment , eliminat ion of fuel expen se, 
lower cost of mai nt enance and eliwination of heat 
that may ca se ear l spr outi ng of stored potatoes. 
These tests have shovm that Maine potat oes d.ri.ed 
by sponge rubber rolls vdll keep as well as pota-
toes dried by forced hot air, that the moisture 
has only a temporary effect on the appearance of 
the potatoes. Because of these considerations 
and because of its economy, t he sponge rubber roll 
method of drying washed potatoes is recommended in 
preference to forced hot air drying of washed 
potatoes . 111 
The point of this section of the paper is that vrorth-while 
services can be rendered at reasonable prices 1vith methods and equipment 
now at hand but th t co ts can be ~urther reduced with car 'lly con-
ducted r e search into methods and machinery. 
Other Ar eas of Cost Reduction 
The costs of transportation are ve ry important i n t he produc-
tion and marketing of potatoes. The significance of these costs is so 
great as t o determine to a great extent where potatoes ·will be grow·n. 
The potato is bulky, heavy, fragile and easi.ly injured by excess heat 
or cold. These are all 1·actors in raising effective transportat ion 
costs. Each shipper must carefully seek out the transport tion method 
which gi ves him the lowest cost when aLl f actors are considered. ch 
more market informat ion is needed to prevent cross-hauli , reconsign-
ment en route and other tr~~ por t ation wa tes ~ In addition, better 
1. :vah L. Per ry-;-11 Sponge Rubber Roll Drying of 'iV a hed ai e _ o fl 
_ aine gricultura Experiment St ation, Orono, Maine , 1?53, pp~ 9-10 
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_, 
handling, loading and temperatllre controls must be devel oped o pre ent 
can1age o the product ~ 
It is the opinion of some e:>...rperts that there are too ma._ 
inefficient. practices in the marketing of fresh vegeta es . Blacl2- says 
there may be too·many people performing small amounts of serv · ce f or very 
small returns ~ A prominent transportation .Labor union ha s asked the coop-
eration of industry in increasing distribution efficiency. It ·would e 
'fell for the potat o industry to investigate its own costs of distribution~ 
A."D.ong the f actors in such costs are the obsolete central terminals, exces-
sive consi grunent selling and unnecessary rough ha.nd.Ling. 
Summary of Co st Minimization 
The reduction of costs is a constant battle won by watching tiny 
details more often tha.ll by maldng tremendous changes. However, we are in 
an era which ha.s developed many new mechanical and institutional devices 
s ome of which promise cost revolution not cost evol".ltions . The potato 
industry must adopt these devices as quickly as every othe r industry or 
it will find that its cost structur . is far out of line with that of its 
competitor ~ 
Profit 'ilaximization 
"Profit Maximization occurs vmere marginal costs equal pri ce. 
So long as :price exceeds the mar ginal cost of output, expansion of output 
1.. J . Bla.ck, Rural Econo y of New England, Harvard Press~ 1950, p .. 453 
will increase profit s . If the marginal cost exceeds price, a contrac-
tion of output will increase proi'its. 11 So says Stigler1 in his book 
The Theory of Pricew 
For purposes of this paper, we can eli~tnate the condition 
wher e price exceeds marginal cost of output. If such conditions e isted, 
there would be no farm probleme But marginal costs do exceed price as 
we have seen in earlier pages so that a contraction of output would be 
necessary to increase profits for the whole industry. One of the means 
which has been utilized in the past to attempt to raise farm prices is 
the device of r estricti ng volume of production or quantities marketed. 
This is quite difficult for farmers to accomplish because of ' heir gr t 
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n; bers, their inability to prevent the entry of new firms into competition 
and their lack of knowledge of prices and demand. The l erna.tive o , tion 
r ic we may consider is to iltili ze demand creation devices, such as w-e 
discusse in Part II to rai se the demand (i.e .. , to shift the demand curve • 
The development of potato chips, animal fodder, and frozen french fries 
are all evidence that the demand CtiTVe can be shifted even fo pot t o- ~ 
A new demand curve -.,v:Lth increased demand may make it possible 
for potato farmers as a whole t o raise prices to the point where prices 
equal present marginal costs.. At any rate, each individual farmr m st 
aim at keeping his ovin ever-changing costs under control s hat they are 
below the prices he can obtain for his products. This would be true 
whether the industry as a whole was close to the point of maximizing 
1. George J . Stigl er, The Theory of Price, The MacMillan Co., New York, 
1954, p . 150 
profits or vmether the industry as a whol e was receivine no profits 
at all. To raise his individual income and lower his costs, a farmer 
may in some cases work alone or in small groups. But where these 
techniques fail and the farmer is rendered helpless as an individual 
economic force in an imperfect economy~ his problem is either to forn1 
oligopolistic groups to control output or to get political hel p in 
increasing his share of the national income. This has been the case 
for many potato farmers but not for all. 
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PART III 
In previous chapters, I have attempted ·to o tline the prob-
l ems that the potato pr oducer mus o ve if they ar e to prosper. 
This portion of the pape r will be dev oted to a discussion o s me of 
the concepts, i nstit utions, and behaviour which have been suggest ed 
or tried as solutions to the sever al problems. There are too man 
to cover more tha.'1 a few· of the most important ones.. Inasmuch as we 
divided the probl ems into the classes based on production and market-
ing, ·with a strong emphasis on price, it will be l ogical for us t o 
study proposals to solve these problems on these same three bases. 
1,. ,. will devote a chapter to each of the areas as follows: Ch ter IV 
vlill treat the schemes for helping farmers by adjusting prod ction~ 
such as the A. A. A. Chapter V will involve attempts t o correct prob-
l ems tlLrough marketing devices, such as the cooperative moveme~t. 
Chapter VI vlil1 discuss the methods proposed by men like George Peek, 
who aim at correcting farm problems by income or pricing controlsa 
These questions have been asked. 1~ do we need any program? 
Why do we not allow the competitive market to solve the problem·? The 
ans-v<rer l i es mostly in the political arena. Our farmers will not allo 7 
the forces of free competition to work. Some of the farmers would e 
hurt by a 11 laissez- faire 11 policy and the farm bloc i s sufficientl y 
powerful to prevent this from happeni g .. ' ore important, however, are 
t he econoiDic factors behind s·u.ch programs. Johnson say i n r e gard to 
economic justification for such programs: 
11 In addition, there are important economic reasons 
why government iP-tervention in agricultural programs 
is required. They are related to the facts that 
agriculture is a declining industry, that it is the 
nation's major source of population growth, that it 
is the seat of a great deal of poverty and its asso-
ciated evils, that it is peculiarly v:olnerabl e to 
business fluctuations and variations in natural 
phenomena and that the small scale family farm i s 
unable to cope with many problems of a modern econOflY 
'Without as sistance.nl 
1J~ e may novr take time t o develop some criteria so as to measure 
the merits of various theories propounded as solutions to farm problen .. 
'.:1ile farm problems are complex and multiple by nature, most of the 
solutions offered are aill1Bd only at the necessity of maintaining farm 
income on an economically sound level or on a high l evel whether econom-
ically sound or not. However, any plan -to accomplish the se ends · ·1 e 
uns t · s f actory if it does not also work toward the follo · na objectives : 
lv A satisfactory quantity and quality of potatoes for 
consumer needs .. 
2. A stable price which is eqt it ble to both cons· _er 
and producer . 
3~ An efficient use of our resources t o achieve IDEL~im~m 
output f or each unit of input .. 
4. An increased stability in our economic structure as 
a whol e not just stability i n the farm segment but 
in industry and commerce as well . 
L D. Gale Johnson, Trade and Agriculture, John 7:iley 
1950, p. 7 
Sons, Ne"V or , 
5. A constant increase in producti ve and marketin 
eff iciency. 
6. An adjustment of the factors of production s o that 
t hose millions of ~ow income f armers can raise their 
stru1dard of living either by abandoning farrning as 
an occupation or by improvi ng t heir productivity or 
the size of their farms so that they will be pros-
perous ~Qthin agriculture . 
7. A greater effort to conserve our soil and other 
r esources against depletion, erploitation, erosion 
or waste . 
8. An ever normal granary or other protection B.fiainst 
famine or shortages . 
9. A sti11rulat ion of research into farm production and 
marketing problems. 
lb. A degree of protection f or t he farmer against the 
disaster of crop failure or price failure from a 
bumper crop . 
lL A minimum amount of centralized power and authority 
to be exercised by government which could result i n 
a loss of economic and political freedom for our 
population. 
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12. A minimum of monopo~y or oligopoly r estraint of 
competition and a maximum of free enterprisee 
If this list of criteria is long, it is because the farmers• 
problems are many. No one plan w..ay hope to accomplish all these objec-
tives.. ·Te must see Y•n ether any of the plans for aidin..g the farmer may 
come close enough to doing the job to make it worth while to adopt it 
as our national agricult ural policy~ 
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CHAPTER IV 
METHODS OF CONTROLLING PRODUCTION 
Inasmuch as the most important farm problems arise out of the 
farmers' failure to adjust production to the demand for their products, 
i t would seem that this might be the prol-'er place to attack such prob-
lems. In other words, if production can be brought into line with 
demand, we would solve the difficulties of low prices and waste of 
resources which arise out of lack of balance. 
Acreage Allotments 
The most important method of controlling production has been 
t hrough acreage allotments for certain crops such as v.-ere used under 
the Agri cultural Adjustment Act. To regulate production unier this 
system, it was necessary to compute the total u. s. acreage needed for 
the crop being controlled, then subdivide this by alloting certain 
acreage to each producing farm. The total acreage could be expanded or 
contracted according to the amount of carryover, the expected demand and 
other factors which seemed important to those responsible. The national 
total was broken down into state totals Which were subdivided among 
individual farms according to their past productive record. Farmers 
were thereby given a property right in a portion of the total acreage 
1 devoted to each crop. 
1. Theodore w. Schultz, Agriculture in an Unstable Economy, McGraw-Hill 
Publishing Company, New York, 1945, P• 174 
The benefits offered farmers for participating were of tl'ro 
kinds. There were direct benefits such as checks in payment for co~ 
pliance with the acreage restrictions, crop loans, reduced prices for 
fertilizer in some areas, and, for a time, the privilege of participat-
ing in crop insurance programs in soroo crops. There were indirect 
benefits of higher prices, a storage program to reduce supply fluctua-
tion from year to year, and soil conservation (where the most soil 
damaging types of crops were cut back in acreage). Beyond these induce-
ments, the A.A.A. was authorized to institute a system of marketing 
quotas with penalties for non-compliance.1 
The A.A.A. Act of 1933 had given the Secretary of Agriculture 
discretion in determining acreage allotments. He was able to exercise 
his best judgment in this area until 1938 when Congress began to make 
the parity price goal much more binding upon the decisions of the 
Agricultural Administrators in Washington. How much effect the A.A.A. 
had on crop acreage and crop production cannot be accurately measured, 
but Schultz feels that some conclusions can be reached. 2 He shows 
average acreages for four basic crops subject to A.A.A. control first 
for 1931-1933 then for 1940-1942. When all the acreages are totaled 
together for each period, he finds a 21% decrease in acreage and 
attributes most of this to the A.A.A. However, acreage reduction is 
1. We will discuss this again under Marketing Controls since they may 
be used both to regulate production and control marketing. 
2. Theodore w. Schultz, Agriculture in an Unstable Economy, Op. cit., 
p. 171 
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only the means to the end of reducing output to raise prices. Let us 
see whether Schultz found that acreage reduction did decrease crop 
production and if so by how much.1 
"Acres of land are plainly only one of several inputs 
that a farmer employs in growing crops. If one of 
the inputs is rationed (in this case the amount of 
land allotted for a crop), he has several alternatives 
open to him should he want to maintain or even increase 
production. (a) He may remove from production his 
poorest acres (that is, keep his best acres in corn or 
cotton or whatever crop is restricted). (b) He may 
intensify the use of the land planted in the restricted 
crop by applying more capital and labor resources 
(namely, by using improved seed, more fertilizer, ~ 
proved tillage, and more labor.) (c) On the acres 
restricted by the A.A.A. allotment he may produce sub-
stitute crops (for example, such crops as alfalfa, 
sorghum, and soybeans may under certain circumstances 
produce even more feed than corn). (d) He may sub-
stitute future outputs for present output by invest-
ing in soil resources (for example, by adopting crop 
rotations and cropping practices that will build up 
his soil). The production effects of these various 
types of substitution on a particular farm depend upon 
the nature of the soil resources, the crop and livestock 
enterprise, the technology, .the relation between the 
cost of the factors employed and product prices, and the 
enterprise of the farmer. 
"What changes did occ\11' in production of the four crops 
under consideration? 
Production Production 
Without AAA With AAA 
1931-1933 1 1940-1942 Change in 
crop in millions in millions Per Cent 
Corn, bu •••••• 2,635 2,757 5 
·wheat, bu ••••• 750 910 21 
Cotton, bales. 14.4 12 -17 
Tobacco, lb ••• 1,318 1,377 4 
1. If the period ,l92tl-1932 is compared with 1938-
1942, the average yearly production for corn 
' 1. Ibid., p. 172 
rose from 2,554 to 2,680 million bushels; wheat 
from 864 to 878 million bushels; cotton fell from 
14.7 to 12.0 million bales; and tobacco rose from 
1,427 to 1,480 million pounds. 
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"In spite of the reduction in acres, production 
actually increased except for cotton. The 17 per 
cent drop in cotton, however, overstates the 
reduction because of the very high yields in 1931 
(which resulted in a 17-million-bale crop) and 
the poor crop in 1941 (when less than 10.7 million 
bales were produced) .n 
After examining the production consequences of the crop 
allotment feature of A.A.A., .Schultz concludes: 
"There has been enough substitution of the type 
described to have made the crop acreage allotments, 
ruling out the vagaries of weather, ineffective in 
regulating production. Drastic cuts in acreage do 
reduce output the first year or two, but even with 
programs as severe as those administered in cotton, 
it appears that within a few crop seasons the total 
output recovers remarkably even in the face of a 
40 per cent cut in acreage. Our tentative conclusion, 
therefore, is that acreage allotment as practiced by 
the A.A.A. is not a satisfactory means of regulating 
production, especially if unemployed resources exist. 
Under a condition of fully employed resources, acreage 
allotments might be more effective.nl 
Acreage Allotment in the Potato Industry 
Let us now examine the potato situation and see how his find-
ings apply. As we noted in the last pages of Chapter I, there has been 
an increase in productivity per acre in potato production. This increase 
is due in great part to the increased use of land substitutes that Schultz 
mentioned. Farmers have used more fertilizer, improved seed, and more 
insecticide; they are adopting crop rotations and intensifying the use 
1. Ibid., p. 174 
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· of their land by planting more closely so as to defeat acreage restric-
tions and increase profits. There has been a shift from inferior land 
to superior land on given farms and from inferior areas of production 
to superior specialist areas vmere output is increased. Beyond this, 
the potato is widely grovm so that it may be substituted for many other 
crops which are under acreage restrictions.1 We can say then that acre-
age restriction would be of little use in the potato industry since this 
industry more than fulfills the conditions which Schultz set up as 
criteria of failure. 
However; we have more direct evidence than Schultz's reasons, 
excellent as they may be, of the failare of acreage restrictions in the 
potato industry. Let us take note of a few incidents which have occurred 
in the administration of acreage controls and the price supports which 
accompany them to make them palatable to the farrer. 
~ben Secretary of Agriculture Brannan announced that support 
price would be 60 per cent instead of 90 per cent of parity and that 
Maine's acreage goal for 1949 would be 141,300 instead of the 195,600 
acres of the previous year, some fa:rrers objected. They said they had 
bought equipment they would not need on reduced acreages. Up to and 
including this announcement, Maine had cut back its potato acreage 32 
per cent from its peak planting in 1946. Yet despite the reduced acre-
age, Maine in 1949 produced a bumper crop of 43 million bushels, greater 
l. "California Potatoes Barred from 1950 Price Supports", Christian 
Science Monitor, Boston, Mass., November 17, 1949 
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than ever before, for a commercial market 1~ich would take only 25 
million bushels.1 The per cent of acreage reduction in Maine was 
greater than that of the nation as a whole. There was a tre100ndous 
national surplus and as a result of the ensuing scandal about dyeing 
potatoes blue and piling them in fields to rot, Congress decided that 
potato support programs were too expensive and dropped them for a few 
years. However, the farmers 1 problems did not solve themselves so 
that potato growers and their Congressmen petitioned the Department of 
Agriculture to do something about disorderly market conditions confront-
ing producers in early 1954. 2 The Department at first refused their 
request on the grounds that price support operations might encourage 
growers to plant too many potatoes again in 1954, but finally announced, 
however, that it would buy a limited quantity of carry-over supplies of 
1953 crop potatoes in an effort to bolster grower prices. It also 
planned to divert additional unspecified amounts of potatoes into the 
manufacture of starch. 
At this time, however, Secretary of Agriculture Benson said, 
11That substantial complaince with the department's 
recommended acreages will be a condition for eligi-
bility for price support aid on the 1954 crop. He 
said a recent planting survey indicated that such 
important potato-producing areas as Maine, Long 
Island, Idaho, North Dakota, and Oregon plan to over-
plant their recommended acreages." 
1. "Huge Maine Muddle Caused by Bumper Potato Crop", Boston Sunday Post, 
February 12, 1950, p. A-5 
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2. "Federal Props Announced for Potato Prices", Christian Science Monitor, 
By Associated Press Dispatch, 1954, Boston, Mass. 
A similar failure to respect acreage limits for two years in 
a row cost California growers their price supports on potatoes in 1950.1 
We can see then that the general conclusion which Schultz sets 
up is applicable in the potato industry, i.e.; acreage allotment as 
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practiced by the A.A.A. is not a satisfactory means of regulating produc-
tion especially if unemployed resources exist and no limitations are put 
on the use of other inputs. The importance of this provision of unemployed 
resources is indeed accentuated by the fact that potatoes can be grown 
under more varied conditions than almost any other crop. The evidence 
against acreage controls is not complete, however, for as surpluses of 
grain and cotton accumulated, the government ordered a reduction of acre-
age of these crops for 1953. When a farmer's acreage was cut, he planted 
those displaced acres to other crops in order to maintain income and an 
efficient sized unit. Thus land that once produced cotton and vlheat was 
diverted to such crops as soybeans, oats, barley, dry beans, grass and 
2 potatoes. Thus, as acres are diverted from one crop, they act to reduce 
the price from other crops1 and the income l'Jhere the demand for these crops 
is inelastic. If the acres taken out of production were the least fertile, 
the society as a whole would have some gain, but this is not always the 
case. A given farmer will shift his reduced production to his most fer-
tile acres but the allotment system interferes with such normal shifts 
in production from one area to another. 3 
l. "California Potatoes Barred from 1950 Price Support", Christian Science 
Monitor, Boston, Mass., November 17, 1949 
2. Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Monthly Review, September, 1954, p. 2 
3. Ibid., P• 3 
As a result, some of the nation's best land is diverted to crops for 
which it is less well adapted. For example, the 1950 Maine potato acre-
age was cut 13 per cent below that of 1949 compared to a national cut 
of seven per cent, yet Maine's yield for 1949 was 450 bushels per acre 
compared with a national yield of 211 bushels. On the other hand, the 
complying farmer did not necessarily prosper under acreage restrictions 
because while his price per unit of output l'las stabilized, · he found 
sometimes that acreage restrictions reduced his gross income and perhaps 
his net income. (The latter is apt to disappear if his acreage is 
reduced below an efficient size and his costs rise as a result.)1 The 
farmer who was losing money by ·complying, was tempted to evade the pro-
gram's restrictions and as a result the production control features of 
the government program on potatoes were evaded increasingly as the pro-
2 gram progressed. 
"In order to visualize the difficulties encountered 
in policing the restrictions imposed by the potato 
program, several important characteristics of the 
potato industry must be kept in mind. First, 
potatoes are produced in widely scattered areas, and 
consumption is general. Furthermore, potatoes are 
not processed, and there is no single marketing 
channel through which all or a major part of the crop 
must flow. In consequence, there is no point in the 
marketing system at which policing of the government 
program could be handled expeditiously. Throughout 
the war period extensive policing was not necessary. 
Producers generally could produce in accordance with 
their own inclinations, and if production became 
excessiv~government support was avaiLable to absorb 
excess quantities. 
1. Wi.iliam E. Schrumpf, "Farm Economic Adjust:rrents in Aroostook County, 
Maine, 1948-1951", Maine Agricultural Experiment Station, Mimeo 
Report 38, Orono, Maine, pp. l-5 
2. Gray, Sorenson and Cochrane, Bulletin 211, Op. cit., p. 51 
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11This condition was altered in the postwar period. 
As acreage restrictions increased, the incentive for 
non-cooperation became greater, and increasing numbers 
of producers failed to comply 'With the program. As 
a result, an increasing proportion of the crop was 
being produced 11outside 11 of the program. Severe 
restrictions resulted progressively in more and more 
non-cooperation, and the more extensive non-cooperation 
became, the greater were the restrictions necessary on 
those who continued to comply. Since the effect of a 
general price support operation is not selective, but 
rather spreads to the whole of the crop including that 
produced by non-cooperators, it is evident that those 
who failed to comply with acreage restrictions benefited 
at the expense of those producers who complied. Event-
ually this process could have resulted in a breakdo~n 
of the whole program as progressively more severe 
restrictions resulted in more extensive non-cooperation. 
"Apart from the problem of non-cooperation, the problem 
of enforcing compliance with the terms and conditions of 
the program among cooperating producers and marketing 
agencies became increasingly difficult as the program 
progressed. Incentives were strong among cooperating 
dealers and producers to engage in illegal activities 
which increased their returns. These activities included 
various attempts to obtain direct price support for 
potatoes produced out of compliance with the program and 
the much publicized resale of potatoes for which price 
support payment had been received." 
Additional charges are made against the A.A.A. acreage allot-
ments by the authors of the economic analysis of The Impact of Government 
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Pr ograms on the Potato Industry of the United States. They first question 
1 the effectiveness of acreage allotments, because they were unrealistic 
in that they did not reflect the trend of increasing production in special-
ist states and decreasing production in the lake states. 2 Secondly, they 
1. Ibid., p. 110 
2. Lake states - the tier of states which borders on the Great Lakes. 
challenge the fairness of the acreage allotments because allotments 
of acreage to states vihere production was declining often exceeded the 
previous year's p~anting while the specialist were alloted fewer acres 
than they had actually planted the year before. Fairness of non-
comp~iance penalties was also challenged in that failure to achieve the 
increased output standards of wartime invoked no penalty for the areas 
where production was declining whereas overproduction by the specialists 
after the war drew a penalty. Third, and most important, the author s 
challenge the efficiency of the acreage allotments. As they so well 
•t 1 express 1. , 
"The best of economic efficiency must run in terms 
of resource allocation. In the present context, the 
important question is whether desirable adjustments 
in potato production among the states would have been 
impeded had the allotment distribution been followed 
• • • • • • • • It was shown that the adjustment toward the 
specialist states had been underway for a period of 
30 years or more prior to 1942. This adjustment •••••• 
was accelerated during the initial phase of the pr i ce 
support period. · It seems reasonable to infer ••••••••• 
that the comparative advantage l ay with the specialist 
states. If this inference is accepted, then allotments 
were not handled in such a way as to maximize efficiency. 
Having once permitted •••••• a desirable shift toward the 
specialist states in the initial phase of the program, 
the reversal of policy from encouragemnt (of production) 
to restriction (of production) became also an attempt to 
halt this shift •••••• (because) the restrictive program 
allowed for a much slower acreage shift than had been 
occurring even in the pre-program era. 11 
Let us examine the effect of acreage allotments on the market-
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ing and production problems outlined in Chapters II and III to the extent 
1. Gray, Sorenson and Cochrane, Technic~ B~letin 211, Op. cit., p. llO 
that such information is available. Vii·e have said that acreage allot-
ments have an adverse effect on the decisions .as to who should produce 
potatoes and where they should be produced. In regard to the kind of 
potatoes that should be produced, acreage allotments had little direct 
effect. However, acreage allotments were tied to price benefits which 
had some effects on quality and type of production as we shall see 
10l+ 
later. The effect that acreage controls have on prices is also indirect 
in that acreage methods were tied to price benefits. We can say, however, 
that to the extent that prices were maintained at artificially high levels, 
they placed an umbrella over high cost operators and high cost areas. 
In addition, artificially high prices must inevitably decrease the total 
quantity demanded. 
From the marketing point of view, acreage allotments did not 
offer the farmer any incentive to grow the kind of product that special-
ized segments of the market wanted or to market it in a new way. Acre-
age controls did indirectly damage the quality standards of potato growers 
and marketers in several ways. First; the farmers who sold to the Commodity 
Credit Corporation under the price benefit program had little incentive to 
improve grading and marketing practices. The government would accept 
potatoes which met u. S. grades - No. 2, 1 7/'d inches minimum size, or 
u. s. No. 1, Size B, etc., as long as they were not damaged or affected 
by disease, insects, frost, rendering them unfit for normal consumption 
or unable to stand normal shipment or storage.1 These were loose stand-
ards; rigid quality standards, such as those enforced in Idaho in 1948, 
1. Ibid., p. 48 
would prohibit the out-of-state sale of potatoes less than 2 inches 
in diameter.l Small wonder that a farmer would be lax about grading 
pota·toes which were going to be destroyed. The buyer (the government) 
was tolerant. Indeed, there were some who continued their poor grading 
habits after the termination of price supports. 2 The second way in 
which quality standards were damaged was in the impetus which acreage 
controls and the accompanying price supports gave to small inefficient 
growers. With the diversion of the potatoes of the specialist areas 
lOS 
like Aroostook County, which would ordinarily have been sold at retail, 
the small growers close to the market had a chance to develop customers.3 
Since the end of the price support program, Aroostook appears to have 
regained much of this loss but at a price sacrifice due to competition. 
However, as we know the local growers are not very conscious of standards 
and grading so to this extent quality also suffered. 
Sununary of Criticisms of Acreage Allotment of A.A.A. 
1. They tend to cause inefficiency in the allocation 
of economic resources. 
2. They are hard to administer. 
3. There is a widespread tendency to evade compliance. 
4. They do not encourage better marketing practices. 
1. Clayton Libeau, "Marketing Potatoes for Consumer Approval", Idaho 
Experiment Station, Bulletin 285, June, 1951, p. 20 
2. Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Monthly Review, March, 1954, p. 2 
3. As one Maine potato supply dealer expressed it, "All Maine can do 
now is to put nothing but top quality potatoes on the market and 
try to regain the markets we lost when potatoes were price supported 
and everybody else tried to get into the act. 11 Boston Sunday Globe, 
January 31, 1954, p. 26A 
5. They are subject to political interference. 
6. They involve discrimination between the 
recipients of benefits. 
7. They do not solve the problem of overproduction 
unless resources are fully employed and if 
resources were fully employed, overproduction 
would in all probability not be a problem, for 
production would either balance vd.th demand or 
we would have shortages. 
To offset these, it must be noted that individual farmers 
probably benefited at least in the short-run from the A.A.A. But it 
does not solve the farm problem from the point of view of the nation 
as a whole or from the long run point of view of individual farmers. 
Other Plans 
There are other plans of production control or rather supply 
control which could help the farmer according to their proponents. 
One method which has been utilized by the A.A.A. for other crops is 
called Marketing Quotas. Marketing Quotas for a given crop are pro-
claimed by the Secretary of Agriculture and approved by the farmers 
in a referendum. The quota is converted to a national acreage allot-
ment on the basis of national acreage yield and apportioned among the 
states, counties and farms on the basis of statutory formulas. Market-
ing of crops in excess of allotment is subject to penalties provided 
by statute. This has two big objections. One, that it is hard to 
enforce with potatoes for they are widely produced, widely distributed, 
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and they lack any centralizing point at which market controls could 
be exercised to limit l'lhat the farmers market. Secondly, if a farmer 
does comply, rather than do what is in his individual best interest 
and 11bootleg11 his surplus, he must destroy the surplus. Nothing is 
more infuriating to the taxpayer than the destruction of food at 
public expense. The taxpayer while infuriated might do nothing, 
however, but the State Department people become so impressed with the 
propaganda value of such destruction in the Communist Press, that they 
do something; and they do it in Congress where it counts. 
There are other criticisms of marketing quotas but they are 
about the same as those we examined in the case of acreage controls. 
For these reasons marketing controls are inferior to acreage controls 
for they wait till after the horse is gone to lock the barn door, 
whereas acreage controls at least are aimed at preventing the horse 
from being stolen. 
A third plan for controlling production involves control of 
10 
land somewhat different than acreage allotments. Dr. Raymond W. Miller 
of the Harvard Business School told the 1954 Convention of the American 
Association of Agricultural College Editors that retirement of cropland 
to fallow or non-production in a national program that will assure 11 acres 
for tomorrow is the sanest and cheapest method of solving America's 
surplus crop problems." As quoted in the Christian Science Monitor, he 
said: 
'"Scientists, economists, and politicians have all 
tried to solve the American farmer's overproduction 
of grains, oil seeds, and fibers. ~e have failed,• 
Dr. Miller alleged, •because we haven't gone back 
to look at the faucet and see whether it can be 
turned off. ~Vhile we have taken crops out of pro-
duction through acreage controls, we often have 
planted the same acres to another crop, creating 
another surplus rather than keeping the land out of 
total commercial production. 
11As a result, we have developed extremely bad public 
relations both at home and abroad. The farmers of 
Europe and Asia conclude we are either very stupid, 
or are stockpiling for World War III.• 
11Dr. Miller would have fanrers compensated by the 
Federal government for taking land out of production -
11putting land in moth balls, n he called it - and 
keeping it ready for future production by proper · 
conservation methods. This kind of expense would 
cost, at a guess, perhaps less than half the present 
type of farm subsidy which has resulted in piling up 
surpluses. His project would be voluntary, Dr. Miller 
said. Farmers, many of whom have land they have 
bought as a hedge against inflation, would sign up for 
the moth-balling payments. 
"The farmer would get a small return on his investment, 
not to exceed 3 per cent, which must be spent for soil-
improvement practice. 
"'This project would literally turn off the faucet,' 
Dr. Miller said, 1 instead of trying to solve the prob-
lem with buckets and mops. We would be better off 
nationally to spend some money for this type of program 
rather than spending the millions of dollars we are 
allocating at the present time to warehousing crops v.-e 
don't know what to do with.' 
11 Since counties and states need tax money for school 
and highway maintenance, he went on, the federal govern-
ment should pay taxes on all land voluntarily retired 
f rom the production of surplus crops. This, he believes, 
could be worked out in an allocation program, state by 
state. He emphasized that ,it should be a voluntary act 
l 8 
11 on the part of the owners and should result in 
taking out of production much land held by absentee 
owners fo1~ speculation, which now only adds to 
surpluses. 
11
' Such a program might be called acres for tomorrow,' 
he said. 1That is precisely what it would be. Our 
population is growing and may go to 275 or 300 million 
during the next century. There will be an acute need 
then for more good cropland. Acres for tomorrow would 
also be a vital reserve during times of national 
emergency, such as the war we all pray won't come.'" 
Let us examine the effect. this plan wouJ.d have on sorre of the 
problems we set up in Chapters II and III. 
If properly administered, it co-aid retire some land from pro-
duction. However, since the decision as to what land to retire would 
be voluntary, we have no assurance that we would allocate our la._l"ld 
resources to present production most efficiently. Miller hopes that 
speculators vdll take their land out of production but this would seem 
to be opposite to the nature of speculators. He does not tell us how 
we would decide who would be chosen if an excessive number of farmers 
applied for retirement benefits. Nor does he define productive land 
very well or tell us what he vnuld do lill-i th new acreage brought into 
production by some of the vast irrigation projects now contemplated. 
-v~e cannot, .therefore, see how this plan can help to solve the problems 
of potato farmers i n regard to who should produce potatoes, vihere they 
should produce, how they should produce, or Vlb.at variety they should 
produce. If the plan is advocated as a remedy for marketing problems, 
it wi l l have nothing to offer in regard to stabilizing prices, for 
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production would still fluctuate as the weather dictated and so, there-
fore, would prices. Nor wouJ.d the consumer be guaranteed a better 
product under this plan, or a more dependable supply. 
11 
Perhaps the pl~~ might raise prices by ~ithdrawing one resource 
from production, but we do not know that this is so because productivity 
changes and shifts such as those which defeated A.A.A. type acreage 
allotments might also work here to defeat this plan. If production per 
acre increased rapidly, it might be very difficult to retire enough land 
under this system to affect prices and farm prosperity. Dr. Miller makes 
no mention of the factors of production which complement the land i n the 
production of crops, yet idle land would also entail idle labor and 
capital and the result might not be economically or politically efficient. 
llve do need a plan to ·withdraw some land from production in order to con-
serve our resources. Lands subject to erosion whether by lr.Lnd or water 
must be utilized in such activities as grazing and forestry which ~ill 
minimize the damage to the soil. The Miller P~an does not provide for 
this, however, and such plans w-ould have little direct effect on potatoes 
because they are not generally associated with destructive planting 
practices. 
To swrunarize the merits of plans based upon control of produc-
tion or output according to our criteria, we may say: 
1. Production controls thus far enacted do not bring 
about a balance between supply and demand. 
2. Production controls tend to be injurious to quality 
standards so that the consumer loses. 
3. Production controls may tend to raise prices to 
artificial levels by raising costs of production. 
This comes as a result of freezing production in 
old inefficient areas and as a result of increasing 
values and rents of land which has allotments 
attached to it. 
4. Production controls do riot always encourage the 
efficient use of resources. They tend to perpetuate 
historical land and resource uses despite changes in 
economic relationships which ·would ordinarily bring 
re-allocation of resources. 
S. Production controls tend to reduce production in 
periods of depression when full production would 
be a weapon against long continuation of the slump. 
6. Production controls do not tend to improve the product-
ivity of the low-income farm families. 
7. Production controls tend to defeat efforts to conserve 
soil resources by causing farmers to deplete small 
acreages through intensive farming. This is sonewhat 
offset where adequate crop rotation is also practiced. 
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8. Production controls would not be consistent with 
an "ever-normal granary" concept although they 
may work together if production controls are 
utilized to maintain the surplus crops at a pre-
determined level. 
9. Production controls would not stimulate research 
into marketing practices. This program might 
encourage production experiments aimed at defeat-
ing the restrictions on acreage by better utiliza-
tion of other resources. 
10. Production controls are the most centralized and 
most restrictive of freedom to allocate resources 
of any of the farm agricultural plans, therefore, 
most unsatisfactory. 
11. Production controls do not promote oligopoly or monop-
ol y by individuals for all real power to make decisions 
rest.s with the government. 
112 
CHAPTER V 
THE MARKET CONTROL PLANS 
There are various ways of trying to aid the farmer by manipu-
lation at the marketing level of our economic system or by affecting 
consumption itself. Among the best known methods are Commodity Loans, 
Marketing Agreements, Marketing Orders, Subsidies to groups other than 
farmers, Marketing Cooperatives, Direct Purchases by Government, and 
Purchase Agreements. We realize that the last t'WO might be thought of 
as controlling supply and so might have been included in Chapter IV. 
However, since they are aimed at the marketing level, not the production 
level, will treat them here. So, too, some of the marketing agreements 
contain production controls and pricing controls, bu.t theiy are exercised 
as the crop goes to market, not on the production level. 
Marketing Agreements and Orders 
George N. Peek, the chief sponsor of the Marketing Agreements 
section of the original A.A.A. in 1933, and first administrator of the 
Act said, 1 
"The purpose of such marketing agreements is to put 
the agencies of government behind private enterprise 
(corporate and cooperative) in disposing of surpluses 
and to aid in maintaining for producers the fair 
exchange value for their commodity.K 
1. Gilbert c. Fite, George N. Peek and the Fight for Farm Parity, 
University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, Oklahoma, P• 247 
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The present Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act traces back 
to the 1933 law which was strengthened by new features after the 
Schechter case invalidated the N.R.A., and virtually broke dolVll the 
marketing agreement program.1 The Secretary of Agriculture was given 
the power to use "marketing orders11 instead of the licensing authority 
Which he had been reluctant to enforce under the original act. As it 
stands, in November, 1954, the Agricultural Marketing Act authorizes 
the Secretary of Agriculture to enter into marketing agreements for any 
agricultural coJIDD.Odity. The statute is based upon the authority to 
regulate interstate commerce and so regulates commodities only to the 
extent that such commodities move in interstate or foreign commerce, or 
directly burden, affect, or obstruct interstate or foreign commerce. 2 
Marketing agreements are voluntary con~racts entered into by 
the Secretary of Agriculture and the processors, producers, associations 
of producers and others relative to the handling in interstate commerce 
of products covered by such agreements. They are entered into after 
appropriate hearings and bind only those who sign them. On the other 
hand, a marketing order is issued by the Secretary of Agriculture with 
or without the marketing agreement, and · it becomes binding on all the 
handlers as long as certain proportions of the producers voting approve. 
"The issuance o! orders is limited to certain 
enumerated3 products including potatoes; on the 
other hand, agreements covering anY agricultural 
commodity may be entered . into. 
1. Murray R. Benedict, Farm Policies of the United states 179Q-19SO, 
Twentieth Century Fund, New York, 1953, p. 305 
2. United states Department of Agriculture, Marketing Agreements, 
November, 1954 · 
3. Gray, Sorenson and Cochrane, Technical Bulletin 211, Op. cit., 
pp. 148-149 
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"The administrative procedure for promulgation of an 
order can be summarized as follows: 
1. The request for regulatory action is made 
by producers. In practice this request 
normally is initiated through a producers' 
organization. This voluntary feature of 
the administrative procedure, along with 
the voting privilege, is designed to prevent 
the imposition of market regulations .where 
such regulations are opposed by the majority 
of producers in an area. 
2. After a request for action has been received 
by the Production and Marketing Administration, 
a preliminary investigation is conducted to 
determine the need for and. probable efficacy 
of a marketing order in correcting the prob-
lems involved. 
3. Unless the proposal is rejected, a notice of 
hearing is published. 
4. The public hearing, or hearings in the case 
of orders covering a large area, is held. 
All peraons submitting or favoring proposals, 
or persons opposed to proposals, are given an 
opportunity to appear at the hearing. 
5. The hearing record is analyzed after the time 
for filing briefs has expired, and the Assist-
ant Administrator for Marketing of the PMA. 
files a recommended decision with the rearing 
clerk. The recommended decision includes (1) 
a proceedings, (2) a ruling upon each argument 
submitted by interested persons, and (3) a 
proposed marketing agreement and order; or a 
recommendation that no regulation be established. 
6. Interested parties are given an opportunity to 
file exceptions to the recommended decisions. 
7. After giving due consideration to aJ.l exceptions 
the Secretary of Agriculture issues his decision. 
This includes the findings and conclusions -with 
the reasons therefore, along with final rulings 
on all proposals not previously ruled on, rulings 
on all exceptions filed, and either a denial of 
the order proposal or a marketing agreement and 
order. 
11.5 
8. A producers' re.f"erendum is held. A 
favorable vot.e by either two-thirds 
of the produclers voting in the referen-
dum, or by two-thirds or more of the 
production r«~preaented in the referen-
dum, is suff:Leient for approval. Since 
either one but not both of these condi-
tions must bH ful.f"illed, it is possible 
for a minori1;y of" large producers to 
impose marke1•ing restrictions even 'When 
these restric:tions are opposed by a 
majority of the producers who vote. 
9. The Secretary initiates tm procedure for 
establishing the regulations provided for 
in the order proposal. 
"Once a proposal is approved by producers, copies are 
mailed to all handlers in the designated area .for their 
signature. If the proposal is signed by at least 50 per 
cent of the handlers 'Who also handle at least 50 per cent 
of the commodity frol!l the designated area, then the condi-
tions are made binding on all other banqlers in the area 
by the issuance of" ail order. The regulation is then 
termed a marketing agreement and order. If" insuf.f"icient 
handlers sign, the order is issued anyway if the Secretary 
.finds that (l) the .failure of the handlers to sign the 
agreement will tend 1•o prevent the effectuation of the 
declared policy of the act and (2) the issuance of a 
federal order is the only practicable method of achieving 
that end." 
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"Marketing Agreementfl are seldom used 'Without marketing orders, 
since the actions of non-signat1ory handlers could nullify the intended 
effects on market conditions of the program. nl 
The marketing agreem:tn:li was designed to benefit agriculture 
through the following methodsa~~ 
111. To induce processors and distribution to agree 
to pay remunerat.ive prices to growers, and pass 
these on to the consumers. This was possible 
only in situatic•ns .where the demand was sutfi~ 
cently inelastic: to permit of" moving practically 
1. Benedict, Op. cit., p. 305 
2. ~!',p. 305 
11 the entire crop into consumption at the higher 
price, so long as processors and handlers did 
not cut prices against each other. 
2. To dispose of as much of the crop as possible 
through regul.ar channels at remunerative prices, 
and to find other ways of disposing of surpluses 
that could not be marketed at the higher prices, 
or to induce growers to retain them on the farms 
as livestock feed or wastage. This 100ant in 
some cases discarding the poorer grades. 
3. If the situation could not be handled in these 
ways, the next step would be to turn to produc-
tion adjustment." 
As of January 1, 1955, there were at least five grade and 
size marketing agreements and orders in effect in the potato industry. 
These were mostly in the specialist production areas of Idaho, Maine 
and California.1 (See Appendix III page 20?) 
11The statute provides several types of regulatory 
activity.2 Any one or a combination of the follow-
ing methods may be used in a marketing agreement or 
marketing order: 
(a) 
(b) 
Regulation of quality. This is usually accom-
plished by specifying the grade, size, q~ality 
or maturity of the product which may be shipped 
to market. 
Regulation of quantity. This method of regula-
tion involves the establishment of the quantity 
o:f the product lVhi.ch may be shipped to market 
during a specified period. The total quantity 
is allocated among all handlers on the basis of 
either past performance of handlers, or the 
amount of product each handler has available :for 
current shipment. (Known as Volume Proration.) 
1. United States Department of Agriculture, Marketing Agreements and 
Orders in the Potato Industry, January, 19 
2. united States Department of Agriculture, Marketing A.greemam,s for 
Fruits and Vegetables, November, 1954, pp. 3-4 
(Also see page l 29 this paper.) 
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11 (c) Reserve pools. This method involves the establish-
ment of a reserve pool of the product, and the 
equitable distribution of returns derived from the 
sale thereof. 
(d) Surplus control. This type of regulation involves 
determining the extent of a surpl us, providing for 
the control and disposition thereof, and equaliz-
ing the burden of surplus elimination among producers 
and handJ.ers. (Combined with "C" to make Surplus 
Pools.) 
(e) Containers. A regulation may be undertaken to fix 
the s1ze, capacity, weight, dimensions, or pack of 
containers, which may be used in marketing fresh or 
dried fruits, vegetables, or tree nuts, provided 
that no action may be taken which is in conflict 
with the Standard Container Acts. 
(f) Research projects. Provisions may be made to under-
take marketing research and development projects for 
the purpose of improving and marketing, distribution 
and consumption of the commodities covered. This 
may include marketing research' projects and those 
aimed at disseminating educational information for 
the purpose of increasing consumption of the commod-
ities involved. It does not authorize advertising 
or sales promotion programs. 
11 In addition to the above, one or more of the following types 
or methods of regulation may be included in a marketing agree-
ment or marketing order: 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
Unfair trade practices. A method may be provided 
for prohibiting Urifair methods of competition and 
unfair trade practices in the handling of agricul-
tural commodities. 
Price postieg. This involves the requirement that 
handlers file their selling prices and such handlers 
are not permitted to sell at prices lower than such 
prices as filed. Handlers may change the prices at 
any time, but adequate notice must be given thereof. 
Additional provisions. Such other terms may be 
included which are incidental to and necessar,y to 
effectuate the provisions of the program." 
ll 
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George Peek felt that marketing agreements should be the first 
method of attacking the problem of surplus production and the resultant 
low prices. Henry Wallace, his superior in Washington, felt that market-
1 ing agreements should only supplement acreage controls. In the end, 
Wallace's view prevailed for Peek2resigned in just seven months, and his 
successor put more emphasis on production controls and centralized 
decision-making which Peek abhorred. As a result, some experts £eel that 
marketing agreements have not been given a fair trial and used to advan-
tage. Thomsen says for exam:ple:3 
"Marketing agreements and orders might be used for 
many more commodities and for a much broader program 
of 11 orderly marketing" than in the past. Some amend-
ments to the Act would be required. More importantly, 
a much more aggressive and more broadly educational 
program to acquaint producers and handlers with the 
possibilities of these programs would be necessary. 
The Department infrequently has taken the initiative 
in pushing marketing-agreement and -order programs; 
and the state public agencies, not being directly 
involved, have shown surprisingly little interest. 
Few farmers have more than vague notions of what the 
programs are or can do. 
11 It is conceivable, even, that the marketing-agreement 
approach might be used as a partial substitute for 
other government-action programs in support of commodity 
prices. One of the most commonly encountered complaints 
by farmers and justifications for direct action by 
government in supporting commodity prices is that the 
large number of individually small agricultural pro-
ducers have no means of governing the flow to market of 
their commodities, comparable with those of industrial 
1. Fortune, June, · 1949, "Those Prosperous Farmersn. In 1933, Henry 
Wallace said, 11It may be necessary to have compulsory control of 
marketing, licensing of pl owed fields, and base and surplus quotas 
for every farmer for every product in every month of the year. 
In other words, it will be necessary to make a public utility out 
of agriculture." 
2. Gilbert c. Fite, George N. Peek, Op. cit., Chapter XV 
3. L. Thomsen, Agricultural Marketing, McGraw-Hill Publishing Co., 
New York, 1951, p. 4b2 
"producers. The marketing agreements and orders 
provide such a means. They do not, of course, care 
for the problem of an unlimited overall production; 
but neither, in the long run, do the govermoont 
market-purchase and other price-support programs 
except production controls. Handlers, of course, 
would much prefer to sell products at a profit to 
the government than to become part of a marketing-
agreement program. Many problems would arise in 
connection 'With any large-scale extension of market-
ing-agreement and -order programs, requiring prelim-
inary research of a high order.n 
In short, marketing agreements can help to solve some farm 
problems although they are not a panacea.l 
We are inclined to agree that the Wallace attitude is. defeatist 
and that~ can be done by the farmers to help themselves through coop-
erative endeavours of one sort or another which can offset some of the 
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actions and decisions of individual producers which harm the whole industry. 
On the other hand, Schultz does not discuss marketing agreements 
in his book Agriculture in an Unstable Econosr• He does say that it is 
inconsistent with the public interest for the government to promote mono-
2 polistic competition. Schultz says, 
"The government' s task is to keep monopoly from becoming 
established or by control to reduce to a minimum effects 
adverse to the generaJ. interest. A number of farm pro-
grams need scrutiny on this score because they serve as 
instruments for the establishment of some monopolistic 
competition in behalf of farm groups." 
Schultz recognizes that the farmer, because of the status of 
competition in agriculture, is at the mercy of industry. 
1. Developed further in next ten pages. 
2. Theodore w. Schultz, AgricuJ.ture in an Unstable Economy, McGraw-Hill 
Book Company, Inc., 1945, New York, p. 255 
"To restate the major consequences: When business 
contracts, agricultural production does not drop, 
While the prices received by farmers for their 
products decline more than the prices they pay for 
goods and services used in farm production and for 
family maintenance. Conversely, vvhen business 
expands, industry's output rises more than agricul-
ture's, and the prices of the goods and services 
that farmers buy rise less than the prices of crops 
and livestock that farmers sell. This basic relation-
ship between the volume of indistrial and agricultural 
output and what farmers receive in exchange for what 
they sell is in one sense elementary, but it is funda-
mental to an understanding of the main cause for the 
cyclical instability of agriculture's terms of 
exchange." 
But Schultz does not feel that the remedy for agriculture's 
il~s lie in cutting its production or controlling its prices so that 
agriculture would move in the same direction as industry. After admit-
ting the facts, {1) that farmers may obtain a more favorable 11parity 
pricett in any given year by curtailing farm output; (2) that industry 
and labor may keep their prices and wages high relative to prices of 
food and fiber by producing little while agriculture produces plenty. 
1 Schultz says, 
"Both courses of action outlined above, are, however, 
in conflict with the general interest and in addition 
give only temporary advantage to -the group pursuing 
such a negative policy. It is necessary for each group 
to produce more, not less, for to do otherwise is to 
curtail the wealth of the nation." 
Schultz feels that it is better to preserve the steadiness of 
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farm production as a counter-cyclical force and to remedy the maladjust-
ment in the economy by raising and steadying industrial production. 
1. Ibid., p. 136 
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He would provide compensatory payments to farmers to sustain farm income 
while letting farm prices seek their own ~evels in perio~s when business 
recedes and unemployment spreads rather than to attempt a program of price 
supports.l 
To the extent that the farmers 1 income troubles arise out of 
recessionary economic developments originating outside of agriculture, 
we are inclined to agree w.i..th Schultz. But all the farmers 1 economic 
problems do not arise out of cyclicaJ. causes, however, as we have endeav-
ored to show in Chapters two and three. For example, subsidies will not 
help a farmer to decide what to plant unless accompanied by production 
controls. When the business cycle behaves in such a way as to endanger 
the stability of our whole economic system by causing prices of farm 
commodities to drop too low, subsidies are a possible answer to this 
problem. But subsidies are not an answer to all problems. 
We further agree with Schultz when he says it is necessary to 
produce more in time of depression. It is also necessary to sell what 
you produce. Low prices alone do not sell merchandise. For example, 
potatoes are low in price but farmers carmot sell all they produce. The 
consumer will buy a product for the satisfaction he expects to obtain from 
its use. If he expects enough satisfaction, he wi~l pay any reaso~ble 
price for it. This is true with potatoes as well as other products. The 
potato industry must do all that is possible to build up the consumer 
2 
expectations in regard to its products. Some of this developmnt of 
1. Ibid., p. 137 
2. Developed in detail under Product Differentiation, Page 66 
demand can be accomplished by small groups under marketing agreements. 
Other problems can also be helped by marketing associations, ie., such 
price depressing marketing practices as may arise out of failure to 
deliver potatoes to the market at the rate at which they are needed or 
out of failure to maintain dependable quality standards. To produce 
more1 as Mr. Schultz suggested1 is commendable provided the output has 
utility for the consumer. Properly designed products have more utility 
than improperly designed ones, they give the consumer more satisfaction 
and he. will buy them at a higher average price. Marketing agreements 
can help to choose the product, package it and deliver it more wisely 
than either the individual or the government. Our individual farmers 
do not have the resources or time to do market research and plan their 
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marketing alone. The government would be too inflexible and centralized 
to consider the ability and needs of the individual farm3r, but marketing 
agreements can do the job. For farmers to band together into cooperatives 
or marketing agreements nee.d not have a fatal effect on pure competition 
as defined Stigler and others.1 Yet cooperatives and marketing agreements 
might modify practices of packaging, of using brand names, of choosing 
marketing channels, of choosing transportation m:ldia, of setting quality 
standards and of even choosing the type of potato to grow. As we pointed 
out in Chapters two and three there is adequate opportunity for improve-
ment without harm to the consumer or any one else. 
1. George J. Stigler, The Theory of Price, Op. cit., p. 13. ttRequisites 
for eompetition •• each economic unit be sufficiently small that it 
exerts an imperceptible influence on price. That neither government 
or private associations erect obstacles to the movement of resources 
in or out of industries or regulate the prices paid or received by 
economic units. That entrepreneurs be informed of prices ••• in this 
or other industries.n 
Marketing Agreements in the Potato Industry 
It is difficult to get material with which to appraise the 
merit of marketing agreements as a means of solving farm problems. 
This perhaps is why Schultz did not attempt to evaluate any more than 
acreage allotments and commodity loans.1 Ho·wever, let us see wh:rt. 
Gray, Sorenson and Cochrane found in their study as regards the impact 
of marketing agreements in the potato industry. One conclusion which 
they reached was that while most orders were similar in major methods 
used and in policies, there is a high degree of flexibility in adapting 
regulations to fit local conditions.2 This flexibility arises from 
the fact that the administration of marketing orders is in the hands 
of committees composed of producers and handlers which are very 
independent. 
"'rhese committees function with broad powers to 
administer3 the provisions of the order, to make 
rules and regulations, to effectuate the terms of 
the order, to receive, investigate, and report to 
the Secretary complaints of violation, and to 
recommend to the Secretary amendments to effective 
orders. Although the committees are empowered 
only to make recommemations to the Secretary 
regarding amendments to regulations, this provision 
has been liberally construed and recommendation by 
the committee in most cases ·is tantamount to amend-
ment since approval by the Secretary is usually 
obtained without difficulty •••••••••• 
"Restriction on marketings is effectuated by requir-
ing that all potatoes shipped into commercial channels 
must be inspected by an authorized member of the 
federal-state or other designated inspection service. 
Potatoes not meeting minimum requirenents are elim-
inated from consumption channels. 
1. Theodore w. Schultz, Agriculture in an Unstable Economy-, Op. cit., 
p. 180 
2. Gray, Sorenson and Cochrane, Bulletin 211, Op. cit., p. 149 
3. Ibid., pp. 150-151 
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11 In effectuating each order the administering committee 
is charged with the responsibility of making recommenda-
tions to the Secretary prior to each marketing season 
concerning the marketing policy deemed desirable . In 
determining such marketing policy the committee is 
expected to give due consideration to: 
(a} The market price of potatoes including prices 
by grade, size and quality. 
(b) The supply of potatoes by grade, size and 
quality in the production area and in other 
areas. 
(c) Trend and level of consumer income; and 
(d) other relevant factors. 
11Upon receiving the reconnnendation of the committee, the 
Secretary issues a regulation Whenever he finds that such 
regulation w.i.ll tend to effectuate the purpose of the act. 
In practice the affirmative finding of the Secretary has 
been almost automatic after such recommendation is made 
by the committee •••• •• •• 
11In practice, potato orders have been used to eliminate 
lower grades and qualities from consumption channels. 
The quality level at which the regulations have been 
applied and the degree of flexibility in the application 
of restrictions vary considerably between areas. 
Ordinarily, however, each committee permits unrestricted 
shipment of potatoes for seed, export, distribution by 
the federal government, manufacture or conversion, · and 
livestock feed. The widest divergence among regions 
·results from the adoption of different quality require-
ments for potatoes which go into domestic consumption 
channels. There is a tendency for areas producing higher 
quality potatoes to place higher quality requirements on 
market potatoes •••••••• 
"A large majority of the orders, however, restricted 
marketing to u. S. No. 2 or better quality potatoes with 
minimum size requirements ranging from lj to 2 inches in 
diameter. In addition to grade and size requirements, 
potatoes which were materially skinned, feathered, or 
otherwise damaged were withheld (destroyed} from the 
market. 
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"These requirements were often changed or temporarily 
suspended to avoid undue hardship in localized areas." 
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The authors found sufficient evidence to show that an empirical 
evaluation of the effects of the orders would be difficult. In addition, 
. such an evaluation would be made more complex because of the scant informa-
tion available as to the quality of potatoes produced in various areas 
from year to year. They .did conclude that it might still be possible to 
make a theoretical analysis which would be useful in guiding program 
planners and administrators, however .. 
It is important in determining the worth of the marketing agree-
ments to note that it has been necessary for the government not only to 
promote their adoption but to compel it, as a condition of price support 
operations by the government. 1 
"Beginning with the 1946 crop there has been an abundant 
supply of potatoes each year, except for 1951 and for 
most of the calendar year 1952. During this period, 
marketing agreements versus marketing quotas have been 
widely discussed as a means of coping with the extra 
supplies. Representatives of potato growers, in request-
ing extension of price support~ in 1948, testified before 
congressional committees that marketing agreements were 
acceptable as a condition of continuing price support but 
marketing quotas were not. The Agricultural Act of 1948 
authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to require co~ 
pliance with production goals and marketing regulations. 
Production areas, in which a marketing agreement was 
considered feasible, were required to consider adoption 
of such a program for 1950 as a condition of eligibility 
for price support. Areas failing to approve a marketing 
agreement program were ineligible for price support. 
The same legislation stated that "For the crop year 1951 
and thereafter no price support shall be made . available 
for Irish potatoes : unless marketing quotas are in effect 
with respect to such potatoes." 
1. United States Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Marketing 
Service, Potato Marketing Agreements under Federal Legislation, 
October, 1954, p. 2 
Gray, Sorenson and Cochrane interpreted rejection of seven 
order proposals in 1950 as rebellion against government controls r ather 
than a vote gambling that the advantages of government price support 
could be had without the necessity of complying with a marketing order 
. 1 in the area. They further note that large growers tended to favor 
marketing agreements more than small ones and that rejections are more 
likely to come when a large proportion of the growers take time to vote 
because more small producers then vote and affect the results. The 
ordinary election, however, finds the small far~rer indifferent to his 
duty t o vote so that the minority of large producers can adopt a market-
ing order because they control enough of the output to determine the 
election results. 
The implications of the election results do not seem important 
until the authors ,tell us that the most important operational probl em 
is the difficulty of adopting a marketing program which is effective and 
at the same time acceptable enough to the producers in the area. They 
point out that while restricting sales in order to increase revenues 
seems simple, that it is very complex. It is important because of the: 2 
"particular means of restricting sales that was adopted, 
with certain variations, in all agreements and orders. 
The means of restricting sales was that of restricting 
by quality. Keeping low quality pqtatoes off the market, 
as distinct from withholding high quality potatoes or 
certain quantities without regard to quality, would seem 
1. Gray, Sorenson and Cochrane, Bulletin 211, Op. cit., p. 152 
2. Ibid., p. 155 
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11to be an eminently sensible approach to the restric-
tion problem. By this method consumers obtain the 
choicer qualities, the mechanics of the operation rely 
upon inspection of the commodity instead of an attempt 
to keep tab on growers' production and sales, and the 
probability is that the revenue-raising power of a 
given quantity of restriction is greatest when the 
restriction is against low qualities. 
"If it is . estimated that the removal of, say, 10 per 
cent of the crop of a given area will result in a price 
approximating parity, then it should be possible, at 
least theoretically, to translate this 10 per cent 
figure into a quality regulation. Perhaps a study of 
. available records and reports on the current crop 
indicates that it is comprised of 10 per cent potatoes 
of a specified small size or poor quality and 90 per 
cent potatoes of larger sizes or better quality. It 
VY-ould seem to be a simple matter to remove these small 
and low quality potatoes from the market. 
"Actually, it is far from simple - largely because of 
geographical differences in the composition of the crop 
by size and quality. Typically, most of the small and 
low quality potatoes fall in one part of an area, in 
which case the producers involved will take a dim view 
of, say, a 50 per cent restriction on their marketings 
in contrast to no restrictions in another part of the 
area. The administrative dilemma is thus spelled out 
as follows: The most economical way to increase 
revenues (i.e., getting the largest revenue increment 
from the least restriction) under these circumstances 
may involve a blanket quality regulation covering the 
entire area; whereas the most acceptable method may 
involve a variety of quality regulations which contrive 
to limit marketings in about the same amount throughout 
the area. In practice, such conflicting considerations 
have been comprised, typically with a relatively heavy 
emphasis upon suspensions or exemptions which help to 
forestall rebellions against the orders. Diversity in 
the production pattern and heterogeneity of the product 
have made this problem of compromising program effective-
ness and program acceptability particularly acute in the 
case of potatoes. The diverse pattern of potato produc-
tion in the United States suggests that this particular 
dilemma would be intensified in a nationwide or crop-
. wide agreement and that other methods of restricting 
sales would encounter similar administrative complica-
tions." 
2 
Let us now look at what the Department of Agriculture has to 
say about potato marketing agreements. In the historical introduction 
of "Potato Marketing Agree:rents under Federal Legislation" several worth 
. 1 
while observations are made: 
"Expanded production brought on by World War I left 
a wake of excess production that caught the attention 
not only of farmers but also of many others interested 
in the farmers' welfare. Voluntary plans for coping 
with large supplies offered a testing ground for 
various marketing ideas. The basic principles of 
voluntary marketing agreements proved to be sound, if 
all farmers and handlers would follow a common pattern. 
However, many of these plans failed, or were of limited 
use only, because a small minority proved to be the 
marginal group that tipped the scales away from attain-
ment of industry objectives. 
"Federal legislation authorizing the use of agreements 
and licenses for regulating the handling of fruits, 
vegetables and milk was enacted in 1933. This legisla-
tion was reenacted in 1937 under the titl e, "Agricul-
tural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937." Three basic 
types of regulation have been used for f ruits and 
vegetables: (1) grade, size, quality and maturity, 
( 2) volume proration, and ( 3) surplus pools. Only the 
first of these three types, however, has been used for 
potatoes." (See pages 117 and 118 for explanation of 
terms.) 
This study makes it clear that producer support is necessary 
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for the success of marlceting agreements. There are too many opportunities 
for evading restriction to keep an agree:rent eff ective by police methods 
2 if members do not cooperate. In addition it is only when the members 
understand the dollar value of high standards of quality that they are 
1. United States Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Marketing 
Service, "Potato Marketing Agree:rents under Federal Legislation", 
October, 1954 
2. Ibid., p. 5 
willing to adopt standards of sufficient rigidity to obtain maximum 
benefits. However, even when standards are adopted and the majority 
does agree with them, there is still need for government inspection 
to check compliance -v;"ith the regulations.1 
The authors of this study tell us of the difficulty in trying 
to compute exactly any increases in prices due to grade and size l imita-
tions under marketing agreements. However, they do conclude that prices 
are affected by three types of influence, namely: 
1. Elindnation of grades or sizes for which prices 
are normally discounted. 
2. Increase in price due to reduction in the supply. 
3. Merchandising factors such as maturity and 
cle an.Line ss. 
It is generally found that the elimination from marketing 
channels of grades and sizes ~hat are discounted in price outweighs 
the effect of limitations of volume. 2 In other words, eliminating low · 
quality is more effective than limiting the volume marketed in rais ing 
prices. 
An important factor in this area of effectiveness of grade and 
size regulations is the extent that growers and handlers are willing to 
go in grading out particuJ.ar qualities and sizes of potatoes. This will 
depend on such things as the quality and size of a given crop, marketing 
practices, and mechanical probl ems of separating grades and sizes. 
Another factor in effectiveness of grade standards in maximizing income 
is prompt destruction of culls as soon as they are sorted out for if 
1. Ibid., pp. 6-7 
2. Ibid., p. 7 
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they remain in storage, they depress the market price because they may 
be released in the future. 
Summary 
The merits of marketing agreements in solving the problems we 
set up in Chapters two and three can be summarized as follows: 
Because of their loose administration and democratic principles, 
marketing agreements have not interferred with economic tendencies such 
as shifting of areas of production, or Ydth attempts on the part of 
individual producers to increase the efficiency and productivity of their 
operations. In fact, by raising standards of quality slowly as members 
are able to achieve them in a given area, market agreeiOOnts encourage 
scientific methods. On the other hand, marketing agreements do not work 
too effectively without the help of government inspection and enforcement 
agencies to insure that a marginal minority group do not destroy the 
benefits to the farmers as a group, which a marketing agreement can bring 
about . In other words, marketing agreements have the same strength and 
weakness of any democratic institution.1 They allow room for individual 
initiative but they suffer from opportunism, carelessness, and lack of 
standards on the part of a minority of the group. However, vfhen the group 
majority realizes the importance of the organization aims and purposes, 
individual initiative and government help can work together to achieve 
the group's ends. The chief advantages of marketing agreements are that 
they encourage producers to work at solving their OlVIl problems and give 
1. John K. Galbraith reaches a similar conclusion in his book American 
Capitalism (Chapter ll), Houghton Mifflin Co., Boston, 1952 
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the individual, farmer some of the tools necessary to profitable existence 
in an economy characterized by monopolistic competition.l It is not 
suggested that they constitute a panacea for all the problems which beset 
the farmer. 
Cooperatives 
Because of the excellent study made by George N. Goldsborough 
of the Farm Credit Administration of the United States Depart100nt of 
Agriculture, we shall utilize his findings virtually intact to discuss 
2 
the place of cooperatives in the potato industry. 
l. Ibid. 
11Potato cooperatives in the United states developed 
certain chronological and organizational differences 
in two geographical regions - northern and southern. 
The Northern States, or the 'late potato region,• 
harvests the commercial potato crop in the fall; the 
Southern states, or the 1 early and intermediate 
region,' harvests and ships potatoes during the winter, 
spring and early summer. While climate determined the 
chief differences in the development of potato coop-
eratives in the two areas, the greater concentration of 
potato production in the late states also accounted for 
some dissiffiilarities. 
"From a broad, national standpoint, however, the history 
and development of cooperation in potato marketing can 
be separated into four clearly defined phases: (1) the 
slow development of local cooperatives (1900-1918); (2) 
the rapid development of local cooperatives and the 
merging of most of these new organizations, and some 
older ones, into State-wide federations and national 
exchanges (1919-24}; (3) dissolution of most of the 
federations, the national exchanges and many local coop-
eratives (1925-30); and (4) rebuilding along local and 
district lines and renewing and reorienting the role of 
the national exchanges (1931-50). 
2. George N. Goldsborough, 11 Cooperative Marketing of Potatoes in the 
United states", United States Department of Agriculture, 1951, 
Bulletin 62, Summary 
11 Cooperative marketing of potatoes began in 1900 in 
the early and intermediate region at Onley, Va., "With 
the organization of the Eastern Shore of Virginia 
Produce Exchange. Almost a decade passed before the 
next cooperative was organized, at Freehold, N. J. 
From 1910 to 19l8, the grov~h of cooperatives gained 
mozoontum, but primarily in the late States of Michigan, 
Wisconsin, Minnesota and New York. Some of the success-
ful associations of today were organized during this 
period. 
11In general the · beginning associations grew out of the 
growers' dissatisfaction with local marketing methods, 
and from their need to improve facilities for assembl-
ing, grading, packing aD.d warehousing potatoes. The 
gradual concentration of potato production into commer-
cial areas, and the increased growth of urban consumer 
districts, made the development of specialized market-
ing services essential and growers looked to cooperatives 
to perform these functions. 
11 Immediately after World War I, between 1919 and 1924, 
scores of locals were organized. As part of the same 
movement, several State federations were set up to 
market for the newly formed locals and for a substantiai 
portion of the established locals. Most of these State 
federations were in the late region. 
IIDuring this same tiroo, the State federati ons cherished 
the dream of forming a national cooperative sales agency 
for potatoes, in order to control the marketing of most 
of the commercial crop. However, they were never success-
ful in establishing a national potato agency. Instead, 
they used the services of national sales agencies ·which 
handled various fresh fruits and vegetables with potatoes 
being customarily the largest commodity marketed. 
11 All but two of the state federations that were organized 
in the early 1920's were out of business by 1925, along 
"With many of the. locals. The early national exchanges 
had also failed by 1930. This boomeranging failure 
resulted from organizing locals and over-head associations 
faster than efficient services and experienced workers could 
be developed. Since a principal objective was to control 
the potato marl<et, they concentrated on large volume rather 
than on needed services. 
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11With the dissolution of the State potato federations 
and the national fruit and vegetable agencies, the 
effort to control the crop as a means of raising the 
price of potatoes disappeared. Thereafter, potato 
cooperatives returned to their original objective -
to provide needed services to members. Under this 
redefined objective potato cooperatives have made 
continued progress •••••••• 
11At the time of this study, there were 114 cooperatives 
in the United States handling potatoes. Tmy were 
located in 31 of the 48 States. But 73 per cent were 
in the late region. About 64 per cent of the 144 
potato cooperatives were independent locals; almost 2.5 
per cent were local nembers of federations; 8 per cent 
were centralized associations, and 3 per cent were 
federations. 
"Practically all potatoes (96 per cent) marketed by 
cooperatives during 1948 were sold for fresh consumption. 
Slightly less than 4 per cent were processed; and about 
half of 1 per cent were sold for processing. Most of 
the cooperative processing is done in the late States. 
The methods of processing in order of ·importance are: 
·Starch manufacture, dehydration, flour manufacture, and 
the freezing of French fries. Commercial potato chippers 
bought almost two-thirds of the processing potatoes sold. 
"Cooperatives handled slightly over 9 per cent of the 
total amount of potatoes sold for food, seed, feed and 
processing during 1948. n 
Conclusions1 
"The information obtained on cooperative potato marketing 
in the United States indicates the following: 
l. Cooperatives have played, and are continuing to play, 
a major role in the development of the practices 
fundamental to good marketing; these being the produc-
tion of better quality potatoes, grade standardization, 
efficient methods of grading and packing, better market 
facilities; consumer packaging; direct 11 farm-to-retail 
store" marketing, more stable pricing methods, and 
effective advertising and promotion. 
I. Ibid., pp. o9-7o 
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"2. There is no one 11 ideal11 organizational pattern 
or marketing program best suited for marketing 
potatoes cooperatively. Cooperative structure 
and operational methods must be tailored to the 
needs and customs of the growers served, to the 
type of farming and geography of the area covered, 
to the relative concentration of the producing 
section, to the location of potential markets, 
and to accepted marketing practices. 
3. There is a vd.de range in the importance of coop-
eratives in marketing potatoes from the various 
producing States. Apparently, in some States, 
cooperation never recovered from the disillusion-
ment created by the disastrous experiences with 
the ill-fated federations of the 1920's. In most 
areas where cooperatives do not handle an important 
proportion of the potatoes marketed there appears 
to be an abundant need for the services, and for 
the "balance "Wheel" factor which growers could 
provide for themselves through cooperatives. 
4. The coordination and integration of merchandising 
effort between cooperatives on a district and 
national scale have proved to be practicable and 
of considerable value to cooperatives engaging in 
such programs. It would be worth while for coop-
eratives marketing independently to consider a 
similar type of joint effort in expanding their 
markets." 
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Cooperatives have many of the same advantages and disadvantages 
of marketing agreements with the one exception of government aid in polic-
ing members. Because they tend to be smaller they are less able to 
influence market price by controlling quantity but probably are more able 
to control the quaJity of their pack and brands. They do not have to 
include unwilling members as is the case with marketing agreements. This 
is a source of strength in that those who remain members are cooperative 
in attitude while it is a source of weakness in that a member may easily 
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withdraw if slightly dissatisfied. They probably offer more advantages 
to the small grower by performing services for him better than he can 
perform them himself. There are no absolute limits to the type of farm 
problems which cooperatives can tackle or to the means which they can 
use to solve these problems. They can be large or small, centralized 
or decentralized, monopolistic or not as the membership finds practical. 
They are noted for their aid in solving most of the minor types of 
marketing and production problems outlined in Chapters t"WO and three. 
However, they are not panaceas; they will work only as well as an enlight-
ened membership makes them work. If the individllal farmers recognize the 
problems 'Which face them in production and marketing, they can build coop-
eratives which can help in solving these problems. Cooperatives will not, 
however, take the place of individual initiative on the part of tre pro-
ducer, for their members must exercise initiative to make trem work. 
Commodity Loans 
Among the methods of aiding the farmer financially, at the market-
ing level, are commodity loans. They can only be used to supplement other 
devices since by themselves they would only aid the farmer to hold his crop 
until such time as he might sell it at the highest price. One type of loan 
actually used under the Roosevelt and succeeding administrations was: 
"Commodity Loans.1 This is one of the most effective 
of the price-support programs. Loans by the Commodity 
Credit Corporation or other qllalified lending agencies 
are made at the full support price to those who agree 
to join action programs, i.e., acreage allotments and 
1. Robert E. Summers, The Reference Shelf - Subsidies for Farmers, H. w. 
Wilson Co., New York, 1951, p. SO 
"marketing quotas. These loans are secured by a lien 
on the commodity. If the market price of the commodity 
falls below the loan value, the farm3r does not have 
to make up the difference - the government merely takes 
over the commodity and the farmer receives the loan 
value. If the market price rises above the loan value, 
the farmer sells his product, pays off the loan, and 
pockets the difference. 
"These loans are known as non-recourse loans, and for 
the farmer are analogous to the old remark of "heads 
I win, tails you lose." 
11 Such loans are intended to place a floor under connnodity 
prices. 11 
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As such, they _aid orderly marketing but probably encourage over-
production as presently administered. They would, of course, be useful 
to the program of orderly marketing whether conducted under parity prices, 
production quotas, or marketing agreements. 
There is a second type of commodity loan, that is a loan vr.i.th 
recourse. This would not be aimed at putting a floor under prices but 
in helping a farmer to finance his marketing operations. Such loans 
enable him to pay his bills when due, yet hold his crop for the most 
opportune selling period. They would tend to stabilize supplies avail-
able for sale by placing a crop in storage when it is plentiful and 
releasing it when it is short. This would benefit consumers and producers 
by stabilizing prices in the short run without interferring with long run 
cost or price trends. 
A third purpose is that of stabilizing prices over the course 
of the business cycle by buying or making loans at the bottom of· the 
cycle and selling or calling loans at the peak of the cycle. Loan programs 
aid orderly marketing because they would tend to increase the income 
yield of the crop by enabling fanoors to deliver the crop to market 
more in accord with market needs or at least when prices are most 
attractive. Presumably, prices reflect market needs and available 
supplies at any rate. But it is difficult to be sure from the profits 
of individual farmers who take advantage of this program whether or 
not the aggregate income of all farmers will be increased by storage 
operations over a long period. Johnson says that if these programs 
are to result in lower farm income over a period of a business cycle; 
the elasticity of demand must be from three to five or more times as 
large during the period of release of stocks as during the period of 
accumulation.1 However, farmers may find the additional income gained 
I 
during depressions is worth more to them than the greater dollar loss 
in more prosperous times. 
Storage and loan programs do not contribute spectacularly to 
total farm income at any rate but may be justified from the point of 
view of stabilizing income and stabilizing supplies available. It must 
be remembered, however, that there are other devices for financing the 
crop while it is being held until the most opportune moment of sale. 
For example, private banks give collateral loans to farmers and handlers 
based on public warehouse receipts and that these would serve some of 
the same purposes but not all since they are short term loans and not 
centrally coordinated. They may also be subject to recall at the dis-
cretion of the lender and so may further unstabilize a falling market 
price. 
1. D. Ga:le Johnson, Trade and Agriculture, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 
New York, 1950 
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Commodity Purchases and Purchase Agreemeni~ 
These are basically the same as non-recourse commodity loans 
but they work somewhat more discriminately and directly to bolster farm 
income. 
11 Commodity Purchases.1 There are two types of 
purchase procedures used in support operations -
direct purchases and purchase agreements. · 
(a) Direct purchases have been utilized 
especially in the postwar period, in 
order to bolster prices by removing a 
portion of the supply from regular 
marketing channels. They have been 
used most extensively with respect to 
eggs, potatoes and dried fruits. 
(b) Purchase agreements were developed to 
supplement commodity loans. Under this 
agreement the farmer pays a small charge 
for the guarantee of purchase by the 
government, and depending upon Slibsequent 
market price, may sell all, part, or none 
of the specified quantity. 
11For the farmer, they are advantageous in that producers 
who do not need immediate funds can obtain price protection 
without borrowing. 
"The purchase agreerrent was first used on a l arge scale in 
1948, with the Commodity Credit Corporation introduced it 
with respect to grains." 
Vfhen used with parity price supports, commodity purchases, 
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purchase agreements and non-recourse loans have the effect of maintaining 
commodity prices at artificial levels. 2 They protect the high cost opera-
tor, the high cost area and those who produce a quality of goods just high 
1. Ibid., pp. 50-51 
2. Theodore w. Schultz, Agriculture in an Unstable Economy, Op. cit., 
P• l !jQ 
enough to sell to the government. They do provide a mea.n.s of handling 
existing surplus farm production most efficiently. In addition, they 
provide us with a sort of ever-normal granary which has already helped 
us once in time of shortage during World War II. 
Purchases and Loans and the Potato Industry 
These programs do not encourage the adjustments and improve-
ments which can ultimately improve the health of the potato industry. 
As a matter of fact commodity loans do not work too well with potatoes 
since the lowly spud cannot be kept for more than a year and so the 
surplus carry-over cannot be stored until a shortage arrives in which 
the surplus can be used. 1 This has led to scandals during and after 
the war 'When the government was forced to destroy rotting potatoes. 
Commodity loans with recourse do not cause land to be used 
more efficiently, they do not bring about more ·efficient planting 
methods, nor do they increase the consumption of potatoes, or benefit 
the consumer directly. In short, they do nothing but aid orderly 
marketing by providing cash when the farn:er needs it. They must be tied 
with parity plans, marketing agreements, cooperatives or some other 
device to solve other problems. 
Non-recourse loans, purchases, and purchase agreements do not 
bring about any increase in consumption, benefit to the consumer, or 
more efficient production methods. They do provide cash when needed by 
the farmer, but they raise prices to such high levels as to cause an 
oversupply of potatoes. 
1. An atomic radiation device which will keep potatoes from sprouting 
for 15 months was announced in Business Week magazine, April 16, 
1955, p. 86 
Subsidies to Groups Other Than Farmers 
Farm income may be aided by payments of subsidies to consumer 
groups who use certain categories of farm goods. These may be straight 
subsidies paid to either domestic or foreign consumers. Section 32 of 
Public Law 320, provides that 30 per cent of the receipts from custom's 
duties shall be available to encourage the exportation or domestic con-
sumption of agricultural commodities. Such funds have been used as 
export subsidies or for commodities distributed to charitable institu-
tions and to the school lunch programs. This gives the farmer a sale, 
at a price profitable to him, to a customer who would not otherwise buy. 
There are other subsidy systems, however. For example, the 
two-price plan which traces ba~k into the early 1920's when George Peek 
was its advocate.1 This plan would establish a relatively high price 
for the domestic market and a low price for the foreign market. Vlhen 
the domestic demand is inelastic and the foreign demand is elastic, it 
will produce its greatest revenues. Here the foreign market is being 
used as a dumping ground for · that portion of production that domestic 
markets will not take at profitable prices. These foreign exports 
under Peek 1 s plan would be subsidized by an equalization fee at the 
expense of the domestic consumer. Under this nethod, the domestic 
consumer pays more money for less goods. Beyond this, the Whole effect 
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on foreign trade would be unhealthy in that it would lead to retaliatory 
subsidies and tarrifs on other commodities by competing foreign nations. 
1. Gilbert c. Fite, Op. cit., p. 62 
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Let us note here that subsidies would have no beneficial 
result in raising the quality of potatoes unless the subsidy was 
directed to specific standards and grades of potato. Nor would such 
subsidies work directly toward increased efficiency of marketing and 
production techniques because they would not be tied to such techniques. 
As a matter of fact, it would seem that subsidies are predicated on the 
failure of the product design or quality or price to commend the product 
sufficiently to the consumer so that he will buy adequate quantities 
(adequate from the farmer's viewpoint or from viewpoint of the consumer's 
own health and welfare requirements). Rather than correct the deficien-
cies of the product at their sources, the government substitutes a sub-
sidy to induce added consumption. This subsidy obviates the need for 
improvements in the efficiency of t .he industry, such as cost cutting, 
better advertising and promotion, or improved quality. The farmer is 
able to sell his product without improvenents. The consumer who receives 
the subsidy benefits, and the farmer who is relieved of his entrepreneurial 
responsibility of maintaining eff icient production may also benefit; but 
the taxpayers' losses may offset these to such an extent that the whole 
economy loses. The amonnt of loss would depend on the misallocation of 
resources through the farmers inefficiency and the costs of administra-
tion. 
It is doubtful that indirect subsidies would aid in the efficient 
allocation of resources, in the preservation of our resources, in the 
stimulation of research, or in the security of the nation against shortages 
due to crop failure. They might aid in raising the standard of living 
among our poorest farm families but in this case they would probably 
defeat efforts to get such families to engage in more profitable occupa-
tions than farming. 
Subsidy plans involve a disturbance of the economic structure 
and incentives ·which may raise the cost of goods to tm conswner and 
perhaps the cost of production. Indirect subsidies may be useful for 
some crops in the short run for changing consumer tastes and habits, 
but in the long run they may lead into a stagnant econo~ because they 
may eliminate the need to improve efficiency in fa1~ng. 
Subsidies to Others Related to the Potato Industry 
It is doubtful, hovffiver, that such subsidies can be used to 
best advantage in the potato industry in view of the relatively inelastic 
demand for potatoes. Some potatoes are diverted into the school lunch 
program, but it Im.lst be recalled that children who go home for lunch may 
also eat potatoes so we have no proof of increased consumption without 
careful studies. 
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As for export subsidies, potatoes are too perishable, too bulky, 
and too low in value to lend themselves to international trade. 
To summarize the merits of the plans which are designed to work 
on the marketing level and make a comparison with the criteria set up in 
the introduction to Part III, we may say: 
1. Market plans will do little to regulate the quantity 
produced but may help to control the quantity con-
sumed so as to bring the two into balance. Market 
agreements and cooperatives may improve the quality 
of the product. 
2. Market plans may be effective in some cases in setting 
equitable short-run prices but they cannot always be 
depended upon. Long-run prices are dependent upon 
more fundamental forces of supply and demand. 
3. Market plans cannot assure the most efficient use of 
our resources in production to achieve maximum output 
for each unit of input. They can improve certain 
marketing practices and the quality of the product. 
4. Marketing plans could do so~ething to promote stability 
throughout the whole economic structure by maintaining 
farm income and the flow of farm goods to market in 
times of depression. 
5. Marketing plans can do little to aid in the relocation 
of such low-income farm families as depend on potato 
production for their livelihood. 
6. Some marketing plans, such as cooperatives and market-
ing agreements can be devised to do much Ymrk in stinmlat-
ing research, education and greater efficiency in potato 
farming. 
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7. Market plans cannot help to conserve our resources 
against depletion, erosion, or exploitation except 
indirectly through research and education. 
8. Market plans cannot protect the farmer against crop 
failure except indirectly by encouraging research and 
scientific farm practices. 
9. Market plans can achieve :mati.mum results in disposing 
of bumper crops to prevent price collapse for the 
potato farmer. They cannot relieve continued over-
production, however. 
10. Market plans can achieve good results in establishing 
reserve stocks of potatoes on a year to year basis to 
prevent shortages between crops. The idea of a long-
run, ever-normal granary is not feasible unless potatoes 
can be stored over one year. Some may be diced and . 
frozen and new devices may prevent sprouting. The effect 
of these new mechanical aids in total marketing is not 
clear. 
11. Market plans can be exercised by decentralized agencies, 
such as cooperatives to achieve good results vdth a 
minimum of government control. 
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12. Market plans are often based on oligopolistic concepts 
and so must be carefully watched to prevent exploitation 
of the consumer. There is, however, some area for co~ 
bining producers into cooperative groups w.i. thout unduly 
influencing prices since the number of producers· and 
producing territories is so great. 
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CHAPTER VI 
THE USE OF PARITY AND OTHER PRICING AND INCOME DEVICES 
TO SOLVE FARM PROBLEMS 
Among the many methods of attacking the problem of low farm 
income, the pricing mechanisms are the best known. Of these price 
support methods, the parity program is being utilized but under severe 
criticism by the authors of other plans. Among the other plans are 
Forward Prices, the Brannan Plan, and Cost of Production. Vie shall 
not try to criticize these plans in any new manner since others more 
qualified have explored them in greater length than we can in this 
paper, Yve shall merely try to cull the best criticisms we can out of 
the material at our disposal. 
Parity 
The parity price concept was sponsored by George Peek as 
"fair exchange value 11 in 1922 as an answer to the maladjustment in the 
relation of agriculture and the rest of the society •1 Peek and his 
associate Hugh Johnson saw the farmers' problems in the operation of 
the protective tariff. They felt that agricultural tariffs did not 
protect those farm crops which the United States produced in abundance 
vmile industrial tariffs were effective in protecting industrial goods 
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l. John Black, Parity, Parity, Parity, Harvard Press, Cambridge, Mass., 
1942, p. 45 
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and caused higher prices for such goods. This meant that prices of 
farm commodities were forced down to world prices Whenever a surplus 
existed but manufactured goods sold at higher than world prices. In 
other words, farmers were buying at higher than world prices and sell-
ing at world price levels. They felt that the tariff would be effective 
if the surpluses which depressed domestic prices to world price levels 
were removed or segregated. They wanted farmers to reg~late supply to 
meet demand on the domestic market but they realized that farmers are 
unable to control weather, yields, or to cooperate. They said, there-
fore, that the government must help bring the farmers together to do 
for themselves What industry did for itself. The surplus crops they 
would dump abroad under a two-price system, which was developed in 
their booklet "Equality for Agriculture 11 • 
11If the farmer could achieve effective protection, 
Peekl declared, his products would have a 'fair 
exchange value' with those of industry. Thus, 
equality for agriculture would be achieved. Since 
farmers had been relatively prosperous before ·world 
War I, he defined a fair exchange value as 1 one 
which bears the same ratio to (the) current general 
price index as a ten year pre-v1ar average crop price 
bore to (the) average general price index for the 
same period.• To get this result he suggested that 
a fair exchange value or ratio-price be established 
by law and a fluctuating tariff created to protect 
that price on the domestic market. The price of 
farm commodities would, therefore, rise and decline 
vdth the general price level and provide a farm 
dollar with a fair and stable purchasing power. 
Peek's idea of a fair price was cost of production, 
plus a profit. He mentioned this in the first 
edition of 'Equality for Agriculture', as well as 
in his personal correspondence. 11 
1. Gilbert C. Fite, Op. cit., pp. 39-40 
1 
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All t hrough the 1920' s and into the 1930 ' s , Peek and Chester 
Davis wor ked t o get fair exchange value (or parity as it had come t o 
be known) adopted in the McNary-Haugen Bill. There were many competing 
i deas, such as "cost of production", and 11the ever-normal granary" of 
Henry A. Wallace . However, the wealthy Peek, by intense effort and at 
gr eat expense fought unt il he won, and as a r esult: 
"The A~icultural Adjustment Act of 1933 contained 
a clearl st at enent of the intent of Congress to 
'reestablish prices t o farmers at a level that will 
give agricultural commodities a purchasi ng power 
with respect to articles that farmers buy equivalent 
to t he purchasi ng power of agricultural coim!lodities 
in the base period1 •••••••• But the actual drafting 
of the Act was mainly in the hands of a nonpolitical 
group containing persons who knew that no device as 
crude as an inflexible application of the parity 
ratios in terms of a 1910-14 base uniformly to all 
products could be made to work in such a way as to 
achieve the declared goals. According.Ly, they care-
fully instructed the administration of t:OO Act rto 
approach such equality of purchas~ng power by gradual 
correction of the present inequalities therei n at as 
rapid a rate as is deemed feasible in view of the 
current consumptive demand in domestic and foreign 
markets• •••••••••• 
"There was argument also as to wMther the parity 
intended was not fundamentally parity of income 
rather than parity of prices. The language of the 
origina.L act was specific in terms of prices, but 
mentioned income also. After all, wasn't it the 
purchasing power of the farmer's total income that 
must be raised to its prewar level if they were to 
have parity?" 
During the next few years the legislation was amended toward 
income parity. In 1936 the parity basis was shifted to a comparison 
of the purchasing power per capita of the farm population with that 
1. Robert E. Summers, Op. cit., pp. 71-72 
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for the total non-farm population using 1910-1914 as base period. 
But before the Department of Agriculture could gather the statistics 
necessary for the computation of parity, prices slumped in 1937. As 
a result of this, Congressmen did not want to hear any income equality 
theories. What they wanted was a proper price for their farm constit-
uents' crops regardless of whether the market worked out such prices 
or not. They worked for and obtained supplementary 11parity payments". 
They juggled the base periods to more prosperous eras than 1910-1914 
and they even tried to raise parity levels to llO per cent of the 
highest base period.1 Parity income, in 1938's A.A.A., was defined 
as the per capita net income to persons on farms from farming that 
bears the same relationship to per capita income of persons not on 
farms as prevailed in 1910-14. (Note that non-farm income of farm 
people is allocated to the non-farm popula~ion.) Since this defini-
tion was worded to fit available statistics, it satisfied no one.2 
The definition of parity income in the Agricultural Act of 
1948 is as follows: ntparity'' as applied to income shall be gross 
income from agriculture which will provide the farm operator and his 
family with a standard of living equivalent to those afforded persons 
dependent upon other gainful occupation. 11 Such a definition involves 
subjective judgments not statistical objectivity on the part of the 
administrator. ·what this definition does is change the parity price 
concept of Peek into the parity income concept of today. It takes 
1. Ibid., pp. 70-73 
2. Ibid., p. 76 
lSO 
the emphasis away from price equality and puts it on to equal standards 
of living. 
But as of 1949, the Secretary of Agriculture said that he 
could not put this definition of parity income into statistical form 
so that the parity formula is still based on parity prices. 1 
11The parity price of an agricultural commodity, 
generally speaking, is the price which will give 
the commodity the same purchasing power as it had 
during a given base period in terms of (l) prices 
of commodities farmers buy, (2) interest on 
mortgage indebtedness, (3) taxes on farm real 
estate, and (4) for most commodities, wage rates 
for hired farm labor. The parity price of an 
individual farm commodity, in other words, is a 
standard for measuring the purchasing power of 
that commodity in relation to prices of goods 
and services during a definite base period. The 
Bureau of Agricultural Economics calculates parity 
prices each month"•••••••••• 
The formula for parity has been modernized in accordance with 
legislative amendments as of 1950. It still employs an Index of Prices 
paid (producer goods, consumer goods, interest, taxes and wage rates) 
and Index of Prices received, and both indexes are related to a 1910-
14 base. 
"The ~ase price of the commodity for which a parity 
price is to be computed, however, has been changed. 
The new base price, called the 'adjusted base price,' 
is obtained by taking the follo'Wing steps: 
l. Determine the average of the prices 
received for the commodity over the 
last ten-year period. 
2. Determine the average of the index of 
the general level of Prices Received 
by Farmers (1910-14 = 100) over the 
last ten-year period. 
1. Ibid., p. 77 
2. ~Westing, Readings in Marketing, Prentice-Hall, Inc., New York, 
1953, p. 193 
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]. Then (l) ~ (2) = 'Adjusted Base Price' of 
the commodity. 
"The parity price of a commodity is obtained simply by 
multiplying the 'adjusted base price' by the Index of 
Pr i ces Paid by Farmers (1910-14 = 100) .ul 
However, parity price or income aims have never really been 
achieved for Congress has actually made prices a goal rather than the 
means of the goal of solving farm problems. Congress has made it 
mandat ory that crop control, loan rates, support prices and other 
measures be used to achieve parity prices in order t o raise the stand-
ard of l iving. Congress should have used prices to allocate the factors 
of production instead it used prices as a means of distributing i ncome. 
Schult z devel ops this idea as follows: 2 
"To improve income distribution, it is necessary to 
be guided by welfare crit eri a, while in the alloca-
tion of resources to maximize production, it is 
necessary to be guided by the principle of marginal 
production. It is, therefore, essential to distinguish 
both in analysis and in policy, between the personal -
income distribution problem and the resources alloca-
tion problem and to treat each separately. If the 
pricing of farm products is employed as a means to 
bring about a more equal distribution of incomes among 
persons, it i s likely to cause inefficiencies in the 
use of resources, confusion, and waste. Price pol i cy 
is not an effective or even a suit able t echnique to 
improve the personal distribution of income.n 
There are, however, other reasons why parity does not work. 
G. A. Elgass points out that:3 
1. 
2. 
]. 
Ibid. 
"A farmer's real income, however, depends not only 
upon the relative prices of his products, but also 
upon the number of units of product which he can 
produce per day of labor and other resources - in 
short, upon the productivity of farmers. This 
Theodore W. Schultz, Agriculture in an Unstable Economy, Op. cit ., 
P• 255 
J. H. Westing, Op. cit., p. 156 
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"productivity can also be expressed in terms o£ 
cost per unit o£ production (excluding price 
changes), and thus it has a very important bear-
ing upon r eal income, £or if a unit of £arm 
product has the same purchasing power but costs 
less to produce, the £armer 1 s real income is 
increased. Yet changes in productiVity are not 
allowed £or in the parity price concept." 
Schultz1 says that relative prices do not equilibrate or 
distribute the labor force between agriculture and other occupat ions . 
I n t his respect, Elgass concurs, saying:2 
11The present approach of parity pricing, using an 
ancient set of price relationships as a ·guide, works 
against required employment shifts and other changes 
by resisting basic forces such as changes in con-
sumer tastes and increases in productivity. 
"Only by accident will a price computed by a parity 
formula avoid conflict with such basic forces. Con-
sequently, the parity concept does not provide a 
sound measure of relative prices. Prices determined 
in that way can be either too high or too low. By 
resisting necessary changes the parity concept tends 
to distort production and income relationships. 
Moreover, 'When consideration is given to some very 
real differences among farmers, parity pricing 
appears to be neither economically sound nor equit-
able even as among farmers." 
In view o£ the above facts, we may say that if prices are to 
guide farmers in their production, then prices must be based on current 
and expected supply and demand and not on some historical situation, 
such as parity for 1910-19~4. Price changes that keep farm production 
in line with demand ought to be facilitated; while price changes which 
1. Theodore W. Schultz, Agriculture in an Unstable Economy, Op. cit., 
p. 257 
2. J. H. Westing, Op. cit., p. 188 
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do not encourage production adjustments, but contribute to price 
uncertainty in farming, ought to be minimized. That ie, price 
changes that are expected at the time when farmers are planning 
what to plant do not disturb the production picture, "l'ihereas 
uncertainty as to price changes does cause distortion of the econom-
ical use of resources.1 
Another source of difficulty with the parity system arises 
in its inability to measure the relative changes in the unit cost 
of production between farms, between areas and between crops. Some 
of this inability to measure ~ost changes remains despite the fact 
that there has been an attempt by Congress to improve the law be-
cause computations are still based on historical relationships.2 
The Agricultural Act of 1949 provides a modernized parity formula 
(previously explained) which tends to reduce the parity price of 
field crops where mechanization has made production economies 
possible, and raise the parity price of livestock products, fruits, 
and vegetables where such economies are less extensive. 
Changes in the unit costs of production between areas and 
farms are partly due to changes in productivity and partiy due to 
variations in the cost prices of inputs. The parity system attempts 
to make adjustments by states3 in order to recognize these varying 
costs of production in the parity prices of the various states. 
1. Theodore .W~ Schultz, Agriculture in an Unstable Economy, Op. cit., 
p. 265 
2. J. H. Westing, Op. cit., p. 194 
3. Gray, Sorenson and Cochrane, Technical Bulletin 211, Op. cit., 
pp. 104-107 
154 
These adjustments were extremely difficult to accomplish and their 
efficiency was doubtful in the potato industry according to Gray, 
Sorenson and Cochrane~1 
11The procedures followed in price determination, 
in contrast to those followed in distributing 
acreage allo·tments, were complex and were con-
tinuously subject to modification according to 
the .administrators' judgment. For this reason, 
it is virtually impossible to reach any definite 
conclusions regarding the efficiency of these 
determinations. The efficiency of these price 
determinations may be considered, however, in 
terms of the factors which influenced the price 
relationship among states. The three major 
factors which influenced this price relationships 
vrere (1) the historical price levels in the 
various states, which are predominantly a function 
of distance from market, (2) the movement of inter-
state price relationships between the parity base 
period and the recent 5-year base period, and (3) 
the proportion of each state•s crop which was 
p~rchased by the government. 
"Concerning the first of these factors, the absolute 
method which was used was favorable to outlying 
(i.e., low-priced states) as was brought out in 
earlier examples of applications of the .three methods 
considered here. Since the specialist states are 
predominatly outlying states, this would have favored 
efficient allocation. The second factor (i.e., the 
intrusion of a recent base period into the formula) 
would have worked in the opposite direction. The 
specialist states were the expanding states between 
the 19201 s and the immediate presupport period; 
hence their prices declined relative to the lake 
states' prices. The parity base period was relatively 
more favorable and the recent base period relatively 
less favorable to these expanding . and presumably more · 
efficient, producing areas. The third factor like-
wise was disadvantageous to the specialist states. 
1. Ibid., P• 113 
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"The states in which production was expanding in 
terms of comparative advantage found their upward 
thFust accelerated during the early program years; 
hence they sold more to the government and were 
therefore penalized by this standard of price 
determination. The net effect of these factors 
on efficiency in resource allocation cannot be 
formulated rigorously, but it appears doubtful 
that this effect was positiv:e.n 
In other words, the parity system rates all the producers 
within the various states as having similar problems. But this is not 
necessarily so for each individual farm has different combinations of 
production and marketing problems as we have endeavored to show in 
156 
Chapter II and III. Elgass makes the additional charge that the i nflexi-
bility of the parity method in reflecting cost adjustments is unfair to 
1 
consumers. 
11Moreover, "When the parity pricing concept acts 
to prevent consumers from benefiting from the 
rapid cost reduction which occurs in some more 
favored lines, it can hardly be hailed as equit-
able~ Fortunately, such a situation is strikingly 
unusual in our economy. 'VIe do not find that the 
owners of capital keep all of the increased output 
of goods produced with their capital. Nor do we 
observe that producers of manufactured goods are 
able to keep all the gains when greater productivity 
lowers production costs. Normally, increased produc~ 
tivity sets in operation market forces Which act to 
reduce price or improve product quality and thus, 
regardless of their origin, make the gains of produc-
tivity generally available. But in agriculture the 
law does not allow changes in productivity or other 
basic economic forces fully to express themselves 
through price changes. Authoritative measures such 
1. J. H. Westing, Op. cit., pp. 191-192 
11 as government buying, government credit, acreage 
restrictions, marketing quotas, etc., are used to 
maintain the parity relationship of prices and 
rigidly resist such basic forces. Certainly, there 
would be vigorous opposition if any group tried to 
make the prices of such goods as electric light 
bulbs, radios, automobiles, rayon, etc., conform to 
some ru1cient pattern which would block the general 
distribution of the gains of higher productivity. 
"In a competitive economy the benefits of increased 
productivity will be largely passed on to the whole 
body of consumers even if the producers can claim 
full credit for improvement. Not even this claim 
can be made for the advanced productivity of agricul-
ture. In fact, much of the increase in productivity 
is due not to farmers but to city people - the 
producers of farm machinery and equipment, the pro-
ducers of chemical fertilizers and insecticides, and 
scientists who have worked out better methods of 
·production and developed superior seed and animal 
stock. An appeal for fair treatment hardly supports 
the argument that farmers should have the power to 
keep all the gains of higher productivity. 
11There are of course other important forces which 
would have a bearing on agricultural prices and output, 
but enough ha.s been said to indicate the basic unsound-
ness of the parity price concept. It should be empha-
sized, however, that the uneconomic effects of this 
concept · are especially dangerous during this period of 
national emergency. When the law provides that prices 
be supported at 90 per cent of parity at least some 
departure from the historical price pattern is allowed, 
but in the present environment of general price ceil-
ings there is still less opportunity to depart from the 
outmoded price pattern since the law ~11 not allow 
ceilings on farm prices to be lower than 100 per cent 
of parity. The preceding analysis of parity indicated 
that an economically sound price may be either above or 
below a price computed by the parity formula. By 
authoritatively forcing prices closer to the parity 
pattern this 100 per cent of parity requirement will 
yield a pattern of price relationships which is more 
unsound than that which already exists. It ' also adds 
to the array of dangerous inflationary forces. Neither 
of these effects enhances our national strength." 
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On the other hand, G.ray, Sorenson and Cochrane believe that 
the average farm p.rice of potatoes during the support period was below 
what it would have been under a f.ree market. . As a .result, the income 
received by farmers f.rom the sale of potatoes was probably less also, 
and while this was not the aim of parity as established by Congress, 1 
it was not necessarily bad for the consumer or the farmer. (Explained 
below.) 
Let us examine how the theories above specifically fit the 
potato industry. Gr~y, Sorenson and Cochrane found that the principle 
change brought about by the action of the potato price supports was 
not to alter the level of potato prices relative to the price of other 
farm commodities, but rather to alter completely the relationship 
2 between production and relative prices of potatoes. This would be 
economically satisfactory insofar as it brought production and demand 
into line but unsatisfactory if it tended to keep farmers overproducing 
potatoes. (Unacceptable because of the social costs of using resources 
for producing potatoes which could be used else'Where to produce more 
desirable products.) · Gray et al found that the price support program 
had two separa-te effects: 3 
11It resulted in the use of resources for the pro-
duction of potatoes which could have been more 
economically employed in the production of other 
things. Second, it was instrumental in accelerat-
ing a movement toward more efficient production." 
15 
1. Gray, Sorenson and Cochrane, 1echnical Bulletin 211, Op. cit., p. 137 
2. Ibid., p. 140 
3. I'6id., P• 145 
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This latter fact is tied closely to the reduced income that 
the producer received for potatoes apd which we said was not necessarily 
bad for him or the consumer. Vrhat we have are lo•~r cost producers sell-
ing their crop at a lower price but npt necessarily at a loss. (It may 
be that due to the increased efficiency of specialization that the 
industry on the average has actually increased its profits though we 
have no proof of this.) 
This does not, however, prove that Elgass is wrong when he 
says that parity prices can prevent the consumer from benefiting from 
the cost reduction of shifts to lower cost producers. It may be that 
while parity prices do allow some price reduction, they minimize these 
price reductions in such a way as to deprive the consumer of the full 
benefits. Of this we have little evidence, but we can say that parity 
was designed to give the farmer a bigger share of national income and 
if it wrks, it must deprive so:rreone of that share at any given level 
of national income. Of course, if parity raises the level of national 
income, we might raise the far:roors 1 share without reducing the absolute 
level of anyone elses share. There is one good way of measuring the 
worth of potato parity, that is by measuring the costs and benefits. 
"VV'hen farmers produce surplus food that must be1 
destroyed or channeled into a lovrer grade use on 
a subsidy basis, resources are not being employed 
in the most efficient manner possible. Some of 
the resources used in production of the surplus 
connnodity should have been used elsewhere. In 
1948 along 135 million bushels of potatoes were 
1. Gray, Sorenson and Cochrane, Station Bulletin 424, Op. cit., pp. 24-26 
"bought by the government. These potatoes Yw-ere not 
needed. With 194tl yields of 215.5 bushels per acre, 
this meant that 626,000 acres were devoted to raising 
unv{anted pot.atoe s. This acreage and all of the labor, 
fertilizer, etc., applied to it should have been Used 
to produce something that consumers wanted. 
"However, society appears to have benefited from the 
program in another respect. Because the shift in 
production patterns was accelerated, potatoes are 
probably being produced more efficiently now than 
would be the case if the program had not existed •••••• 
"The money cost of the program to consumers and tax-
payers may be computed as follows: (years 1942-1950) 
Government expenditures on support 
operations exclusive of administra-
tive costs 
Estimated value of potatoes bought 
by consumers under a free market 
(consumer cost if a free market 
had existed) 
Value of potatoes bought by con-
sumers with price support 
Difference 
Net money costs to consumers and 
taxpayers 
Iviillions of 
Dollars 
$552 
$3,637 
3,270 
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"Y.ihat does this mean to consumers? It means that con-
sumers paid less for potatoes than they would have under 
a free market. The program, therefore, cost individuals 
less than the amount of net government losses. The 
amount they gained as consumers ($367,000,000) must be 
deducted from the amount lost as taxpayers ($.552,000,000) 
to arrive at the net money costs of the program to con-
sumers and taxpayers ( $1.55, 000, 000) • " 
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We can see that -while special groups may have benefited 
from the program, it cost the taxpayers and consumers $155,ooo,ooo 
beyond the opportunity costs to the society (opportunity costs 
entailed in its failure to get the goods and services that surplus 
resources devoted to potatoes might have produced). 
To summarize the merits of parity based plans and make a 
comparison with any of our criteria which are applicable, we may say: 
l. Parity does not encourage the production of a 
quantity of potatoes in balance with the quantity 
consumers demand. 
2. Parity does not offer any incentive to improve 
quality of potato output and may even have an 
adverse affect on quality. 
3. Parity does not always encourage the most effi-
cient use of our r esources to achieve maximum 
output for each unit of input. Efforts of large 
efficient producers to maximize output to take 
advantage of guaranteed high prices is offset by 
tendency of parity to keep price umbrella high 
enough to maintain inefficient producers. 
4. Parity does stabilize our farm income at least 
in the short run. But since it prevents normal 
reallocation of resources, this may cause far 
greater future instability by misallocating 
resources .. 
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5. Parity offers s ome incentive to engage in 
research or to increase productivity but no 
incentive to increase marketing efficiency. 
6. Parity does not encourage lovr income farmers 
to leave farming. However, it may encourage 
them to enlarge their farms because the larger 
the farm the more the owner bene~its from parity. 
7. Parity may be combined 'With soil conservation 
measures to preserve our resources against deple-
tion, erosion, and exploitation. Each program 
loses some of its efficiency, however, and admin-
istration is difficult. 
8$ Parity may be combined with a storage program 
adequate to protect the nation against crop 
failure or wartime shortages. The taxpayer must 
pay the costs and such goods cannot remain a 
threat to market prices if such a program is to 
be successful. 
9. Parity substitutes the authority of government 
decree for the more efficient laws of supply and 
demand in setting prices. It centralizes the 
authority in few hands, whereas, competition would 
allow all interested parties to participate in 
price setting as either producers or consumers. 
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lOv Parity does not promote monopoly or oligopoly 
and perhaps makes it possible for small independ-
ent farmers to survive under conditions vmen large-
scale corporate farming might possibly result. 
lL Parity does protect our farm population agair..st the 
worst effects of price decline during periods of 
depression or recession. It thus helps in some ways 
to bring the recession to an end by protecting farm 
income and farm buying power. 
12. Parity is based upon historical datav As a result 
potatoes ~~th their declining demand are more diffi-
cult to administer than crops -with more stable 
demand. This occurs because parity tends to perpet-
uate the original production pattern in spite of a 
new demand pattern. This leads to over-production and 
pressure on administrators because farmers want to 
preserve the status quo, consumers want to elilJlinate 
surplus crops, and the state department objects be-
cause of the propaganda value of crop destruction to 
the connnunists. 
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Forward Prices 
Schultz has explained the need for forward prices in this 
manner .1 Farmers are vulnerable to any fall (or rise) in general 
level of prices because they are debtors, short of capital, and unable 
to hedge against general price deflation, (inflation- windfalls). 
Most of their business decisions involve relatively long-term commit-
ments - livestock, 3 years; frUit trees, decades. There is slow trans-
fer of resources out of agriculture but relatively quick transfer with-
in, so the structure of farm prices is important as it affects the use 
of farm resources. But the system of relative prices in agriculture 
is not dependable and causes misdirection in use of farm land, labor, 
and capital. Income uncertainty makes capital scarce; checks the 
expansion of farms "Which are too small; and makes farrers keep resources 
too flexible, both contractually and technically. This is true because 
farmers hesitate to contract payments with capital scarce even though 
the added resources would improve efficiency. But labor (especially 
that of the family) is flexible and with prices uncertain, labor becomes 
the residual claimant of income. So most farmers have too much labor, 
too little non-human resources, such as machines, equipment , land, 
fertilizer, buildings, livestock and feed inventories. This all means 
low per capita earnings, high rate of returns on capital and marginal-
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value productivity of capital much higher than the money cost of capital. 
Schultz advocates, therefore, that we eliminate unnecessary 
price changes through forward prices. 
1. Theodore w. Schultz, Agriculture in an Unstable Economy, Op. cit., 
p. 262 
"Four major characteristics distinguish forward prices1 
from the prewar price policies of the government a~d 
from indeterminate market prices: 
(l) The prices would be annou..11ced far enough 
in advance to enable farmers to develop 
their next production program in harmony 
with the announced prices. 
(2) The prices would cover a sufficient period 
of time to permit far~rs to complete at 
least one production period. 
(3) The price announcements would be sufficiently 
precise for each farmer readily to interpret 
the implications of the announced prices for 
his farming operations. 
(4) The prices announced should be those prices 
which will achieve the desired output." 
The system of Forward Prices as advanced by Schultz has not 
yet been tried so we do not have any experience with which to criticize 
his plan. However, we can take note of the fact the forward price set 
might be subject to political log-roiling as is parity today. It would 
seem to be superior to parity in that it is to be given far enough in 
advance to allow each farmer to plan his o"Wn affairs and this is the 
most efficient method of planning because it allows for all the neces-
sary adjustments bet1VBen producers' needs. 
165 
Gray, Sorenson and Cochrane advocate a similar plan as follows: 2 
"A solution to the price variability problem must begin 
vd.th an examination of its source. There are two dis-
tinct phenomena which explain this price characteristic 
in potatoes. These are: (1) the inflexibility of con-
sumer eating habits, and (2) the tendency for many widely 
scattered producers to use price in the previous one to 
l . Ibid., PP• 264-265 
2. Gray, Sorenson and Cochrane, nprice Supports and the Potato Industry~ 
Station Bulletin 424, PP• 29-30 
11three years as a guide for making planting decisions. 
They tend to expand production following high price 
years, and to contract production follovilng low price 
years. But if in making these adjustments each of 
many producers over-adjusts by only a moderate amount 
either too many or too few potatoes will be produced. 
nvihere individuals are unwilling to change the amount 
they consume to any important degree, even a modest 
overadjustment will give rise to an extreme price 
change •••••••••• 
"If these .wide price swings could be eliminated, one 
important price problem facing potato producers would 
be solved. This might be achieved through an income 
payments plan where the size of the payment is adjusted 
so as to partially, but never fully, offset the price 
depressing effect of surplus production. 
"Such a plan might 'VIurk as follows: A production goal 
would be announced each year before planting got under 
way. The goal would be based on estimates of consumers' 
requirements at an equilibrium price. An equilibrium 
price is one which i s just high enough to make the 
quantity which farmers are vrilling to supply equal to 
the quantity demanded at that price. In other words, 
producers would be supplied with a working guide to 
production requirements -- a guide developed in terms 
of quantities needed and an estimate of the price at 
which these supplies would sell. This estimated price 
would not, however, be a guaranteed price. 
"If farmers produced less than is required, price would 
be above the equilibrium level and returns from potato 
production would be high. If production ~ere excessive, 
prices under a completely free market would tend to fall 
greatly and returns from potato production would be low. 
Some protection could be provided against these sharp 
price declines through an income payments schedule. 11 
Under this plan if consl.llOOrs were estimated to be willing to 
take 300 million bushels at $2.00 per bushel, a schedule might be set 
up as follows: 
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For 300 million bushe.Ls, producers would be assured $600 million 
For 400 II II n II " II $500 n 
For 450 " 11 " 11 " " $450 " 
Assume that the quantities actually sold in the open markets as 
fo.Llows: 
300 million bushels sold for $600 million 
400 II II II II $540 II 
450 II . II If II $375 II 
Payments Yrould range from zero where grO\vers produced 300 million 
bushels to $75 million where growers raised 450 million bushe.Ls (or 150 
mi.Llion bushe.Ls surplus). 
11The kind of schedule ultimately developed would1 
depend upon the nature of the compromise between 
two conflicting goals: (l) that of reducing risk 
to producers and (2) that of avoiding excess costs 
to government. 
"The payment to each producer would be made in 
accordance with his share of the total value of 
commercial sales. The relationship between the 
national goal and the payment to an individual 
farmer is illustrated below, where the assured 
income for a 450 million bushel crop is $75,000,000 
more than the crop 'Will bring in the market. 
ncommercial sales 
Government payment 
Assured value 
Government payment 
as per cent of 
assured value 
Total Crop 
$375,ooo,ooo 
75,000,000 
45o,ooo,ooo 
17 
Individual 
$3,750 
750 
4,500 
17 
11The industry received 83 per cent of its total 
return from the market and 17 per cent through 
government income payment. This same relationship 
wou.Ld be maintained for each producer. Upon furnish-
ing proof of the value of his sales each fanner 
would receive a government payxoont "Which in this 
case would equal 17 per cent of his total return. 
1. Ibid., p. 31 
11 It should be noted from the income schedule 
presented above, that income guarantees would 
never be such that farmers would benefit from 
overproducing. The proposal is designed to 
prevent growers from losing as heavily from 
overproduction as under free market conditions, 
but not to eliminate . losses. The government 
payment increases as the size of the crop 
increases, but the crop loses value in the free 
market faster than government payments increase 
at all. levels of surplus production. Hence, 
each additional bushel of potatoes continues to 
reduce the total value of the crop, but by a 
lesser amount than under a free market." 
We do not know whether this plan vmuld work any better than 
Schultz's, since both are untried although it does offer some advantages 
over parity in theory at any rate. Neither plan, however, offers any 
assurance that production would tend to move into the hands of the most 
efficient producers or that inefficient producers would cease to grow 
potatoes. Since no profits would be guaranteed, it would seem to be 
that inefficient producers would be driven out, but we realize that 
•lith small producers, family labor might merely be given a smaller share 
of income than it could earn in other capacities. Yet this share might 
be just enough to keep small inefficient producers grardng potatoes 
instead of transferring their resources into other fields of production. 
Both of these plans have a disadvantage in common VIi th the Brannan Plan 
in that it would be impossible to estimate costs in advance. 
The Brannan Plan 
In 1949, the then Secretary of Agriculture, Charles F. Brannan, 
presented to Congress a new plan to achieve a fair and stable level of 
farm income. This income would be on a parity with average farm income 
6 
1 for the preceding ten years. The plan would support farm income 
directly from public funds rather than indirectly through the use of 
such funds in price supporting measures as has been the case with 
parity. Consumers would be offered the advantage of freel y moving 
prices for perishable farm products, those prices t0 be determined by 
the supply of and demand for these commodities. An excellent summary 
of the Brannan Plan was prepared by the National Association of Manu-
facturers vmich we shall quote. 2 
"Determination of the farm income support level 
for any one year would require the use of a formula 
to arrive at l'lhat is termed a farm Income Support 
Standard for that year. This Standard or 'yardstick' 
in 1950, for example, would be calculated in part, 
by first determining the average purchasing power of 
cash farm income in the years 1939 to 194~. It is 
assumed that the answer to this calculation is a fair 
and just amount of purchasing power for farmers to 
have in 1950. After determining how many dollars it 
would require in 1950 to give farmers this Standard 
amount of purchasing pOYfer, a standard price for each 
farm commodity is calculated based on the purchasing 
power of each commodity in the base period. These 
Standard prices or Price Support Standards for each 
farm product proclaim what the average price of each 
product should be in 1950, for example, if farmers 
are to receive a cash income on a purchasing power 
parity "With farm income in the base period. 
"The P .ian proposes that the Governm:mt, on the basis 
of these prices, support the level of farm income in 
t wo ways: 
(1) The farmers that produce the nonperish-
able or storeab.le commodities, such as 
wheat, would have their income supported 
by floors, or support prices under the 
markets for their products. The support 
price for each product would be the Price 
Support Standard as calculated for each 
storeable commodity • 
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.L. Actually the first ten of the preceding twelve years because statistics 
for most recent two years usually not available. 
2. National Association of Manufacturers, 11An AnaLysis o:f the Brannan 
P.lan", New York, October, 1949, P• 4 
11 (2) The farmers that prodnce the perishable 
or nonstoreable commodities, such as live-
stock, would have their income supported, 
not by price supports, but by 'production 
payments'. That is, if and when the free 
market price of one or all of too non-
storeables fell below their respective 
Price Support Standards, the difference 
between the free price and the standard 
would be paid to the producer directly 
from public funds." 
Among the advantages of the Brannan Plan which its supporters 
claim are the simplicity and directness with which farm income would be 
. t . d 1 ma.J.n a.J.ne • Since three quarters of the cash farm income is obtained 
from nonstoreable commodities, most farmers would be directly paid the 
difference between prices actually received and the price support stand-
ards for those commodities. It is felt that this system would be easy 
to administer than individual price supports under some 160 agricultural 
commodities .. 
"In addition to the directness of this proposed2 
method for supporting farm income, the Brannan Plan, 
in the long run, would likely be of assistance in 
treating some of the secondary maladjustments in 
what is considered to be the farm problem. These 
1byproducts' would be largely in the field of prices, 
production, marketing, and the utilization of farm 
products ••••••• 
11The determination of a parity income for farzoors is 
based upon the relationship between the cash income 
t.hat farmers received and the prices farmers paid on 
the average in the years 1939 to 1948. This period ••• 
was vastly inf~uenced by the wartime conditions. 
Thus, the average of farm prices and income in this 
period naturally reflect the wartime pattern or prices 
1. Ibid., p. 10 
2. Robert E. Summers, Op. cit., pp. 124-125 
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"received and prices paid. From the standpoint 
of those who believe that agricultural prices 
must be maintained at near wartime levels in 
order to keep agriculture 'healthy', the choice 
of the base period 1939 to 1948 is a logical 
one •••••• 
"With the exception of certain of the storable 
commodities, the Brannan Plan would allow for 
the continued high level production of farm 
commodities without resorting to production con-
trols, or a program of •scarcity production1 • 
"Although such production controls are contemplated 
in the case of storable commodities and some of the 
non-storables, it should again be emphasized that 
cash farm income from storable commodities accounts 
for only one fourth of the total cash farm income 
of the nation. By and large, then, the greatest 
number of farm products would be comparatively free 
of production and marketing controls. Even though 
the prices of some of the perishables might fall 
below their price support standards, there is some 
merit to the provision that allows high level pro-
duction to continue in order that consumers may 
have a plentiful supply of such highly nutritional 
foods as dairy products, meat, fruits, eggs, etc. 
The advantage lies in a probably stimulation of 
needed improvements in the diets of consumers ••••• 
"In earlier legislation the government was authorized 
to support only the prices of basic or storable com-
modities with permissible price support for a few 
selected non-basic or perishable commodities. In the 
Brannan Plan, provisions are made for supporting the 
income of the producers of most of the non-storable 
commodities such as meat, dairy and poultry products, 
and fruits and vegetables. Thus, this plan "Would 
extend financial assistance in times of stress to a 
large and important segment of agriculture that has 
so far probably not been adequately provided for in 
the basic farm programs of the nation. In this 
respect, the Brannan Plan would probably be more 
closely integrated with the entire farm problem than 
has been the case with the farm programs in past years. 
..., 
I 
11 In providing income support rather than price 
support to the producers of such commodities as 
wool, sugar beets, and flax, the Brannan Plan 
would likely encourage and perhaps expand the 
operation of several farm enterprises important 
from the standpoint of national security. The 
wool, sugar beet, and flax industries have in 
recent years, not appeared to be in a strong 
enough position economically to exist on a scale 
that would be commensurate with the needs of the 
United States in the event of another ·world war." 
Among the criticisms of the Brannan Plan, the most frequent 
has been Brannan's choice of the years 1939 to 1948 as base period for 
determining a fair income because farm income was so high in this era. 
The Brannan answer is that the gap between farm and non-farm income 
come s nearest to being closed and farrrers were able to pay debts, buy 
machines, purchase farms and improve their standard of living. In 
1948, the gap was $909 per capita farm income and $1,569 per capita 
non-farm income. 1 But these two figures are not strictly comparable 
because farmers do not buy as much food or pay as much for it as do 
city dwellers so that the dollar gap overstates the real difference in 
income and purchasing power~ Opponents do not dispute t hat farm living 
standards have in some years fallen below those in cities, however.1 
Another criticism is perhaps more vital. The plan includes 
provisions for employing subsidies, production controls, marketing con-
trols and other techniques which have been utilized before without com-
plete satisfaction. Some of these actually aggravate farm problems as 
we have seen. 
1. National Association of Manufacturers, Op. cit., p. 12 
Also, Robert Ee Summers, Op. cit., pp. 123=128 
1 -
In time of depression, farmers who grow perishable crops 
would be dependent on the Federal treasury for a substantial part of 
their income, and Congress would be under pressure from all sides to 
readjust the appropriations. .Even before the program has been adopted 
one of the most widespread criticisms of the Brannan Plan has been the 
cost, which cannot be estimated in advance. 
The Cost of Production Plans 
We have left these plans until last for they are basically 
different than parity in the sense that parity has been aimed at promot-
ing a standard of living whereas these offer merely a floor against 
disaster. Since the government does not guarantee such groups as the 
textile workers in Massachusetts a high standard of living in the textile 
field if they are not efficient producers, it becomes a matter of equit-
able treatment that it should not attempt to give inefficient farmers 
such a guarantee. What the government does do for industrial workers is 
t o set minimum wage laws and social security plans which protect the 
worker against the worst effects of economic forces over ~ich the worker 
would not have any control. However, ambitious workers would not be 
satisfied too long with either minimum wages or unemployment compensation 
benefits, so they seek for an occupation or a new degree of efficiency 
which would give them a bigger income. So, too, •vith farmers if we only 
protect them against disaster and chaos. We should be able to encourage 
them to find better farming methods or new occupations which will give 
them a higher standard of living. 
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These cost of production plans will not automatically make 
the low income groups in our population want, or work for, or seek out 
new employment to earn a higher standard of living. But if such p.Lans 
prevent the present surp.Lus of farm commodities from growing larger 
through the discouragement of inefficient producers at the same time 
that the sociologists, educators and economists work to reduce the 
men and other resources devoted to farming, these plans will be better 
than the present programs which seek to give everyone in agriculture 
a higher standard of living. Vlhat we want in agriculture is an income 
adequate to induce our efficient farmers to feed and clothe our popula-
tion or supply raw materials for its economy~ Other people should be 
disco-uraged by every means from remaining in agriculture and an average 
cost of production would be discouraging to high cost producers. Me~ 
While, they encourage the low cost producers to work to solve the many 
problems which we said in Chapter II and III interfered -with maximizing 
income and minimizing costs, because price levels would not be forced 
to such heights that even a most efficient producer would want to relax 
his efforts in these areas. 
There are several plans which have been advocated in this area, 
one by Governor Thornton of Colorado, and one by the author. I shall 
first quote Thornton's P.Lan as he .outlined it in a speech in Shenru1doah, 
Iowa, on August ll, 1953~ 1 
1. The portions of Governor Thornton's speech which are pertinent vdll 
be included as quotation. 
,.., 
- I 
"At this time I can only present the framework of an 
agricultural program which I believe is basically 
sound, economically advantageous, and above all, it 
is Americ~~. The successful operation of this plan 
Ydll react profitably to the cattle producer and 
feeder. 
"Generally speaking, there are five points in this 
plan, which I will present to you, and as I previously 
stated, this is only the framework. Its detailed 
development will be planned after conferences wv.ith 
Secretary Benson ~~d others. 
(1) The number one principle of this plan is 
to eliminate the price supports and sub-
sidies which gu.ara."ltee a profit to the 
farmer or rancher. I propose a guarantee 
to the producer of the Average cost of 
production for the agricultural commodity 
which he produces. This is a f~oor against 
disaster, insurance against disaster, if 
you please. After that, it is the sphere 
in which the free competitive enterprise 
system can work, meaning that if private 
industry can absorb and pay more for the 
farmer's commodity,_ them it will flow i nto 
the channels of use and consumption. In 
other words, profit to the producer will 
come from keeping his production costs 
below the average and producing a quality 
product for which the market price will be 
higher. 
I stress average production costs , which i n 
actual operation ·will be an incentive to the 
farmer to be efficient and economical in 
production, vii th due regard for the steward-
ship of his soil. Price supports which 
guarantee a profit to the producer encourage 
exploitation of one of the greatest of our 
natural resources, the soil, they subsidize 
inefficiency and waste. As long as price 
supports guarantee a profit, we will have 
with us the t sui t-ease' farmer and the 
•scalper 1 who see only the chance to line 
their pockets, although in so doing, they 
rob the soil, ruin the watersheds and invite 
soil erosion. 
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"On the other hand, the guarantee of average 
cost of production is insurance against dis-
aster and the collapse of our agricultural 
economy. IYhen the prices paid by the con-
sumer for the co~nodity are regulated through 
the channels of consumptive use, adjustment 
of production in accordance with market demand 
will be encouraged, thereby reducing surpluses. 
I believe that such a program properly applied, 
will permit any American to engage in any type 
of livestock or farming operation which he shall 
desire without the aid or hindrance of subsidies 
or government controls, and without danger of 
over-production in any field destroying the 
market or the products sold or produced. The 
elimination of subsidies is desirable because 
the payment of a subsidy compels the taxpayer 
to pay it in the form of taxes and repeats the 
cost when, as a consumer, he must purchase the 
commodity for consumption. The taxpayer pays 
both. This average cost of production guarantee 
would be acceptab.J..e to other groups and the 
producer will not price himself out of the market8 
It has been demonstrated that agriculture can 
price itself out of the market as illustrated by 
the present unrealistic supports on butter. Such 
support may have had the illusory appearance of 
prosperity, whereas, in reality, they only delayed 
the day of reckoning. In the so-called •spread' 
sales, during 1952, butter obtained only 45% of 
the business while oleo margarine took 55%. The 
government currently is spending about two million 
dollars per w-eek in the support of butter "Which 
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-eventually may become rancid and be sold as inedible. 
"Cattle are not supported while the feed items to 
create fat cattle, such as corn, are supported. 
This creates a cost of producing fat cattle after 
they have left the range of about 30 cents per 
pound. The market price of such cattle, for the 
first five months of this year, after they were 
fattened, was about 22 cents a pound or an 8 cent 
per pound loss to the cattle fattener •. 
"As long as government subsidies and price supports 
guarantee a profit to the producer, we vdll have 
surpluses accompanied by depletion of the soil, 
which I have previously mentioned. It is a known 
"fact that wheat, when grown year after year 
from the same soil, depletes it. This was 
true in this State of Iowa, so that now other 
states have become the great wheat producing 
areas and Iowa produces more corn. Yet the 
goverrunent maintains high price supports on 
wheat and we are currently producing up to 
one-half million bushels of wheat per year 
more than we need in the United States. This, 
of course, depletes the soil to just that 
extent .. 
"The plan I propose, encourages self-help, does 
not freeze opportunity, results in efficient, 
economical production of quality products. 
11 (2) This plan calls for regional administration. 
Growing conditions, climate, soil fertility 
and financing costs are reflected in the cost 
of production and vary in different geographical 
locations. Possibly 8 regional administrations 
would be established and the average cost of 
production would be made at the end of each 
production year by crop statisticians and experts 
out of the Department of Agriculture. Each area 
should be adaptable to the production of the 
commodity at reasonable cost. 
"(3) This plan will bring about either a reduction of 
surpluses, looking forward to their ultimate 
elimination except as a reserve against emergen-
cies or disaster, or their beneficial use. In 
the case of grains, some reserves should be held, 
purchased by the government on the basis of the 
average production cost. These then cease to be 
surpluses, but necessary reserves. However, if 
in times of economic pressure, it is necessary 
for the government to purchase surpluses to save 
a skidding market and to prevent economic dis-
aster, those surpluses should be purchased at the 
average production cost and used to feed hungry 
people, both here and abroad. President Eisenhower 
has put into effect such a plan on a small scale 
in selling grain to hungry countries, paid for in 
their own currency •••••••••• 
"The best available statistics show that the govern-
ment has ample amounts on hand, acquired through 
price supports •••••••••••••• 
177 
11As in many cases, this distribution of food 
to hungry people sounds easier than it is in 
actual accomplishment, and the validity of 
some of the objections must be recognized. 
American commercial exporters fear that sQch 
a program 1vill disrupt their foreign markets 
by making their products available as 'gifts• 
instead of regular purchases. Exporters of 
other countries fear it would have a depress-
ing effect upon their commerce. Nevertheless, 
this program has been inaugurated successfully 
on a small scale and can be so planned and 
managed that it will not affect commercial 
exchange or sale of produce adversely, either 
domestically or abroad • .- •••••••• 
"The further expansion of our markets is essen-
tial to absorb these surpluses. Our foreign 
markets should be extended and at least 10% 
of production should be exported through the 
regular channels. This leads directly to the 
fourth item in the proposed plan. 
"(4) The principal role of government should be in 
education and research. Devising means of dis-
posing of our commodities through new uses, 
thereby creating new marketing outlets, improv-
ing methods of distribution, both of these should 
be primary objectives of government. The effort 
to increase quality offers a challenge and at 
the same time increases the demand. Cheaper 
.., 
I 
methods of production through the advances of 
mechanization, fall within the realm of government 
activity. Nature's secrets have been uncovered 
through research, thereby assisting agriculture 
to become a highly efficient and mechanized 
business. The business of neeting the ever-increas-
ing demand for agricultural products will come from 
sound and tested research. Extension work must 
keep pace with the needs of the time and take the 
results of research to the people. 
"(.5) A transition period must be provided in which the 
agricultural and livestock producer may reorganize 
this planning and gear his operations to this 
plan •••.••.••• " 
The Average Cost Plan and Potatoes 
Governor Thornton's p~an is loosely worded so that we cannot 
be too precise in fitting it to the potato industry. 
The average costs of production in the potato industry would 
be difficult to compute but not more difficult than for any other crop. 
Potato growers may, ho~~ver, need such protection against financial 
disaster more than some other types of farmers, because potato prices 
fluctuate so extremely. (In the period ~nile this thesis was being 
written, potato prices have ranged from $2.00 to $7.UO a barrel.) 
The plan of regional administration would be more efficient 
for the administration of a potato program than a central administration 
would be since potatoes are to a very large extent grown and marketed 
regionally. In addition, growing costs vary greatly by regions accord-
ing to climate, soil conditions, etc. 
179 
Potato producers have had more trouble disposing of surplus 
output than producers of any other crop. For this reason, a plan such 
as Governor Thornton's which is designed to minimize the incentive to 
produce by not guaranteeing profits should be better than parity schemes. 
The fourth proposal in this p~an meets the ideal -vlhich we have 
set up for government aid to farmers. It is essentially the program 
that the State of Maine and other states are carrying out, a progrmn of 
research and education. They are devising new techniques of marketing, 
new uses, and new machinery to increase the profitable sale of potatoes. 
Criticisms of Cost of Production 
There are some criticisms of cost of production plans for 
protecting farmers against price or income collapse. John Black points 
out that there are basically three types of costs1 to use in setting up 
farm price supports. 
"Historical cost, that is the sum of the cost items 
actually spent on some production already completed. 
In computing such costs, buildings and machinery are 
charged on the basis of depreciation from their actual 
original purchase price, labor at what was actually 
paid it, and so forth. It will be apparent that costs 
thus computed will conunonly be out of line with prices, 
on the high side in a period of improving technology 
or declining price level •••••••••• 
11A second meaning of cost of production is cost equal 
to what prices 1 should1 be - for example equal to price s 
that will support the kind of living producers want, or 
that somebody thinks they should have •••••••• (these 
somebodies usually think the price they should have 
would be above their accustomed 'reservation' price). 
Of course, there isn't any scientific way of figuring 
this kind of unit cost of production. V~hat you really 
do is decide what incomes and prices you want for 
farmers and figure back from these ••••••• (Author 1s note 
by Collazzo- these 'good price costs' sound like parity 
not cost of production). 
"The third and most useful meaning of cost of production 
is the amount that will need to be spent now, or in this 
production year which is just starting, to get the needed 
amount of it produced. This is commonly called 'necessary 
cost•. It is of course the same thing as the necessary 
price discussed in the last chapter. Necessary price must 
cover necessary costs. When one goes about getting this 
figure from a cost approach, one undertakes to say what 
amount of each of the cost factors is going .to be used 
this year, and what must be paid for them to take them 
away from their nearest competing uses. Present use-
values take the place of historical investment costs. 
1. John D. Black, Parity, Parity, Parity, The Harvard Conunittee on 
Research in the Social Sc~ences, Cambridge, Mass., 1942, pp. 177-180 
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"Necessary cost figured by this method is likely to 
be fairly closely in line with prices over a period 
of several years. Any one year, the accidents of 
weather, or wars, or business recessions and the like, 
may make actual prices either higher or lower than 
necessary costs estimated currently just in advance. 
The 'prudent investment' theory which the Supreme 
Court now tends to accept does not al ways give the 
same results as necessary cost, but points exactly 
in that direction. 
"A distinction must be made between necessary costs 
in the short run and in the long run. As has been 
stated, manufacturers may largely forego returns on 
fixed plant for a few years that they cannot forego 
indefinitely. Very often, however, t he fixed plant 
has no alternative future use, so that any returns 
upon it at all are a gain to the enterprise. Or 
perhaps only part of the existing plants will be 
needed in the future, so that only part of a replace-
ment reserve must be allowed for necessary cost. 
"Reckoning necessary costs from a social standpoint 
may thus involve some broad questions. Does the nat ion 
need to have cotton farming maintained in the hill lands 
of the Old South, or should production be allowed to 
shift to the new rich lands of the delta bottoms of the 
Mississippi? How much of present dairying does the 
nation need to maintain in New England? Economy in 
production is of course the main factor to be considered, 
but not the only one - vmere are the people of the 
Piedmont to go if cotton farming goes. 
"Earlier we slipped very easily over a phrase that calls 
for some attention. We said, •to get the needed amount 
of produced'. What is the needed amount? Under our 
present social system, the amount bought and consumed 
depends upon the price. And so likewise is the amount 
produced. So here we have our old friend the equilibrium 
with us again. Necessary cost is the amount required to 
induce producers to turn out what consumers •vill buy at 
that price. 
11Now all three of these meanings are possible and even 
valid. The point is that they should be called by 
different names to keep them from being confused - histor-
ical costs, perhaps 'good-price costs' for the second, 
11 and necessary costs for the third.. (The writer 
has never been able to settle his mind on an 
acceptable name for the second.) 
"It should also be recognized that these three 
costs will seldom be the s~ne, necessary costs 
almost always being the lovvest. Necessary costs 
are the only ones that will keep Ylithin easy 
reach of market prices.n 
To enlarge upon Professor Black's statement, I may say that 
historical costs do lag behind prices at times both going up and coming 
down, but that they do cha~ge and t hey do measure the actual invested 
dollar cost. For that reason business men use them to compute profits 
and losses and to help make future necessary cost estimates. They can 
also be used to compute farm costs- Professor Black himself says the 
professional teachers of farm management use them for this purpose. 
In regard to his definition of costs as related to standards 
of living, we have no quarrel with him. However, we believe the use 
standard of living as a cost criteria is a characteristic of pari ty 
plans and not cost of production methods of aiding the farmer. 
We also agree ~~th Professor Black vvhen he says that if there 
is to be any public price fixing on a cost basis, it would be accord-
ing to necessary costs. Hovvever, he seems to assume that such costs 
l 
must be computed centrally and ~~th this we do not agree. Our 
competitive system works efficiently when it does not compute costs 
centrally but at the business level at which they are incurred, and 
corrective action is tru{en at that point. If costs are computed 
1. Ibid.' p. 181 
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centrally, they often become so complex that perfect or even near 
perfect accuracy is impossible or actual losses are hidden among 
averages. We thinl< it would be more efficient to compute costs at 
the level of the business firm (in this case the farm) although we 
recognize the validity of his statement that errors in central 
computed prices could be compensated for over a period of time. 
Professor Black makes a far more serious criticism to the 
effect that a program of fixing prices according to unit costs of 
production would always involve the danger of pyramiding prices and 
costs . This would occur if prices were set appreciably above 
necessary costs for then farm rents, wages and capital goods costs 
would rise in response and so set a new higher cost base to use in 
the future. He points out the Tariff Commission 's calculations of 
unit costs were generally higher than necessary costs and this caused 
a price-cost spiral.. The commission 1 s computations mixed historical 
cost and 11 good-price 11 costs by charging proprietor a.'1d family labor 
•wll above reservation prices. But it is on this point that we think 
Professor Black falls down, for attempts to raise the standard of 
living are not cost of production guarantees, and the Tariff laws are 
usually designed as much to raise the standard of living of segments 
of the population as to do anything elsee If guaranteed cost plans 
are based only on historical costs or necessary costs, they should not 
tend to spiral because they will not be set appreciably above necessary 
costs. (Since today's necessary costs become part of tomorrow's 
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historical costs, the latter should ref~ect the former adequat ely for 
such purposes over a period of time.) 
Professor Black makes an accurate appraisal of one of the 
fairures of central cost calculators in determining costs accurately. 
He says approximately that while a farmer's reservation costs are 
necessary costs, a central authority car>..not estimate a farmer's 
reservation costs. He attributes this to the fact that they are apt 
t o overvalue the reservation price in relation to the value the f armer 
himself puts on his personal services and property. It is my belief, 
however, that if you let the farmer estimate his own reservation costs 
as he must do under pure competition, that you can eliminate this 
defect in cost of production plans. The mistake i n calculat ion ris es 
out of attempts of the central authority to fix prices; if you dispense 
1vith the central price fixing, you eliminate the defect. 
One criticism in Parity, Parity, Parity is app~icable to 
Governor Thornton's pian to average all the individual costs. Black 
feels that because of the 1ride variation in cost s between individual 
producers, there is no merit in averaging their costs together. 
"Half of the output would be produced at a loss if 
prices were fixed at an average of all true costs. 
On the other hand, if prices were set to cover the 
costs of the poorest farmer, many of the others 
would be making so much money that they would be 
strongly induced to expand output. rt]. 
We see then according to these criticisms, the guarantees of 
cost of production usually are deficient because of the method of 
4 
calculation of the central authority or because the computers are 
trying to raise the standard of living and not merely to reimburse 
the producer for actual costs of production. 
Vibat then is needed is a plan which prevents financial 
disaster without making farming too profitable either deliberately 
or by faulty calculation of a central authority. Since the faults 
lie with the central authority, I have devised a plan to dispense 
with central price fixing entirely. This will be presented in the 
next section. 
Professor Black makes some other criticisms of cost of 
production plans which for Thornton's plan may be justified. 
Professor Black does not vush arbitrarily to choose the most effi~ 
cient producers in reckoning necessary costs from the social stand-
point. For instance, he does not vush to decide whether cotton 
1 5 
should be grovm in the Piedmont or in the delta land of the Mississippi. 
Again, if we let the farmer reckon necessary costs, no such arbitrary 
central decision is necessary, and the question can be decided effi-
ciently by individual firms. In regard to Professor Black's question, 
how to determine how much to grow, Governor Thornton would allow the 
lack of profits to drive farmers out of unnecessary productive activity. 
That would work, but slowly since all farmers including high cost pro-
ducers would have a guaranteed average level of income low as it might 
be. The bid plan which follows would let the economic system arbitrar-
ily decide which farmers were necessary and which were not. 
We do not feel that a plan to guarantee essential farmers 
a return of the costs of production need be concerned with what 
happens to inefficient farmers who may be driven out of cotton plant-
ing or potato planting. Under the free enterprise system, they would 
have to shift for themselves at any rate. However, since their plight 
is a social problem, if not an economic problem for the whole society, 
a guarantee cost of production price protection for efficient farmers 
should be accompanied by plans to help relocate such inefficient 
farmers and their resources in more rewarding productive areas. 
Cost-Bid Plan 
For purposes of development, let me develop a summary of the 
whole plan, then fill in details.1 ~he Bid Plan differs from that of 
Governor Thornton's in several respects. Rather than have a regional 
or central authority attempt to compute the average cost of production, 
I would allow each farmer to compute his own cost of production and 
submit an advance bid much as a road construction contractor does. 
1 6 
These bids would consist of offers by each farmer to supply the nation's 
economy, an amount of potatoes equal to his average production, by each 
grade, for the last five normal years at the cost per unit which he 
computed for his own operation. These bids would be arrar~ed on the 
basis of lowest cost bids being accepted first, and the quanti ties of 
production would be added until the offers of production for high 
1. All details cannot be worked out in the limited confines of this 
master's thesis. It would furnish adequate material for a doctoral 
dissertation. 
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quality potatoes equaled the quantities of potatoes of those same 
qualities purchased the previous year by all consumers. Those farmers 
wvhose bids were accepted would be so notified by mail. Formal notifica-
tion of the highest cost per bushel which was accepted would be mailed 
out to those whose bids were too high along with the rejection of their 
bid. This would increase their understanding of their ovni cost position 
and relative inefficiency and would discourage them from further produc-
tion. Farmers villose bids were accepted could plant in knowledge that 
they could not lose any money if they produced an average quality crop 
at an average yield. If prices received were below their bid price, 
the government would make up the difference; thus prices could seek 
the level necessary to move the crop to market while the most efficient 
producers would be protected against disaster. 
Details of P .Lan 
First and foremost we must consider a definition of costs and 
what would be included as costs. There are many out-of-pocket costs 
which are easy to measure and ascertain, such as costs of seed, fuel, 
fertilizer and labor which would obviously be inc.Luded as they are most 
important in the short run. But there are also long-run costs, such 
as depreciation of equipment, interest on borrowings, rents and other 
overhead items of that sort vvhich are more difficult to include. At 
this point, we might digress to note Schultz's warning that some cog-
nizance might be taken of social costs , of erosion, of soi.L depletion 
and other hitherto unmeasured costs. However, before the reader 
objects to the difficulty of measuring such costs, we remind him 
that each farmer must measure most of these costs to pay his income 
tax and all of them if he is to manage a modern farm correctly. We 
would expect the o'Wiler of an automobile agency worth over thousands 
of dollars to use scientific accounting controls to insure profits 
and protect his investments. This automobile dealer can and does 
measure his costs and so must the farmer because his investment is 
eqtuilly great on an efficient farm today.1 He must measure all his 
1 
1. Fortune magazine discussing the complexity of farm decision making 
today and the need for better records and controls says, "Fortunately 
for the American farmer, he may soon be the beneficiary of no less 
a management tool than 1 linear programing, 1 which is the mathematical 
determination of the best of thousands of combination of choices. 
Several agricultural colleges are working on the idea, but its prac-
tical application has progressed furthest at Iowa State College, 
under Professor Earl Heady •••••••• completely accurate allowance c~ 
not be made for price changes, and the weather always remains unpre-
dictable. But the best combination of available factors can be 
chosen, and if the farroors can be induced to keep better data then 
most of them now do, the day is not far off w7hen they will be able 
to take their data to the agricultural colleges or experiment sta-
tions, have it processed on an I.B. M. 702-type computer, and arrive 
at a relatively small number of options, all much more accurate than 
any choice arrived at by budget analysis, rough estimating, intui-
tive judgment, or all three •••••••• The farmer's industrialization, 
moreover, has made his operation more flexible; it has reduced the 
proportion of his fixed costs, like operator labor, and increased 
the proportion of variable costs, like purchased fertiiizer, seed, 
feed, and so on, the consumption of which he increases or reduces 
at will. This eventually will enable the efficient farner to 
maximize profits not by biindly increasing output when he sees 
prices falling, but by reducing costs more than he thinks his sales 
will decline. Like all capitalists, he will be able to put every-
thing to the test of profitabiiity. 11 Gilbert Burck, "The Magnif-
icent Decline of U. S. Farming 11 , Fortune, Time, Inc., Chicago, 
Iilinois, June, 1955, p. 101 
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costs including certain implicit costs using standard rules of account-
ing set by government and base his bid on these computations. His own 
labor and labor of his family would be included at the average hourly 
rate for farm hands which prevails in his country at the time as deter-
mined by the Department of Labor. Outsiders' wages would be included 
as actually paid. This would be necessary to separate entrepreneur:Lal 
rewards from straight wages. Net profits would not be included as 
costs in the case of individual enterprisers or corporations, but 
losses would be carried over as costs on future operations to be amor-
tized by future income. 
Second major detail would come in the definition of quality, 
delivery areas, prices received and other such points. Obviously, 
potatoes of the same quality sell at different prices at the same place 
at different times, sell at different prices at different places at the 
same tine and vary in their net return to the farmer when sold at the 
same price, same place., and same time. For this reason, the government 
guarantee would cover the difference between pri ces received at point 
of delivery to a bona fide purchaser, not the net return .to the seller, 
and the bid. At any rate, no selling price which was out of line with 
the nearest central market price less normal transportation charges 
would be allowed as a base for a guarantee payment. The government 
would pay full guaranteed differences only for u. S. quality No. 1 or 
better as graded by government inspectors and sold at prices below the 
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amount bid by the grower. These features of the plan are designed 
to encourage efficient production and marketing of the crop. 
If the farmer produced a bumper crop of good quality pota-
toes at a time when all others produced a surplus and prices were so 
low that his total income was driven below the cost bid on his entire 
crop, he would receive as a differential a sufficient sum of money to 
cover his costs as totaled on his bid. If, however, because of a 
drought, he produced less than he had planned to grow, he woUld receive 
for every bushel of potatoes sold as first quality, the average cost 
per unit which he had computed for a normal crop. There would have to 
be a quality differential established so that every farmer would be 
paid a different guarantee per unit of each lower grade of product 
which he produced. This differential might be obtaimd by simply divid-
ing each farmer's average price for first quality into his average price 
for second quality to get the relative value of second quality as a per-
cent of the value of first quality. Then take the resulting percentages, 
multiply them by the bid price per unit to get a guarantee amount per 
unit for second grade. 2 Similar calculations would be made for each 
lower grade. 
Under these provisions, a farmer would, therefore, get com-
puted unit costs for each bW3hel of first quality potatoes and a pro-
portionately lower guarantee price for second quality so that he would 
1. This gives the farmer no protection against drought or flood which 
might damge his crop. For this he should buy insurance, federal 
or private. 
2. No farmer would ever receive more than his total costs under any 
circumstances so that these differentials would only apply where 
quality or quantity were so deficient as to fail to bring back 
production costs even with government guarantees. 
be encouraged to produce first quality. However, in a year in which 
his quality was high although his yield was low, he might still get 
sufficient return from his sales and the government payments to cover 
his total costs.. If his income from actual sales was sufficiently 
great to cover his costs, of course, he would get nothing from the 
government. If, however, he produced a very low yield and poor 
quality, his income from sales together with his government payments 
might not cover his costs of production~ This would arise because 
unit prices for second grade production are normally below unit cost 
in a free market and they would also be lower under this plan. As a 
result, if a farmer did not produce a sufficient quantity of grade 
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one potatoes, the low guaranteed price on grade two would make it 
unlikely that government guarantees could make up the differeme be-
tween his income and costs unless the farmer had an extraordinary 
yield. Since a great yield is unlikely when quality is poor, farmers 
who produce poor quality would be unlikely to cover costs even Ydth 
government guarantees. These things would be done to encourage t he 
farmers to salvage as much of a damaged crop as possible and also to 
work for a quality crop with irrigation, insecticides, et c. An 
i nsurance plan might be devised to cover such contingencies as drought s 
and floods, but this is not feasible on a non-contribution basis as 
in this plan. 
No farmer's bid would be audited u~less he actually applied 
for payment of the guarantee, then comparisons would be made with costs 
of others in the area, selling prices, social security payments and 
income tax returns, along ll'ith ar1y other steps to check accuracy as 
the administrators would see fit to require. This would keep the 
cost of administration (one of the most serious criticisms of this 
plan) dovm to a minimum,. 
The bid would be compared ·with actual expenditures and if 
a farmer had not actually incurred costs as great as his estimates, 
then his actual costs would supplant his bid as his gL~.arantee level 
If his costs had exceeded his bid, the latter would remain as his 
guarantee level. This would discourage a farmer from submitting a 
low bid to be sure of getting a guarantee. 
No guarantees would be given to farmers Vvhose farming 
practices di~nished the fertility of our soil by depleting it of 
nutriments without replenishment or whose location and practices 
caused unnecessary erosion by wind or water. Such provision would 
be necessary to prevent farmers from cutting costs by neg~ecting 
necessary long-run conservation practices.l The amount of production 
which the government would contract for would depend on the previous 
years' consumption by all users as measured by their purchases of 
potatoes. In operation the government might make allowance for trends 
of consumption if these proved to be of such strength as to warrant ite 
Also, some allowance might be made for the carr yover of the old crop 
1. Some conservat i on law is necessary if we are to preserve our 
resources for future generations whether we have this farm plan, 
any other, or none at all. 
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and the sales of number two quality and culls, if they influenced 
prices to any great degree or the demand for the first quality 
product. 
Summary of Plans Merits 
This plan should not encourage incompetent farmers t o remain 
in the industry as do the parity plans. The latter aim at guarantee-
ing a standard of living for all farmers not just a fair return to 
essential, efficient producers .. 
Under the bid system, only the low-cost, efficient producer 
would be given a guaranteee No price umbrella would be erected over 
the industry to protect the inefficient producer. Even the efficient 
producer would receive nothing from the government unless he sold 
below his own costs. But since the market price would not be controlled 
except by the cost of production and the demand for goods in the long 
run, it would tend to seek equilibrium. The equilibrium price (t hat at 
which the amounts supplied and the amounts demanded are equal) would, 
of course, be above the cost of production of the efficient producers, 
therefore, the government would pay them nothing in the long run. In 
the shor t run, until enough high cost farmers had vdthdravna their 
r esources from the production of potatoes, even the most efficient 
producers might receive government help. This plan ~uuld st rengthen 
the efficient producers position while letting the competitive price 
structure drive the non-essential producers out of the potato industry. 
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This would occur because as long as an excessive number of producers 
remained, overproduction would cause low prices. Consumers would be 
encouraged to utilize potatoes as they saw fit with the demand regulat-
ing features of a normal price structure. The plan would in no way 
interfere with attempts of individuals or groups either to tap the 
existing demand curve at the highest possible level or to create a 
new demand curve based on new product s.ervices~ In fact, it would be 
necessary to utilize all available techniques of raising ireore to do 
arry more than break even profit"vdse under this program. Even i f a 
producer had cut costs if he did not try to maximize income, he would 
not get a profit for the government guarantee would not provide it. 
The plan would, therefore, encourage better quality products to the 
advantage of the consumer. The plan would clearly demonstrate to 
farmers Whose bids were rejected that they were inefficient~ Thus i t 
would encourage them to leave potato production for more profitable 
occupations when their costs were too far out of line. The letter of 
re jection could be accompanied by educational efforts on the part of 
the county agent, the state extension service, or other agencies to 
help the farmer decide what changes to make. 
On the other hand, the large efficient producer ~no is perhaps 
least in need of help would not be needlessly enriched under this price 
program as occurred under the parity system. This is true because here 
he would receive only a differential bet~~en the iow selling price and 
his low costs, whereas, under parity he received the same high price as 
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his inefficient co~leagues. Under parity, we deliberately t ended to 
give the efficient producer a big profit in order that the least effi-
cient farmer could make a small profit. This was what parity was 
designed to do but it is an unnecessary drain on the treasury. Under 
this plan, no one is guaranteed a profit so that the burden on the 
treasury is diminished. You cannot change the welfare aims of parity 
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at this late date. It was designed to help all farmers. This new plan 
is designed to help only efficient farmers in producing adequate supplies 
of essential food and fiber. 
PART IV 
CONCLUSIONS 
1 
.As we stated at the end of Part I, under our system of 
imperfect competition, it is possible for the producer to do some 
things to solve his economic problems acting as an individual or 
acting in small groups~ He can develop better production and market-
ing methods, he can increase his efficiency and lower his costs; he 
can develop better quality productsv However, the farmer cannot 
easily control output or prices acting as an individual or even co~ 
bining in small groups. Yet, some farmers think it is essential to 
control either one or the other to increase profits or to prevent 
losses when excessive production causes price-depressirig surplus 
stocks. The subnormal prices arising from such surpluses in the 
potato industry are the most serious problem which potato growers 
have to solve. Such plans of price and production control, ho~Bver, 
are objectionable to others in our society. 
For the potato industry, we, therefore, recommend the follow-
ing policies as those which ~~11 best attain the objectives which we 
. 2 
set up ~n Part II. These policies are designed to utilize the free 
market forces to control prices and production as much as possible 
rather than oligopolistic or monopolistic associations. 
L Page 88 
2. Page 91 
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Let the industry solve as many of its prob.Lems and achieve 
as many of its aims as it can by the use of individual initiative, 
cooperatives, or regional marketing agreements. This is the most 
efficient way. 
Let the government help the individual to become more effi-
cierrt by providing research and education services at the state level 
when these activities cannot be profitably or efficiently carried on 
by individuals or by corporate groups. We specify research and educa-
tion at the state level because farm problems vary so much by area 
and because we feel that overcentralization of these activities in the 
federal government will prevent their efficient accomplishment. 
Let the federal government aid the potato industry in meet-
in~ problems of price disaster by providing a price floor based upon 
the cost of production for the most efficient producers. This should 
not provide profits and should not encourage overproduction. Either 
of the Cost of Production Plans or the Forvvard Price Plans might be 
enacted into law in such a way as to accomplish these purposes. 
Finally, since these plans would not help the most ineffi-
cient producers but rather would only discourage and demoralize them, 
let the federal government adopt such practices1 as will encourage a 
more efficient use of our resources of land, labor and capital so 
that our low income farm population will find more profitable alterna-
tive occupations. 
1. Drost of the governmental activity to help the inefficient producers 
would consist of education and training; loans and other financial 
aid; development and conservation of natural resources; as well as 
the encouragement of the development and relocation of new industry 
in the most backward areas. 
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APPENDIX I{~ 
TABLE 16. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PER CAPITA DENAND FUNCTIONS FOR POTATOES 
I II III IV v VI VII 
Haxirnum 
Constant 
xl t2 
Flexibility value of 
Equation Period Term of price elasticity 
1 I3 0= 135.6053 -28. 0564 .,. .8676 1.6311 .6131 
2 Ir5 y = 273.8455 - 54.7295 -2.J-325 2.5198 .3969 
36 I3 y = 2.3177 - 1.5863 + .2218 1.5518 .6444 
46 II5 y = 3.5071 - 2.o592 - .3502 2.5676 .3895 
l. x = annual per capita consumption in bushels. _ 
2. t = time in years. 
3. Period I = 1870 - 1909. 
4. y = deflated f arm price per bushel. 
5. Period II = 1910-Lr2. 
6. All data i n logarithms. 
~~ Gray, Sorenson and Cochrane, Bull etin 211, Op . cit., pp. 64-65 
VIII 
Coefficient 
of multiple 
correlation 
.9169 
.8308 
.9474 
• 7776 
1\) 
0 
0 
-
e e 
APPEI~DIX I'~ (Cont.. ) 
TABLE 17. CHlillACTERISTICS OF TI-lE I\iA.,.LliillT DE:tvLI\I1ID FtJNCTIONS FOR POTATO::TB 
I II III IV v 
Constant l Equation Period Term X t2 
5 I3 yl+= 90.5625 -.3967 •2.6494 
6 n5 y = 250.7345 -~5108 - .0788 
l . x = United Stat es production in millions of bushels. 
2. t = time in years. 
3. Period I = 1870-1909. 
b Y = deflated farm price per bushel. 
5. Per iod II = 1910-42. 
VI 
Flexibility 
of price 
1.4843 
2.69W 
'(- Gray, Sorenson and Cochrane, Bulleti n 211, Op. cit ., pp. 64-65 
VII VII 
Ii!iaximum Coefficient . 
value of of multiple 
elasticity correlat i on 
.6737 . 8883 
.3711 .e356 
1'\) 
0 
1-' 
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APPEl'IDIX I (Cent. ) 
EXPAI\'DING AND CONTRACTING N!ARKET I N THE PRESUPPORT ERA 
"The presupport era has already been divided into the period precedingl 
1910 and the period 1910 2n d after on t he basis of the discernible con-
sumption patt ern. It is convenient at this point to specify more closely 
vn1at is meant by an expanding or contracti~~ market and to measure this 
expansion or cont raction for these two periods. The market may be said to 
be expanding when the market demand function at the producer level i s r i s-
i ng through time. It is contracting when the market demancl function i s 
f alling. 
"The cha.r acteri stics of both t he per capita and t he m..arket demand f unc-
t i ons for potatoes for the two periods (1870-1909; 1910-42) have been 
measured and are presented in tables 16 and 17. The figures of imme-
diate interest are contained in colwnn V of tables 16 and 17, v.rhi ch show 
the di r ections and rates of change in the various demand f unct ions. I n 
the f i r st equation (y:: 135.6053 - 2B.05bL~ x .a. .867bt) f or the period 
1870-1909 where x is per capita consumption and t is time, the price of 
a bushel of pot atoes may be s aid to rise almost l cent annually (.8676) 
when per capita consumption is held constant; one measure of t he eAJPand-
i ng per capita demand for potatoes is thus provided in the above equation. 
Since popul ation vvas also expanding rapidly, the market demand function 
rose more than three times as rapidly as the per capita demand funct ion 
(equation 5, column V, table 17). During the second period (the 1910-42, 
preprogrrun period of declining per capita consumption) per capita demand 
declined. Again, holding per capita consumption consta.nt, price declined 
sli ghtly more than 2 cents per bushel annually throughout the per iod 
(equation 2_, colwnn V, t able 16). Furthermore, the expansion i n popula-
tion, while rapid_, was not quite suff icient to offset t he decline i n per 
capita consumption; consequently, market demand declined slightly (equation 
6, colwnn V, table 17). The same relationships, expressed in logari t hmic 
terms, provi de a convenient check of the numerical r esults ( equati ons 3 
and 4, t able 16). n 
1. Gr ay, Sorenson a11d Cochrane, Bulletin 211, Op. cit., pp . 61.~-65 
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KEY ROLE OF RISK 
"It may be noted for the periods for which demand characteristics havel 
been rneas~ed (table 17) that demand vras much less el asti c i n the period 
1910- 42 than in the earlier period (1870-1909) . This accords with 
Schultz 's conclusion that the elasticity of demand for potatoes has been 
declining, and also vvith me asurements f or more recent periods which 
u sually place the coefficient of elasticity for potatoes in the nei ghbor-
hood of -.2. This would indicate, then, that potat o production has been 
characterized by a higher degree of price variability (risk) in the second 
era of industry development (1910-42) than in the pr eceding er a . 
"Some attention may now be given to the reasons f or and i mplications of 
this declining elasticity of demand. Recallin~ the earlier discus sion 
of the changed dietary role of the potato, Which provided the basi c diet 
of many Europeans but has become part of a varied diet in the United 
States, it ·wi ll also be rE!called that it was argued that pot atoes once 
stood i n a closely substitutive relationship to cer eals and that this 
is no longer the case . As this substitutive relationship disappears it 
would be expected that the elasticity of demand would decline. The very 
low elasticity of demand which today is attached to pot atoes befits their 
new, r elatively minor, but relatively stable place in the diet. 
"This declining elasticity of demand, in causing vvider price fluctuations, 
added t o t he rj_sk of gro'Win_g potatoes . To what has already been said 
regardi ng the development of regional specialization i n the industry it 
may be added that the second phase of industry development was first 
impeded by increasing riskiness and then accelerated with the r emoval of 
risk under price supports. If this were added then the composite picture 
would comprise: 
11 (1) An earl y phase in the development of regional specializa-
tion, d:.1ring which the shift from the corn belt to the 
lake states occurr ed because of: 
(a) an expanding market for the new prod~cers, 
(b) a period during which the market ceased to 
expand but alter native enterprises in the 
corn belt aff orded farmers an attractive 
means of escaping potat oes, 
1. Gray, Sorenson and Cochrane, Bull etin 211, Op. · cit., pp. 71-73 
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"(c) relatively high demand elasticity (i. e., 
relative to that in later periods), and 
consequent relative stability of price. 
n ( 2) A second phase in the development of regional specializa-
tion during which a gradual shift from the lake states 
to the outlying specialists occurred. This shift was 
gradual and kept the industry in a period of transition 
because of: 
(a) a contracting market ( decliD..ing aggregate 
demand), 
(b) the absence of attractive alternatives 
for the lake states' growers, 
(c) declining demand elasticity and growing 
instability of price, making the industry 
a risky one to enter. 
"(3) The price support period during iYhich pr e-existing shift was 
accelerated because: 
(a) market expansion was provided in price 
support, encouraging ent ry or expansion 
by specialists, 
(b) demand was made perfectly elastic by 
price s~pports, eliminating price 
variability, and encouraging entry or 
expansion by specialists, 
(c) the concurrent high prices and high incomes 
improved the alternatives to potatoes for 
the lake states' producers. 
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"Before this can be accepted as the true composite picture it is necessary 
to justify the role which is assigned to risk in this picture. The market 
expansion (and contraction) has been demonstrated in the preceding section, 
as has the place of alternatives. The remainder of this section Vv-ill in-
volve an assessment of the plausibility of the contention that risk acted 
as a deterrent to the development of regional specialization during the 
second phase (1910-42). This contention, stated in another way, would be 
that the price support program, by reducing risk, encouraged this develop-
ment. It is important to note that it is more accurate to characterize the 
support program as one vmich reduced price fluctuations than as one ·which 
raised prices. Potato prices averaged 93 per cent of parity between 1910 
and 1942. Against this background, a guarantee of 90 per cent of parity 
does not appear high; but against the background of widely fluctuating 
prices the guarantee appears as a stabilizing factor . 
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APPENDIX I (Cont. 
"Two contentions need to be substantiated in assigning importance to · 
the risk £'actor in explaining the pattern of industry development and 
the impact of the price support program. The first of these is simply 
that the second phase in industry development was a relatively high 
risk phase, i.e., relative to the preceding period and to the price 
support period. This can be seen in the fact that the average year-
to-year price variability from 1870 to 1909 was 3b.8 per cent, compared 
to 52.6 per cent for the period 1910 to 1942. The second contention 
then becomes the major concern of this section - it involves a develop-
ment of the hypothesis that risk was a deterrent to the expansion of 
production in the specialist states. This analysis, in turn, involves 
consideration of the risk situation as it applied to both t he specialist 
and the lake states. n 
APPENDIX II 
"A demand elasticity of (-.194) .•• • was arrived at by taking the mean1 
value of 12 separate elasticities during the interwar period where each 
is caJ.culated ·with the formula: 
(Log Q1 - Log Q2) - (Log Q2 - Log Q3) 
E - ----------------------------------(Log P1 - Log P2) - (Iog P2 - Log P3) 
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"1I0hen applied to empirical data this formula produces satisf act ory results 
in all cases v~1ere the shifts in demand between periods are fairly con-
sist ent in magnitude and in direction. Thus in these calculations (begin-
ning Ydth 1923 and moving progressively forward 1 year at a tiroo until 
the last calculation utilized price and qllantity data for the years (1939-
41) the large majority of the results (12 of 17) fell within the range of 
-.11 to -.29. The mean of these 12 observations (-.194) probably repre-
sents a close approximation of the actual price elasticity of derruh~d for 
potatoes at the local market levels. Because demand shifted vd.th suf -
ficient irregularity to produce unrealistic results in the other five 
cases, these were eliminated in calculating the average. 
l. Gray, Sorenson and Cochrane, Bull etin 21~, Op. cit., p. 129 
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APPEI!DIX III 
M..I\.RKETING AGREEMENTS AND ORDERS 
SU11l.rnary of Potato Grade and Size Regulations in Effect 
as of January 1, 1955 
Order No. and Area 
57 - Idaho~Malheur 
County, Oregon 
58 - Area No. 1 -
Western Slope 
Area No. 2 -
San Luis Valley 
Area No. 3 -
Northern Colorado 
59 - Oregon-California 
70 - Maine 
92 - Washington 
1/ Both dates inclusive 
Regulatory Provisions 
Red skin varieties: U. S. No . 2, 
1 7/8 in. min. Other variet ies: 
U.S. No. 2, Size A, 2 in. or 
Ef f ective 1/ 
From To 
4 oz. min. 6/28/54 5/31/55 
Round varieties: u.s. No. 1, 2 
in. min., 24 oz. max.; u.s. No . 
2, up to but not including No . 1 
grade, 2 in. min. Long varieties; 
u.s. No . 2, 4 oz. min. 7/19/54 5/31/55 
Round varieties: U.S. No. 1, Size 
A, 2 in. min., or u.s. Com1l., 
Size A, 2 in. min., or u.s. No. 2, 
l 7/8 in. min. Long varieties: 
u.s. No. 1, 2 in. or 4 oz min.; 
or u.s. No. 2, 4 oz. min. 10/2/54 b/30/55 
u.s. No. 2, 2 in. min. on round 
varieties, 2 in. or 4 oz. on long 
varieties 9/6/54 5/31/55 
All varieties: U. 0. No. 2, 1 7/8 
in. min. 10/11/54 5/31/ 55 
Round whites and red skin varie-
ties: u.s. No. 1, 2 in. min. in 
100 lb. packs; U. S. No. 1, Size 
A, 2 in. min. in less than 100 
lb. packs. Long varieties: U.S. 
No. 2, 1 7/8 in. min. or 3 oz. 12/13/54 6/30/55 
Red skin varieties: u.s. No. 2, 
l 7/8 in. or 3 oz. min. lfihite 
Rose or Netted Gem varieties: 
U.s. No. 2, 2 in. or 4 oz. min. 6/15/54 5/31/55 
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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS 
ECONOMIC PROBLEMS OF THE POTATO INDUSTRY 
The purposes of the thesis are first to summarize the produc-
tion, marketing and income problems of the potato producers, and secondly 
to examine some possible solutions to these problems. All available 
sources of information have been used to obtain data and expert opinion 
to make the summary of problems as complete as possible. Most of the 
importa~t concepts, institutions and methods advanced in the past as aids 
to farmers in solving their most important problems are discussed and 
evaluated. In addition, the author proposes an original plan of price 
protection for farmers designed to overcome the flaws in other schemes. 
The history and background of the potato are discussed begin-
ning with the discovery of the sweet potato Ipomoea Batatas by Columbus 
and the discovery of the Irish potato Solanum Tuberosum by other early 
Spanish explorers. It is the latter species with which this thesis is 
concerned.. Historical, economic and social determinants of importance 
to the potato industry are traced through the period of increasing con-
sumption, which roughly coincided with the rise of capitalism; and into 
the period of declining consumption which began around iorld ar I. 
Part II begins with a discussion of economic factors involved 
in such problems of production as Who should produce potatoes, what kind 
of potatoes to produce, and where production should take place. Price 
flQctuations, income and profits are related to each other as well as 
t o production and consumption. A great effort is made to show how 
improved product differentiation, grading, and standardization may 
affect the relatively inelastic demand for potatoes. In addition, 
the possibilities of demand creation are explored as a means of 
shifting the demand curve to maximize the industry's income. The 
conclusion is reached that potatoes .inust be promoted into a useful 
yet superior class of goods by developing higher quality standards 
and increased product services. Potatoes cannot remain as an 
inferior economic good if the industry is to know anything but 
decreasing usage, surplus production and low prices for years to 
come~ 
On the other hand, cost minimization is given emphasis as 
a major area of difficulty for the potato producer. Storage, trans-
portation, packaging, grading, and handling costs and trends are 
discussed. 
The third part of the thesis involves the various methods 
of solving farm problems. Measure for controlling production are 
developed and evaluated. Among the techniques of control discussed 
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are acreage allotments, marketing quotas~ and withdrawal of l and f rom 
production. These pl ans are discussed as general agricultural policies 
first; then related directly to the potato industry where evidence i s 
available. 
The various ways of aiding the farmer by manipulation of prices 
and practices at the marketing level of our economic system are the 
next area developed. Among the best know-n methods discussed are 
cormnodity loans, marketing orders, marketing agreements, marketing 
cooperatives, direct purchases by the government, and purchase 
agreements as well as consumer subsidies. Advantages and disadvan-
tages of each are weighed along with the description of the important 
features of each plan. So far as evidence is available, t he actual 
experiences of the potato industry with various techniques of farm 
aid are discussed. 
The last chapter in Part III is a discussion of parity 
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and other pricing and income devices to solve farm problems. Included 
among others are the parity scheme sponsored by George Peek, Brannan's 
plan, the forward price plan of Schultz, and the cost of production 
plan of Governor Thornton of Colorado. There is in addition an original 
cost of production plan devised by the author of the thesis. 
No one plan of agricultural aid can solve the many problems 
of the farmer. Cooperatives, marketing agreements, connnodity loans and 
other devices to help the farmer help himself must be accompanied by 
some sort of price protection plan. We advocate a price guarantee based 
on the individual farmer's cost of production. Each farmer would esti-
mate his cost of production using standal~d accounting procedures and 
submit a bid to a government authority to supply a given number of 
bushels of potatoes at a given cost before planting his crop. The 
government would accept the lowest cost bids until a volume of potatoes 
sufficient to satisfy estimated market requirements for the following 
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years was contracted for ~ No potatoes would be sold directly to the 
government but f armers whose cost bids were accepted would be protected 
against price declines 'Which fell below their individual cost of pro-
ductione Those whose cost of production estimates showed them to be 
inefficient would be discouraged from planting potatoes at all, first 
because they would know in advance their costs were too high, and 
secondly, because they would have no price protection. 
We advocate this plan because we believe that the far100r can-
not control production to maintain a high price level as industry does 
rrlth many of the products it sells the farmer. ~hile it would be 
unsatisfactory for the farmersto combine to maintain high prices by 
cutting production, •ve do want to give efficient farmers some price 
protection vmile they produce adequate quantities of essential foods 
and raw materials. Profits would not be guaranteed nor would a standard 
of living be protected as with parity plans. Each farmer would have to 
strive to be efficient to make a profi t and the necessity of controlling 
and computing costs for this plan would help farmers to be efficient .. 
Uo farmer would be paid a subsidy unless he sold his crop below the 
computed cost, so that no audit of farm accounts vrould be necessary 
unless a farmer applied for a subsidy. Such a plan would tend t o pro-
mote the constant adjustment of the factors of production to the most 
efficient proportions, the shift of production to the most efficient 
farms or areas, and the most efficient production and marketing practices. 
